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I 
THE PROBLEM OF 
METAPHORS OF MIND 
Early in the nineteenth century, Samuel Coleridge compiled an 
entertaining list of the dominant metaphors of mind used by psy- 
chological philosophers of the eighteenth century. Coleridge 
starts by applauding Aristotle7s position on the association prin- 
ciple, a position he praises as entirely "unmixed with fiction" in 
contrast to those descriptions offered by later writers. According 
to Coleridge, Aristotle spoke of "no successive particles propa- 
gating motion like billiard balls (as Hobbes;) nor of nervous or 
animal spirits, where inanimate and irrational solids are thawed 
down, and distilled, or filtrated by ascension, into living and in- 
telligent fluids, that etch and re-etch engravings on the brain, (as 
the followers of Des Cartes, and the humoral pathologists in gen- 
eral;) nor of an oscillating ether which was to effect the same 
service for the nerves of the brain considered as solid fibers, as 
the animal spirits performed for them under the notion of hollow 
tubes (as Hartley teaches)-nor finally, (with yet more recent 
dreamers) of chemical compositions by elective affinity, or of an 
electric light at once the immediate object and the ultimate organ 
of inward vision, which rises to the brain like an Aurora Borealis, 
and there disporting in various shapes (as the balance of plus and 
minus, or negative and positive, is destroyed or re-established) 
images out both past and present" (101). Coleridge praises Ar- 
istotle for delivering "a just theory without pretending to an 
hPothesziw and for excluding "place and motion from all the op- 
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erations of thought, whether representations or volitions, as at- 
tributes utterly and absurdly heterogeneous" (101-2). The hy- 
potheses of particles, spirits, ether, and so forth simply interfere 
with a clear presentation of the principle of association. 
Coleridge, his editors note, was wrong about the metaphors 
used by Hobbes and Hartley (Coleridge IOI nn 2, 3). Neverthe- 
less, the general problem of metaphorical speech applied to the 
human mind was significant and of long standing. Most of the 
psychological philosophers of the eighteenth and early nine- 
teenth centuries addressed the problem explicitly. Most urged ex- 
actly what Coleridge praises Aristotle for: excluding "place and 
motion" from the list of terms appropriate for describing the hu- 
man mind. Most held that the philosophy of mind should deal 
- - 
purely with the phenomena of the mind, unadorned by meta- 
phorical language. Especially to be avoided was metaphorical 
language derived from the workings of the human body or from 
Newtonian physics. 
The curious fact, and the starting point of my investigation, is 
that despite this wide agreement, these philosophers-as well as 
novelists, physiologists, authors of school texts on mental sci- 
ence-all persisted in using such metaphors as Coleridge de- 
scribes. How these metaphors were used and revised, and why, is 
a topic that scholars have dealt with only superficially, although 
they have used the phrase "metaphor of mind" frequently. There 
has been no extensive survey across several genres and several 
centuries to explore the function, development, and adequacy of 
the metaphors. In offering that survey I am well aware that the 
territory is terribly broad for one book, that my historical scope 
is limited, and that treating only English-language works reduces 
the opportunities for illuminating comparisons. Nevertheless, the 
period and works I discuss allow me to demonstrate one signifi- 
cant change in metaphors of mind and how they were used. The 
metaphor "mind-as-entity," which was shared by all writers on 
the mind, gave way to the metaphor "sentience-as-life," which 
was advocated by psychologists after the middle of the nine- 
teenth century, was implemented by the novelists at the same 
time, and finally began to be integrated into the language of psy- 
The Problem of Metaphor of Mind 3 
chological texts at the end of the century. My survey is thus a 
study of the search for a language of the mind in the midst of 
changing concepts of the mind. 
This discrepancy between the resolve to avoid metaphors and 
the reliance on them in practice manifests itself in the writings of 
Thomas Reid, an early and vigorous proponent of the psycho- 
logical language praised by Coleridge. In his first major book, An 
Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764), Reid praises Descartes for 
applying the method of reflection to the operations of the mind 
and for attempting to maintain the language of the mind when 
talking about the mind. Reid feels that this is a significant ad- 
vance over what he terms the "medieval" method of drawing 
analogies from sources other than the mind (259-60). Neverthe- 
less, there was a problem in Descartes7s method: he believed that 
although other faculties of his mind might deceive him, "his con- 
sciousness could not," and this belief tended to "spiritualize the 
body, and its qualities.'' The Cartesian does not take the existence 
of the body as a first principle but holds that the body and things 
external to the body can only be known through sensations (260- 
61). Descartes's new method of reflection led to such extreme 
positions as that of Berkeley, who held that not only the second- 
ary qualities of matter but also the primary qualities (for example 
extension and form) were "mere sensations of the mind." In 
Reid's view, the result of "reasoning upon the Cartesian prin- 
ciples" is that "matter was stripped of all its qualities; the new 
system, by a kind of metaphysical sublimation, converted all the 
qualities of matter into sensations, and spiritualized body, as the 
old had materialized spirit" (261). 
Reid proposes a middle way between the two extremes: "to 
take our notions of the qualities of body, from the testimony of 
our senses . . . and our notions of our sensations, from the testi- 
mony of consciousness" (261). This proposal, especially the 
point that we take "our notions of our sensations, from the testi- 
mony of consciousness," persists as a theme throughout the pe- 
riod I am considering; every psychological philosopher and 
every psychologist believed that such testimony exists and that it 
is trustworthy. Owen J. Flanagan calls this proposal the "Theszi of 
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the Autonomy of Psychological Explananon (Autonomy Thesk, for 
short), the thesis that the science of the mind should proceed to 
frame its laws and principles in terms of its own specialized vo- 
cabulary without trying to force translations into the vocabulary 
of any already existing natural science" (60). Flanagan7s term is 
a useful label for this major tenet of eighteenth-and nineteenth- 
century psychology and psychological philosophy. 
The autonomy thesis in its early form may be regarded as the 
first attempt to specify a unique subject matter and methodology 
for the study of the mind. It was a forerunner of the attempt by 
nineteenth-century psychologists to establish psychology as a 
unique and scientific discipline. The metaphorical language used 
to talk about the mind was regarded as necessarily primitive; it 
had originated early in the linguistic history of humankind and 
had not developed. Reid could refer to a number of credible 
expressions of this belief. Locke, for example, traced the lan- 
guage of these "ideas that come not under the cognizance of our 
senses" to the same source as all other words which stand for 
intangibles: 
I doubt not, but if we could trace [these ideas] to their sources, we 
should find in all languages, the names, which stand for Things that fall 
not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible Ideas. . . . 
to give Names, that might make known to others any Operations they 
felt in themselves, or any other Ideas, that came not under their Senses, 
["the first Beginners of Language"] were fain to borrow Words from 
ordinary known ideas of Sensation, by that means to make others the 
more easily to conceive those Operations they experimented [sic] in 
themselves, which made no outward sensible appearances . . . [403] 
Locke went on to remind his readers that there exist "no Ideas at 
all, but what originally come either from sensible Objects with- 
out, or what wefee( within ourselw, )om the inward firkings of our 
own Spirits, which we are conscious to our selves of within" (404, em- 
phasis added). Although the words used to describe "the origi- 
nals and principles" of human knowledge have been suggested 
by nature, the concepts themselves come from within. 
This historical account was congenial to Locke7s sensationalist 
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epistemology, but Reid finds it lacking. Insofar as nature is a 
good teacher, the analogy between tangible things and intangible 
concepts should pose no problems. But as he states, nature con- 
tributes more to the formation of the mind than to formation of 
knowledge about the mind. "The way of reflection," which Reid 
calls the "only way that leads to truth," is exceedingly difficult to 
carry out because we usually attend to external objects (hguiry 
252). Since few people are capable of or practiced in "attentive 
reflection" on mental operations, "the way of analogyn becomes 
an easy but inadequate substitute (254). Reflection is difficult, 
and thinking in terms of externals comes naturally; thus it is not 
surprising that the mind has usually been conceived of as "some 
subtile matter" and that the "objects of thought are said to be in 
the mind, to be cipprehended, comprehended, conceived, imagined, re- 
tained, weighed, ruminated" (2 5 5). 
The main problem, Reid insists, is not using metaphorical or 
analogical language but elevating the analogical method above 
the method of reflection. Metaphors cannot be avoided. In his 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, first published in 1785, 
Reid notes once again that it is strictly impossible to "explain by 
a logical definition" the powers and operations of the mind (4); 
the sole arbiter must therefore be the way words are used, since 
usage will reflect the common-sense understanding of our intel- 
lectual powers and will also reflect what nature has taught us 
concerning these powers. Because of common sense we "attrib- 
ute to one internal principle" all activities such as seeing, delib- 
erating, loving ( 5 ) .  It is equally a matter of common sense to 
distinguish between "things in the mind, and things external." 
But here usage must be carefully controlled. Reid points out that 
the distinction "is not meant to signify the place of the things we 
speak of, but their subject" (8). Perhaps the most important fac- 
tor in our understanding of our minds, as reflected in language, is 
the analogy between sentence structure and mental structure: 
"the operations of the mind, which are expressed by active verbs, 
the mind itself, which is the nominative to those verbs, and the 
object" which the verbs govern (14). This structure is common 
to all languages, Reid believes, hence it must be regarded as very 
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likely having a "foundation in nature" (14). Reid's juxtaposition 
of the study of language and the study of mind is typical of his 
era, and the analogy can be found back into the seventeenth cen- 
tury (Aarsleff, Cohen). But Reid warns that even such an obvious 
and compelling analogy as that between mind and language 
should not be accepted uncritically but should be tested. For in- 
stance, we tend to assume that when we think of something our 
minds contain an image of it, an image that either is being or has 
earlier been impressed; we do this because in every moment of our 
waking lives our experience is that bodies affect one another 
(6 only by contact and pressure" ( 5  I). Reflection, however, will 
show us the absurdity of this assumption. We simply cannot find 
such physical images in our minds. Reid ends his discussion of 
analogy with a caution: we must be careful not to "be imposed 
upon by those analogical terms and phrases, by which the oper- 
ations of the mind are expressed in all languages," especially 
those "drawn from some supposed similitude of body to mind" 
(52).  Or, more succinctly, our explanations of mental phenomena 
must preserve the autonomy thesis. 
Nevertheless, in spite of these cautions, in spite of his decades- 
long elaboration of the problems that can result from analogies 
of mind based on physics or biology, Reid frequently resorts to 
just such terms and phrases. His solution to the Cartesian split, 
for example, runs directly counter to the autonomy thesis. Reid 
claims that "the testimony of common sense" leads him to be- 
lieve that his "mind is a substance, that is, a permanent subject 
of thought," and his reason holds that this substance is "unex- 
tended and indivisible" and hence cannot contain anything re- 
sembling extension (Inquiry 270). Why would a philosopher so 
concerned with accurate language take the curious step of defin- 
ing mind as "substance" and then denying that term the qualities 
associated with it by ordinary usage-extension and divisibility? 
One reason is that Reid's goal here is to refute the Berkeleian 
position as he understands it, that the qualities of matter are in- 
accessible to mind. Reid postulates an unextended and indivisible 
mental substance to explain how we can think about physical 
entities, without having tangible images of them in the mind, just 
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as well as we can think about spirits (271). A mental substance 
as Reid describes it can contain intangi6le images of physical bod- 
ies. As I will show in Chapter 3, the implicit assumption here, 
that a mind must contain some representation of external reality, 
is a subtle but important result of the influence of the mind-as- 
entity metaphor. 
The attractiveness, in fact the inescapability, of the mind-as- 
entity metaphor is especially visible in Reid's discussion of men- 
tal processes, for example from Essays on the Intellectual Powers of 
Man, essay 4, chapter 4, "Of the Train of Thought in the Mind." 
He begins, "Every man is conscious of a succession of thoughts 
which pass in his mind while he is awake, even when they are 
not excited by external objects"; this succession is a function of 
<< the constitution of the mind itself," which generates "a constant 
ebullition of thought, a constant intestine motion" (436). The 
succession, Reid notes, has been called many things but is most 
often called "the train of ideas," of which there are two types: 
those that "flow spontaneously, like water from a fountain," and 
those that "are regulated and directed by an active effort of the 
mind, with some view and intention" (437). The language here 
is perfectly in keeping with the assumed relationship between 
mind, thought, and external world: the mind has both active and 
passive modes, and in the active mode it can either direct the flow 
of thoughts, the train of ideas, or let them "flow spontaneously." 
Although the autonomy thesis calls into question the common 
usage "train of ideas," Reid uncritically adopts it as a full and 
accurate description of what is to be found in the mind. 
When Reid describes some of these trains in detail, the lan- 
guage of the mind-as-entity metaphor becomes even more prev- 
alent and questionable. He suggests for instance that the mind is 
divided into two separate areas, the heart and the imagination: 
"Whatever possesses the heart makes occasional excursions into 
the imagination, and acts such scenes upon that theatre as are 
agreeable to the prevailing passion" (443). He suggests that both 
the mind and its thoughts are tangible, as in his description of 
the progress of a child's mind: "As children grow up, they are 
delighted with tales. . . . every thing of this kind stores the fancy 
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with a new regular train of thought, which becomes familiar by 
repetition, so that one part draws the whole after it in the imagi- 
nation. [The child's exercise of invention] gives rise to innumer- 
able new associations, and regular trains of thought, which make 
the deeper impression upon the mind, as they are its exclusive 
propertyv (447-48). Just like a piece of clay, the child's mind can 
take impressions; thoughts are the impressing agents. The same is 
true of the adult's mind. When a mature adult is speaking extem- 
poraneously and fluently, Reid says, the thoughts must be run- 
ning "in a beaten track. There is a mould in his mind . . . [and] 
his discourse falls into this mould with ease, and takes its form 
from it" (452). 
The figurative language of these passages directly contradicts 
the autonomy thesis and seems also to contradict Reid's descrip- 
tion of the mind as an unextended and indivisible substance. The 
language presents the mind as an extended substance, capable of 
being filled (that is, having dimensions) and as divisible into seg- 
ments, areas, or compartments. Although Reid's caution about 
the problem of "analogical terms and phrases" is several hundred 
pages earlier in the book, readers might reasonably expect him 
to abide by it here. At the very least we might expect Reid to use 
similes rather than metaphors to illustrate mental processes, so 
as not to imply that the mind really is an extended, divisible 
substance. We must suspect that for Reid the metaphor repre- 
sents and constitutes the actuality, that mind can literally be de- 
scribed as having tracks or moulds. Reid's stated position, as elu- 
cidated by Peter Heath, is close to our modern position: "that the 
mind has dispositions and capacities, which extend, among other 
things, to the learning, use and manipulation of general words, 
and that our possession of general conceptions consists, there- 
fore, simply in the exercise of these capacities, not in the discov- 
ery, acquisition, and storage of mental or transcendental furni- 
ture" (228). But his metaphorical statements indicate that Reid's 
own habits of thought about mental processes assume a material 
mind. 
The contradiction between Reid's formulation of the structure 
of the mind as an indbhible and unextended substance, on the one 
The Pro6lem of Metaphors of Mind 9 
hand, and his unselfconscious use of figurative language connot- 
ing a divisible and extended mind, on the other, is typical of the 
English empirical tradition during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
A century before Reid, Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan de- 
scribed the main use of speech as "to transferre our Mentall Dis- 
course, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne 
of words." Yet in the same passage his metaphor "Trayne of our 
Thoughts," Hobbes observes that a common abuse of language 
is to use "words metaphorically: that is, in other senses than that 
they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others" (101-2). He 
goes on to say that such metaphorical speech, like any other use 
of language which departs from the actual "ordained" nature of 
things, "can never be true grounds for any ratiocination" (109- 
10). Clearly, for Hobbes as for Reid, "trains of thought" are im- 
portant components of the human mind, autonomy thesis or no. 
In fact Hobbes is the source of a definitive illustration of the use 
of "trains of thought" to analyze apparently random mental 
leaps. He writes that in a particular conversation, one man's sud- 
den question of the value of a Roman denarius puzzled him until 
he realized that "the original subject of discourse naturally intro- 
duced the history of the king, and of the treachery of those who 
surrendered his person to his enemies; this again introduced the 
treachery of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of money which he re- 
ceived for his reward," hence the question of the value of that 
reward. (This illustration is related by Dugald Stewart, Elements 
2: 121, and quoted as late as 1890 by William James, Principles 
540.1 
Half a century after Reid, Thomas Brown declared that the 
language of the mind was inadequate because the prevalent 
physicalistic metaphors drew attention not to mental phenom- 
ena, as would be proper, but to mental faculties. In his Sketch of a 
System of the Philosophy of the  Human Mind (1820)~ Brown pro- 
poses to look directly at "the simple sequences of the Phenom- 
ena of the Mind, the relations of which to each other or to certain 
bodily changes, are all which those words, can be justly em- 
ployed to denote" (x). He suggests that all mental phenomena be 
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regarded "simply as states of the mind," which is the most reason- 
able approach because "from the beginning of life to its close the 
mind has existed, and is known to us only as thus existing, in 
various states of changeful feeling" (xi). 
Thus, he insists, "it is in our power to philosophize on these 
changes of mental state, as we philosophize on any of the 
changeful phenomena of the material world which they indirectly 
indicate to us" (xii). Applying the autonomy thesis in this way- 
looking strictly at states of mind-will result in the science 
Brown calls "mental physiology"; this is where analogy enters 
his system. He begins the first chapter of his Sketch by asserting, 
( 6  There is a PHYSIOLOGY OF THE MIND, then as there is aphysiology 
of the body,-a science, which examines the phenomena of our 
spiritual part simply as phenomena, and, from the order of their 
succession, or other circumstances of analogy, arranges them in 
classes under certain general names" (2). In Brown's opinion, the 
mind can be studied with the same methods used in the study of 
the phenomena of the material world, especially close observa- 
tion and classification, guided by that fundamental concept 
( 6  change of state." As Brown points out, the "mental physiolo- 
gist" is to be guided by what he calls "circumstances of analogy." 
In thus describing his program, Brown rigorously preserves a 
mentalistic view. But like Reid and Hobbes, he uses language that 
implies the mind to be a relatively passive and simply structured 
entity, and he allows the "circumstances of analogy" to be deter- 
mined by the physicalistic view. 
The resulting violation of the autonomy thesis can be seen in 
lecture 10, "On the Laws of Physical Inquiry in Relation to the 
Study of Mind," in his Lectures on the Philosophy $the Human Mind 
(1820). Brown insists that the method of analysis-breaking 
down a complex phenomenon into parts-is the only way to 
make discoveries in the science of the mind (100). The subject of 
this analysis is not parts of "affections," since the mind's affec- 
tions "must be always sikple and ind;Yisi6le," but the various states 
of mind that have led up to the affections being analyzed. For 
Brown, this kind of inquiry is a fundamental human activity: it is 
the "very nature" of the inquiring mind to "decompose" affec- 
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tions that seem to result from combinations of previous states 
(101). For the mental scientist, analysis "is founded wholly on 
the feeling of relation which one state of mind seems to us to 
bear to other states of mind, as comprehensive of them; but while 
this seeming complexity is felt, it is the same thing to our analy- 
sis, as if the complexity, instead of being virtual and relative only, 
were absolute and real" (102). 
Brown goes on to point out that there can be no terms to 
describe these processes other than those derived from the ma- 
terial world; we feel as if our mental affections "could be actually 
divided into the separate elements which appear to us thus vir- 
tually or relatively to be comprehended in them" even though we 
know at the same time they are indivisible, simple states of the 
mental entity (102). It is in this sense that Brown speaks of a 
"chemistry of the mind." Like a chemical compound, a mental af- 
fection may seem to have radically different properties from each 
of its constituents, and it can be traced to these constituents only 
through careful reflection (103). 
By explaining his program so clearly in language that is ex- 
plicitly physicalistic, Brown at first appears to meet the meta- 
phorical problem squarely. He does not ask us, as does Reid, to 
strip a common term of its connotations-to conceive of mind as 
an insubstantial substance. Rather, he would have us adopt the 
method of physiology or chemistry while keeping always aware 
that the complexity of the phenomenon being investigated is 
only "virtual and relative.'' The problem with this kind of ap- 
proach, as Robert Cummins points out in his study of psycholog- 
ical explanation, is that it can at best be termed morphological 
analysis (126): the approach is self-consistent but has little con- 
nection with actual mental events. Brown's approach depends on 
the concept "mental state," but as Coleridge tellingly observes, 
"What is a thought? What are its circumscriptions, what the in- 
terspaces between it and another? When does it begin? Where 
end?" Coleridge continues, "How opposite to nature and the fact 
to talk of the 'one moment' of Hume, of our whole being an 
aggregate of successive single sensations! Who ever felt a single 
sensation? . . . And what is a moment? Succession with inter- 
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space? Absurdity! It is evidently only the licht-pnct in the indivi- 
sible undivided duration" (in Richards, Colenn&e 68). Coleridge's 
point is clear. &the mind were an entity of the kind implied by 
the figurative language of these psychological philosophers, 
mental physiology could make methodological sense. But they 
insist it is not such an entity. 
The twentieth-century reader may wonder why these writers 
create the ~ rob lem for themselves of using physicalistic meta- 
phors while condemning such use. One explanation has to do 
with the role played by the mind-as-entity metaphor, as I will 
explain in Chapters 2 and 3. A second explanation is that the 
study of mind especially before the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury was an intensely moral endeavor, its primary goal being to 
understand human nature in order to further moral behavior. If 
Reid or Brown had been forced to choose between defending the 
study of mind as a science (or a proto-science) and defending 
it as a moral discipline, he would have chosen the latter. While 
the physicalistic approach serves the scientific cause, an anti- 
metaphor stance serves the moral cause. These philosophers be- 
lieved that using metaphors can actually lead to amorality. In 
treating the mind as functioning in the same way physical entities 
function, the moral scientist is separated from reality: he believes 
he is dealing with realities when he is actually dealing only with 
abstract ideas to which he has given names. 
This methodological error can have a moral as well as a theo- 
retical result. As Berkeley points out in his Treatbe Concerning the 
Pnnckles of Human Knowledge (1710)~ to think of the mind as a 
"ball in motion" and of the will as "the motion of the soul" leads 
to the erroneous moral position of viewing mind as having to go 
where it is struck (236). Such a position denies free will. In keep- 
ing with his desire to defend the mind's freedom, Berkeley uses 
language in which the human mind is active in perception and 
reflection. The mind can "consider," "observe," "single out," 
"make" and "frame" ideas: "This perceiving, active being is 
what I call mind, spin), soul, or myself: By which words I do not 
denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from 
them, wherein they enit, or, which is the same thing, whereby they 
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are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in being per- 
ceived" (178). Yet Berkeley's moral program does not preserve 
him from elsewhere figuring forth the mind as a passive entity. 
He accepts the common view that the senses are ikprinted with 
sensations, which then exist "in a mind perceiving them" (179). 
Berkeley denies the existence of matter as defined by philoso- 
phers (that which has extension and substance and exists inde- 
pendently of our perception of it), but the language he uses when 
discussing the human mind connotes just these qualities-sub- 
stance (because the mind can be imprinted) and extension (be- 
cause ideas exist within it). 
This is not to say that the mind-as-entity concept implied by 
Berkeley's language represents a problem for him. Quite the con- 
trary: his is a universe which contains only minds, the minds of 
human beings and then the mind of the supreme being who has 
established a set of laws or procedures by which the ideas of 
external nature are imprinted on human minds. Those ideas im- 
printed by Him are "real things or ideas," and all others are "chi- 
meras" (189-90). Extension and substance can exist nowhere but 
in the human mind or in the mind of God; in fact one of the 
essential differences between the human and the divine condi- 
tions is that "the supreme spirit, which excites those ideas in our 
minds, is not marked out and limited to our view b y  anyparticular 
collection of  sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, com- 
plexion, limbs, and motions" (199). 
As Daniel Robinson points out, Berkeley is not properly la- 
beled a "subjective idea1ist17 His system has a specific "court of 
last recourse," the "Spirit wherein all reality" resides. It is a co- 
herent, self-consistent system which places all philosophical 
problems, especially epistemology, within a psychological con- 
text (Robinson, IntellectualHitory 2 I 9-2 I). Berkeley does believe 
that a certain kind of knowledge is available to human beings: 
knowledge of one's mental operations. The thoughtful person 
can defend himself from "being imposed on by wordF" by seeking 
"to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider," ideas 
which can be regarded in a "naked, undisguised" state (176-77). 
In the words of another eminent historian of psychology, Berke- 
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ley is as much of an empiricist as Locke: "In the empiricism of 
Berkeley, mind generates matter. We must substitute for a theory 
of knowledge about objects a psychological description of ob- 
jects; and it is plain that these objective ideas are formed through 
experienceR (Boring 184). Even with mind generating matter, the 
mind-as-entity metaphor remains the predominant element in 
Berkeley7s language. Human minds are the only dings in the 
world, the only entities of which we have first-hand knowledge; 
these things, as that term is commonly understood, have the only 
extension and substance we can know anything about. 
I show in later chapters that even the empiricists who most 
strenuously attempt to be objective, such as Brown and, later, the 
physiological psychologists Carpenter and Bain, share this 
stance with Berkeley. All of these writers agree that although we 
dispute the boundary or interconnection between the mind and 
the material world, and although we can scarcely obtain unam- 
biguous knowledge about existence outside the mind, we can in 
principle view the mind dispassionately with some hope of 
understanding it. This agreement extends beyond the theoretical 
statements to the figurative language. The metaphor mind-as- 
entity is equally common in those writers traditionally labeled 
idealists and those labeled empiricists. 
According to one of the most often read and recommended 
"mental scientists" of the first half of the nineteenth century, Du- 
gald Stewart, understanding the mind depends on directly con- 
fronting the problem of metaphorical language applied to the 
mind. The system of analogical language used to talk about mind 
is complicated because the actual "communication between Mind 
and Matter" is incomprehensible (Elements 2: 91). Hypotheses of 
perception themselves, according to Stewart, have been charac- 
terized by a contradiction: casting the hypotheses and phenom- 
ena in "general maxims of philosophizing, borrowed from phys- 
ics" while asserting the idea of the soul's immateriality: "To the 
former of these circumstances is to be ascribed the general prin- 
ciple upon which all the known theories of perception proceed; 
that, in order to explain the intercourse between the mind and 
distant objects, it is necessary to suppose the existence of some- 
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thing intermediate, by which its perceptions are produced; to the 
latter, the various metaphorical expressions of ideas, species,fonns, 
shadows, phantasms, images, which, while they amused the fancy 
with some remote analogies to the objects of our senses, did not 
directly revolt our reason, by presenting to us any of the tangible 
qualities of body" ( ~ 9 3 ) .  
Analogical language cannot be avoided in such a situation. 
What the mental scientist can do, Stewart says, is to vary his 
metaphors and thus "accustom himself to view the phenomena 
of thought in that naked and undisguised state in which they 
unveil themselves to the powers of consciousness and reflection" 
( 3 : 3  I 5-16). The suggestion that one should consciously manip- 
ulate one's metaphors shows an unusual sensitivity to the role 
played by metaphor in forming concepts; the variation can func- 
tion as a powerful exploratory heuristic. But the claim that the 
variation allows one to view one's mental phenomena in their 
"naked and undisguised state" appears naive. Does Stewart 
really mean that metaphorical language can be transcended even 
when it cannot be discarded? Probably he does; his language 
implies that elements of thought, including metaphors, are lim- 
ited and discrete and hence can be objectively scrutinized by the 
mind's eye. Stewart's solution draws directly on the mind-as-en- 
tity metaphor. 
The problem then in Reid, Berkeley, Locke, Brown, and Stew- 
art is that they intrude the metaphor of mind-as-entity even into 
warnings about such language. The problem extends beyond 
these eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century philosophers, and 
beyond mind-as-entity as well. In general, the problem results 
from a tension between the drive to develop a non-metaphorical 
language of the mind and the intrinsically metaphorical nature of 
all such language. Such a problem is clearly insoluble, and once 
identified it does not require much additional explication. The 
autonomy thesis may be unrealizable in practice. The more inter- 
esting phenomenon, the one I focus on for most of this book, is 
the emergence of new metaphors as other kinds of mental expe- 
rience came under scrutiny and became more important. 
Literary historians have long agreed that throughout the eigh- 
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teenth and nineteenth centuries interest in character increased 
and that psychological validity became more important, as for 
example in the Gothic writers. (See Hart.) Nineteenth-century 
novelists were more concerned than their predecessors with 
"verisimilitude of feeling" and less with "verisimilitude of ac- 
tion" (Gose 17); they wished to depict how the external world 
(6 impinged with its specific gravity, its full concreteness, on con- 
sciousness" (Alter 87). These phenomena have been fully stud- 
ied, albeit more impressionistically than empirically. The fic- 
tional exploration of personality and identity has been the subject 
of perceptive studies (as for example those of Chase and Lang- 
baum). The use of the language of the new experimental sciences 
and of association psychology by individual literary figures has 
also been treated at book length. (See for example Wimsatt7s ad- 
mirable study of Samuel Johnson, Philosophic Tor&, and Cald- 
well's of Keats.) Coleridge as a representative Romantic has been 
the object of a case study of the metaphorical uses of "inner 
senses" (Lyon). This list could be multiplied tenfold. Neverthe- 
less, some essential work remains to be done. Literary historians 
(and for that matter historians of psychology) have yet to analyze 
how the actual language used to talk about mind changed during 
these two centuries and how the changes correlate with changes 
in the concept of mind. This is the  gap-^ am working to fill. - 
One of my findings is that the language did not develop at the 
same rate in fiction and in psychology; new metaphors are quite 
visible in novels by the middle of the nineteenth century but do 
not emerge in psychological works until later. A further impor- 
tant conclusion is that while the concept of mind may seem to 
have changed dramatically, the new metaphors still relied on 
comparisons with aspects of the physical world. They more ade- 
quately answered Reid's call for a mentalistic language of the 
mind but did not-in fact, could not-entirely replace the phys- 
icalistic approach. 
In the following chapters I describe my conclusions. Chapter 
2 explains how I use current theories of metaphor and defines 
several terms that are useful in analyzing the various relation- 
ships between metaphors and the concepts that the metaphors 
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are intended to represent. I show that metaphors of mind are of 
particular interest precisely because it is impossible to arrive at a 
language of the mind of the sort desired by Reid and Brown. I go 
on to illustrate the prevalence of mind-as-entity during the eigh- 
teenth and into the nineteenth centuries (Chapter 3 ) ,  the continu- 
ing use by nineteenth-century psychology of the mind-as-entity 
metaphor despite theoretical developments that should have 
made the metaphor less tenable (Chapter 4), the attempts of 
Charles Dickens and Charlotte Bronte to extend the mind-as- 
entity metaphor (Chapter 5 ) ,  and the specific techniques devel- 
oped by Henry James and George Eliot to represent mental ex- 
periences that had not been of great interest earlier (Chapter 6) .  
I conclude with a brief comparison of the metaphorical language 
of William James' Pnnckles of Psychology (1890) with the meta- 
phors from these earlier writers. I show that the later psycholo- 
gists and novelists wanted to represent the life of the mind in 
functional interaction with the surrounding web of impressions 
and relationships, that this desire departed significantly from the 
practice of the novelists and psychologists whose primary con- 
cept was of the mind as an entity, and that the later novelists were 
more successful than the psychologists in implementing the 
newer goal. 
Let me say a word about my own position with respect to 
metaphors and mind. Writing this book has led me to three fun- 
damental points. First, as I. A. Fbchards pointed out half a cen- 
tury ago, "we cannot get through three sentences of ordinary 
fluid discourse" without metaphor (Philosophy of Rhetoric 92). I 
agree. I have tried to keep my own metaphors to a minimum, but 
where striving for relatively non-metaphorical expressions 
would have involved me in impossible linguistic contortions, I 
have used metaphors without apology. Second, I have remained 
as skeptical as possible about the actual existence of such a thing 
as "the mind.'' Whenever I use "the mind," "a thought," and sim- 
ilar locutions, I do not mean to imply that 1 believe there really 
are existents attached to the words. This skepticism goes hand in 
hand with my contention in Chapter 2 that no literal representa- 
tion of the human mind as experienced is possible. I say skepticism; 
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I do not mean to go as far as Gilbert Ryle (and others who follow 
his lead) and hold that the "official doctrine" of two separate 
substances, Mind and Body, enshrines a glaringly obvious "cate- 
gory mistake.,' Since "a person's thinking, feeling, and purposive 
doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of physics, chem- 
istry and physiology, therefore they must be described in coun- 
terpart idioms," the result being, according to Ryle, a theory of a 
(mental) "ghost in the (bodily) machine" (18). Ryle7s position is 
theoretically solid but of limited practical use, because we never- 
theless continue to behave, verbally, as if most representations of 
mental activity are literally true. This third point I also deal with 
in Chapter 2. 
There is a term that I must mention because it is not appro- 
priate to my work. I fear that most people, when they see the 
words "literature" and "psychology" together in a title, will 
think of "literary psychology." I ask them not to. Leon Edel de- 
fines this term in his collection S n f o f  Sleep andDreams. For Edel, 
literary psychology relies on the basic postulates of psycho- 
analysis: that an unconscious exists, that it contains "certain sup- 
pressed feelings and states of being," and that the literary psy- 
chologist can detect these feelings and states, as they influence 
"deeper intentions and meanings" in the work, by studying the 
author's choices (33). I avoid the large body of literary- 
psychological analysis for two reasons. First, my skepticism 
about the existence of "the mind" extends to such constructs as 
cc the unconscious.77 Second, pre-Freudian psychology will never 
be well understood in either its theoretical manifestations (psy- 
chology texts) or its literary manifestations until it is approached 
without Freudian conceptual and terminological baggage. In- 
deed, the common term "the unconscious" has a totally different 
meaning for major psychologists of the nineteenth century like 
Bain and Lewes. 
If a descriptive term were needed, Hugh Richmond's "histori- 
cal psychology" would be more appropriate. I have aimed at a 
c< comprehensive humanistic study" whose goal is to illustrate the 
(6 inevitable interaction between art and society"; I study the 
<c evolution of human sensibility and mental processes in ways 
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also analogous to and largely including such more selective dis- 
ciplines as the History of Science, or even the History of Ideas" 
(209). But a label such as "historical psychology" is not neces- 
sary for my study, and I have tried to keep terminology to a 
minimum and give as much space as possible to discussing met- 
aphorical passages. The terms I use to describe how metaphors 
function are defined as they occur, mostly in Chapter 2. 
Two more terms deserve comment here: "metaphor" and 
"psychology." The best definition of "metaphor" I know is from 
Janet Soskice, whose Metaphor andReligious Language has helped 
me clarify my own goals, methods, and scope; we both deal with 
metaphorical representations of that which most people agree 
cannot be expressed literally. Soskice defines metaphor as "that 
figure of speech whereby we speak about one thing in terms 
which are seen to be suggestive of another" (15); this definition 
leads to the conclusion that "the minimal unit in which a meta- 
phor is established is semantic rather than syntactic" (23). When 
I use "metaphor" I mean it in this sense; occasionally I further 
specify, for example "theory-constitutive metaphor" and "gen- 
erative metaphor" (both defined in Chapter 2). I also use Rich- 
ards' terms "tenor," "vehicle," and "ground," with the meanings 
he gave them: "tenor" is "the underlying idea or principle subject 
which the vehicle or figure means," and "ground7' comprises "the 
common characteristics7' shared by the tenor and the vehicle 
(Phihophy 96, I 17). Theorists of metaphor have serious doubts 
about these terms, especially the word "means" in the definition 
of "tenor," but the terms remain useful if we keep in mind Rich- 
ards' own qualifications. He pointed out that we often cannot 
specify the "ground" of a metaphor and that "the relative posi- 
tions of tenor and vehicle" may shift back and forth in an ex- 
tended metaphor ( I  17, 121); not all of his critics give him credit 
for this and other subtleties. 
Although in this opening chapter I have used the term "psy- 
chological philosopher," I will now drop this awkward locution 
and simply use "psychologist" and "psychology." The eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries had a variety of terms for the 
study of the human mind and behavior: "moral philosophy," 
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(6 mental philosophy," "mental science," and of course Brown's 
"mental physiology," to name a few. All of these dealt with the 
same subject matter, shared many of the same illustrative ex- 
amples, referred to the same predecessors, criticized the same 
errors. The books with these terms in their titles served the same 
purposes as our century's "Freudianism," "behavioral psychol- 
ogy," and the like; they constituted the psychology of the time. 
William Carpenter is generally known as a nineteenth-century 
physiologist, David Hume as an eighteenth-century philosopher. 
But when either was writing about knowledge, behavior, percep- 
tion, or beliefs, he was writingpsychology. As with these two, so 
with the rest of the non-fiction writers I discuss: in the context of 
a study of metaphors of the mind, they are properly referred to 
as psychologists. 
I I 
METAPHOR THEORY AND 
METAPHORS OF MIND 
Metaphor theory has been a scene of extensive activity in the past 
two decades. Today we can say that the field not only has been 
discovered but finally is being properly explored; in Wayne 
Booth's apt metaphor, "students of metaphor have positively pul- 
lulated" (49). After centuries of neglect, regarded at best as or- 
namental to the main business of conveying information about 
tangible realities, metaphor is now recognized as one of the most 
challenging aspects of language. In particular, "the problem of 
metaphor" comprises a number of questions. Max Black has 
listed the most central of them: 
I .  How do we recognize a case of metaphor? 
2. Are there any criteria for the detection of metaphors? 
3. Can metaphors be translated into literal expressions? 
4. Is metaphor properly regarded as a decoration upon "plain sense"? 
5. What are the relations between metaphor and simile? 
6. In what sense, if any, is a metaphor "creative"? 
7. What is the point of using a metaphor? 
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The problem of "metaphors of mind" is fortunately not so com- 
plex because, except for facts about the structure and function of 
the nervous system and the sensory apparatus, nothing having to 
do with the mind can be described literally. 
Paul Churchland contends that this state of affairs is not un- 
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changeable, that "the genuine arrival of a materialist kinematics 
and dynamics for psychological states and cognitive processes 
will constitute . . . a dawning in which" our "inner life" is finally 
- 
revealed in its intricacy, "even, if we apply ourselves, in self- 
conscious introspection" (160). At present, however, the physical 
foundation of mental events can barely be described and under- 
stood by neurophysiologists. All but Black's first, second, and 
final questions vanish, and these can be answered thus: we can 
never use anything but metaphor to talk about mind, and we 
automatically treat all descriptions of mental processes as meta- 
phorical. In this chapter I consider the implications of these state- 
ments in light of recent trends in the theory of metaphor, show- 
ing, first, that the deviance theory of metaphor is not tenable, 
- 
and second, that written descriptions of mental processes consti- 
tute a genre that calls up particular expectations in readers. I then 
briefly discuss several possible relationships between metaphors 
of mind, concepts of mind, and the formation of psychological 
theory, and outline the various roles played by the metaphor 
mind-as-entity during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The ContextualApproach in Current Metaphor Theory 
In response to the first statement, it might seem more appro- 
priate to say that the language of mind is literal, since this lan- 
guage consists almost solely of dead metaphors, which presum- 
ably have lost their metaphorical vitality. Usage has established 
that in an expression like "my thoughts were all in a whirl," 
thoughts can be caught in a vortex as easily as can dust particles 
in a whirlwind; a literal reading of the expression might therefore 
seem more reasonable than a metaphorical reading. This position 
receives some support from Donald Davidson. Discussing the 
dead metaphor "mouth of a bottle," he writes: "Once one has the 
present use of the word [mouth], with literal application to 
bottles, there is nothing left to notice. There is no similarity to 
seek ["between animal and bottle openings"] because it consists 
simply in being referred to by the same word" (37). That is, the 
one-time metaphorical expression has become literal by becom- 
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ing established usage. Davidson7s argument, however, does not 
take into account the longevity of dead metaphors. John Searle, 
in suitably metaphorical language, stresses this fact: "Dead met- 
aphors have lived on. They have become dead through continued 
use, but their continual use is a clue that they satisfy some se- 
mantic need" (255). Given a "semantic need" to designate the 
place where a river empties into another body of water, it is pos- 
sible to find relatively non-metaphorical expressions to do the 
job, for example "the place where a river empties into another 
body of water7, rather than "river's mouth," another of David- 
son's examples. 
The problem arises in attempting to extend this argument 
to metaphors of the mind. There is no equivalently non- 
metaphorical or minimally metaphorical expression for "my 
thoughts were all in a whirl," and there would be a semantic gap 
if this expression were stricken from our language. Further, any 
such gap in our psychological language would be significant, be- 
cause describing the mind and explaining its processes has been 
regarded as one of the most important human endeavors during 
the past several centuries. As shown by Michael Smith, Howard 
Pollio, and Marian Pitts, who surveyed works written in Ameri- 
can English from 1675 to 1975, novel metaphors most frequently 
occurred in discussions of psychological processes (922-23). Fur- 
ther, "psychological processes" was the least often used meta- 
phorical vehicle, indicating that, unlike the often used categories 
of "body7' and "nature," this area of human experience was not 
well enough understood to use to explain other areas (928). Thus 
Smith, Pollio, and Pitts interpret their results as supporting Sper- 
ber's Law, that an era's dominant concerns are reflected in its 
metaphors, the concerns becoming, in Sperber7s words, "centers 
of metaphoric attraction" (91 2-1 3). 
Smith, Pollio, and Pitts look only at novel metaphors in well- 
known texts. Their conclusions apply equally well to putatively 
dead metaphors used in discourse about the mind. Such meta- 
phors are actually not dead, as can be seen by trying to give an 
adequate literal paraphrase. For example, "My thoughts were in 
a whirl" is not simply another way of saying "I was confused." 
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The sentence expresses an extreme state of confusion character- 
ized by a too-rapid procession of thoughts. Nor is it simply an- 
other way of saying "I was extremely confused; it was as if my 
thoughts were following one another too rapidly." An "as if" 
statement differs noticeably from an identity statement. More- 
over, even this purported literal statement contains a metaphor, 
thoughts "following one another." We might then try a further 
refinement to replace that metaphor, perhaps "rapid succession 
of mental states." But what is a mental state, and who can say 
when one ends and another begins, a discrimination necessary if 
we really intend to talk about "states"? 
The point is that each attempt at a literal paraphrase moves 
further from the subjective assertion embodied briefly and vividly 
in the original expression: "my thoughts were in a whirl.?' Thus 
even this seemingly dead, literal expression has to be regarded as 
a metaphor. It exhibits all of the characteristics we generally at- 
tribute to a metaphor, characteristics summarized by Andrew Or- 
tony: "(I) the inexpressibility thesis-metaphors express what is 
literally inexpressible; (2) the compactness thesis-metaphors 
express complex relationships compactly; ( 3 )  the vividness the- 
sis-metaphors are more vivid than their literal equivalents" 
("Psychological Aspects" 77-78). Davidson may be generally 
correct about dead metaphors functioning as literal expressions. 
After all, it would be difficult to make a case for the metaphoricity 
of "the mouth of a river" like the one I have made for "thoughts 
in a whirl"; the expression is certainly compact, but it does not 
express what is literally inexpressible, and its vividness has been 
lost through centuries of use. This is all the more reason to re- 
gard the language of the mind, with its figurative expressions, as 
a special case in which even so-called dead metaphors are quali- 
tatively different from dead metaphors in other areas of language 
use. 
For the study of metaphors of mind, the most pertinent of 
Ortony's theses is inexpressibility. Most psychological treatises 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began with the point 
that mental phenomena had not been adequately described, and 
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most then went on to express a version of the autonomy thesis, 
calling for a description of the mind in the language of the mind. 
Such a description, they felt, would be not only adequate but 
accurate-not figurative. Yet like Reid, Brown, and the others 
discussed in Chapter I, sooner or later all fell into language 
either explicitly or (more usually) implicitly metaphorical. Men- 
tal phenomena were (and still are) literally inexpressible, nor is 
it possible to literal& represent the experiencing of mental phenom- 
ena. There is no objective language that will allow two people to 
communicate about their inner lives with any certainty that each 
is evoking an exactly matching "train of ideas," emotion, or 
<< mental state" in the other. 
As my example of thoughts being in a whirl illustrates, the 
more we attempt to specify in literal language something that is 
literally inexpressible, the longer the expression becomes, with 
no gain in the clarity of what is being communicated. This is 
why vividness and compactness belong in Ortony's list. Meta- 
phors of mind fulfill these theses well, expressing mental phe- 
nomena in images that do justice to their complexity. Locke's 
blank slate, as vigorously as it was criticized during the two hun- 
dred years following the publication of his Essay Concerning the 
Understanding, remained compelling as a description of the pro- 
cess and mechanism of human learning because of his meta- 
phors-not that anyone believed in the existence of an actual 
slate somewhere in the cranium, but the dominant theory of sen- 
sations and memory required some mechanism for recording 
sensation-impressions from the external world. 
Ortony also insists quite rightly on the importance of context 
in determining what is and is not metaphorical, a point essential 
in understanding why and how we automatically treat all descrip- 
tions of mental phenomena as metaphorical. According to Or- 
tony, metaphors do not exist in isolation as linguistic expressions 
but rather are linguistic expressions used in a particular way; 
some kind of metaphor-intention either had to be present before 
the utterance was voiced or must be inferred retrospectively 
("Psychological Aspects3 73-75). This is in keeping with the re- 
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cent movement away from viewing metaphors as semantically 
deviant expressions and toward a contextual or cognitivist view 
(Miall,  introduction^' xii-xiii). 
One example of how complex the latter is can be seen in Ina 
Loewenberg's list of the conditions necessary for a performance 
of a "metaphorical proposal," viewed as a "speech-act" (P), (I 
am paraphrasing here): 
I. Speaker believes that P a s  an assertion is false. 
2. Speaker believes that hearer believes that Pas  an assertion is false. 
3. Hearer believes that P a s  an assertion is false. 
4. Hearer believes that speaker believes that Pas  an assertion is false. 
5. Speaker believes that "to consider the referents of the constituent 
terms of P according to P has heuristic value." 
6. Speaker believes that "his hearer does not already consider the refer- 
ents of the constituent terms of P according to PI' 
7. Speaker intends hearer to take P as a proposal to consider the refer- 
ents in the way proposed. 
8. "The hearer takes the utterance of P to be such a proposal because 
he believes the speaker intends him to." [175-61 
This list and others like it, however, leave crucial cognitive or 
linguistic moves unexplained. How does the listener determine 
that the speaker believes that P as an expression is false? What 
does the term "believe" actually mean in the first six conditions? 
In the case of metaphors of mind, as I will show, "believes that P 
as an assertion is false" would have to mean something like "be- 
haves (linguistically) as if P is true but would deny its literal truth 
if and only if asked to agree that it is literally true." 
The contextual approach, although incomplete, is still superior 
to the approach through "semantic deviance.'' One advocate of 
the latter approach, Searle, believes that metaphor is to be under- 
stood through "the principles which relate literal sentence mean- 
ing to metaphorical utterance meaning"; readers utilize a "strat- 
egy" of first seeking the literal meaning of a metaphorical 
sentence before recognizing that it is metaphorical (250, 274). 
Proponents of this view suggest that a metaphor viewed strictly 
as a linguistic expression would be "deviant" if read "literally": 
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it would not make sense. One of the most often used examples is 
"Juliet is the sun," where Juliet is clearly not a hot gaseous body 
ninety-three million miles from our planet. Nevertheless, as this 
example should make clear, some of what Black calls the "system 
of associated  commonplace^'^ ("Metaphor" 40) of the metaphor's 
vehicle (here, "the sun") are appropriate to a determination of 
the metaphor's vehicle: if Juliet is not hot she nevertheless is a 
life-giving power, provides warmth and light to one's spirit or 
heart, and so forth. 
Starting with such observations about the possible range of 
meanings of a word and the limitations imposed on that range by 
a given metaphor, the approach through semantic deviance at- 
tempts to explain how the recipient of the metaphor deems cer- 
tain semantic features or selection restrictions appropriate. For 
instance, Tanya Reinhart identifies two distinct ways to interpret 
metaphor: the "focus-interpretation" and the "vehicle-interpre- 
tation." Focus-interpretation relies on a comparison between the 
metaphor and a syntactically similar literal expression to provide 
an understanding of the "basic (cognitive) content of the meta- 
phor." Vehicle-interpretation latter provides rather for an under- 
standing of the metaphor's figurative content, and it may only be 
available to a privileged few language users, poets in particular. 
For example, in T. S. Eliot's "the yellow fog that rubs its back 
upon the window-panes," the vehicle-interpretation "has to do 
with establishing a relationship between the two concepts in- 
volved-the fog and the cat." The focus-interpretation, on the 
other hand, will just tell us basically what the metaphor is 
<( aboutn-fog touching a window. Only the vehicle-interpreta- 
tion yields "a full understanding of the metaphor." 
Reinhart's discussion lacks just one item, but it is an essential 
item: How does the cat enter the picture? The poem's words tell 
most astute readers to select "cat" from among all animate enti- 
ties that might engage in such rubbing, that have muzzles and 
tongues, that seem to "curl once about" a place before falling 
asleep. But how do the words do this? 
Timothy Crusius and W Ross Winterowd take a similar ap- 
proach to a type of metaphor they call "open," which has for its 
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tenor the semantic feature [-concrete] and for its vehicle "some- 
thing from the natural, non-symbolic world" (32).  The authors 
focus on open metaphors that "'enspirit' language," for example 
"the Word made flesh." They suggest that in apprehending not 
only these but all metaphors, there is a "flash," a brief moment in 
which the metaphor is perceived as literal and hence irrational- 
it violates the selection restrictions associated with the semantic 
feature [-concrete] of the tenor. In this moment metaphor is "Ian- 
guage at its most creative and elusive" because it is disrupting 
our compartmentalization of reality (30).  This clear and persua- 
sive description leaves out one key detail: how that "flash" is 
generated. The only possibility here, as with Reinhart's descrip- 
tion, is that some sort of "black box" processes the input-the 
semantic features of a given utterance-and generates the out- 
put-the recognition that the utterance is metaphorical. 
Shifting the focus of analysis to context as Ortony suggests and 
away from the actual linguistic expression may seem like simply 
moving the black box, but it has two distinct advantages. First, it 
conforms to recent experiments suggesting that processing 
<< anomalous expressions" takes no longer than processing "lit- 
eral expressions.'' As summarized by Walter Kintsch and Teun 
van Dijk, this new evidence contradicts "the classical processing 
theory," that "metaphors are first rejected as semantically anom- 
alous, and then reinterpreted on the basis of some special strat- 
egy to yield appropriate interpretations" (312) .  For Reinhart's 
reader to substitute a word into the metaphor in order to make 
some literal sense and then to compare that sense to the anoma- 
lous expression, or  for Crusius and Winterowd's reader to expe- 
rience momentary confusion in the form of a flash, would de- 
mand a longer processing time than readers in controlled 
experimental settings actually take. These hypothesized pro- 
cesses, however, may be used in apprehending some novel meta- 
phors. As Kintsch and van Dijk note, such metaphors probably 
require "more extensive problem-solving activities," hence more 
time to apprehend, than do "conventionalized or semiconven- 
tionalized metaphors" (3  I 3). Nevertheless, the processes are not 
likely to be used in apprehending novel metaphors of the mind, 
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for the simple reason that no literal description of a mental phe- 
nomenon is possible: any processing strategy requiring a com- 
parison between the given expression and a literal description 
will not hold for this special class of metaphors. 
The view of metaphor as determined by context offers the fur- 
ther advantage of tallying with what ~ e n n e t h  Goodman and oth- 
ers have been insisting and demonstrating for the past twenty 
years, that reading is a whole-to-part process. (See for example 
Goodman's famous "Reading: A Psycholinguistic Guessing 
Game.") The processing of a metaphor is governed at least as 
much by what a reader expects before encountering the metaphor 
as by the metaphor's actual words and syntax, as shown by the 
studies of the time required for apprehension (Tourangeau 21). 
According to Merrie Bergmann, an expression counts as a meta- 
phor "when it has been given a metaphorical interpretation" 
(2'4-1 5 ) .  
Bergmann specifically does not want to say that "the under- 
lying grammatical structure has the form of a simile which may 
be literally interpreted"; rather, we interpret an utterance as a 
metaphor because the context suggests non-literal meanings 
(219). That is, a reader will already be keyed into the necessary 
processing strategy for metaphor before reaching the metaphor. 
Bergmann specifies three roles that context can play: ( I )  it can 
" signal . that an expression is to be interpreted metaphorically"; 
(2) it can indicate or activate "associated commonplaces and con- 
notations . . . as well as relevant knowledge about the author's 
beliefs and purposes"; ( 3 )  it can "signal &ich connections and 
commonplaces are relevant, as well as which parts of terms7 lit- 
eral contents are to be dropped in the metaphorical interpreta- 
tion" (223). She refers to the "broadening function in metaphor- 
ical interpretation," by which she means a dropping of some of 
the selection restrictions of the vehicle. In processing "Juliet is 
the sun," for example, "we drop part or all of the literal content 
of 'sun7 when interpreting the word in the metaphorical context," 
and we do this more or less automatically because of signals 
previously given us by the context (220). 
Such an approach to metaphor requires identifying what kinds 
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of signals the context may provide. A step in this direction is 
taken by Dorothy Mack, who identifies three categories of sig- 
naling devices: genres, "cultural preconceptions" and formulas, 
and precoded language processes (249-50). For the first, "meta- 
phoring occurs unmarked WITHIN such genres, since genre- 
markers, such as once upon a time . . . cue hearers not to expect 
literalness." For the second category, she cites as examples allu- 
sion, epithet, emblem, and cliche. The third category involves 
personification and similar processes. 
This is at best a short step, however. Neither Bergmann nor 
Mack does more than express in a complicated way a point made 
earlier by Derek Bickerton, that "our linguistic expectations ad- 
just themselves to the mode of discourse we are reading" (37). 
Bickerton continues: "If, in reading a poem, we encounter lex- 
emes such as moon, rose, or autumn, we are likely (indeed, without 
explicit indications to the contrary, highly likely) to give them 
values such as 'unattainable beauty,' 'perfect beauty,' and 'ripe- 
ness andlor decay,' rather than 'satellite of earth,' 'species of 
flower,' and 'third season of the year.' But we would in no circum- 
stances do this while reading an almanac or horticultural cata- 
log" (37). Bickerton's example is equally valid whether the read- 
ers are teachers of English or students in Introduction to 
Literature. Awareness of the mode of discourse on the level Bick- 
erton is describing seems to be so thoroughly instilled during 
secondary education (at least in the United States) that by the 
age of seventeen students have trouble applying the more pedes- 
trian, non-symbolic, non-metaphoric meanings to words in a 
poem, however appropriate those meanings might be. 
For a mode of discourse in which descriptions of mental pro- 
cesses are likely, the adjustment Bickerton speaks of is complex. 
When the reader encounters such a description-which is nec- 
essarily metaphorical-the reader accepts the literal content for 
its heuristic or esthetic value but withholds belief. All talk of the 
mind (except for descriptions of experimental studies) constitutes 
a kind of genre or mode of discourse which carries with it two 
injunctions: "Read this (iterally for its heuristic or esthetic value, 
but do not take the literal reading so far that it runs counter to our 
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belief in the immateriality and uniqueness of each individual 
mind." In Bergmann's terms, "broadening" occurs in discussions 
of mental operations; we seldom if ever interpret statements about 
the mind literally. However, up to a point we do behave as if a 
literal reading is appropriate-in conversation we can exchange 
statements that represent the mind as a physical entity, for in- 
stance, because such statements are useful. In this situation our 
responses will be guided within certain channels by the selection 
restrictions pertaining to the metaphor's vehicle. The selection 
restrictions also enter the picture when we are asked or forced to 
attend to the metaphor, to interpret it. In this circumstance a 
reader will never overtly impute to the mind characteristics sug- 
gested by a literal reading of the metaphor. 
As long as the context is one in which statements about the 
mind are expected, the reader does not first process such state- 
ments as literal, recognize anomalies (violations of our beliefs 
about the mind), and then reinterpret the statements as meta- 
phors. The set of possible responses to a metaphor of mind is 
therefore quite complicated. The reader may not recognize the 
metaphor as such and yet respond in metaphorical language that 
shares the same selection restrictions, may accept the metaphor 
as literally valid up to a point (that is, may accept some of the 
vehicle's selection restrictions), or may deny the appropriateness 
of the vehicle's selection restrictions and thus refuse to accept the 
metaphor. Further, a reader's response may pass through different 
modes, for example accepting as heuristically valuable the first 
several sentences of an extended metaphor, then deciding that the 
vehicle is after all inappropriate. Fortunately, all of these possible 
responses can be understood by means of Paul Grice's "cooper- 
ative principle," which applies to all metaphorical utterances: 
readers agree to acknowledge writers' intentions, and writers ex- 
pect such cooperation (45-47). In the case of metaphors of mind, 
cooperation involves the injunction "Do not take this literally" 
and the commonplace beliefs in mind's immateriality and unique- 
ness. Should the writer either intentionally or unwittingly signal 
that a literal reading of the depiction is appropriate or desirable, 
the reader must then decide whether or not to cooperate. The 
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same thing will happen if the depiction diverges too much from 
the commonplaces and the concept of mind they embody. 
The Contextual Approach in Historical Metaphors of Mind 
For  re-twentieth-century metaphors of mind, the common- 
places were based on a fundamental belief in the divinity of the 
mind or that part of the mind termed "the soul." That is, cooper- 
ation was blocked by hints that the mind was material in nature. 
A comparison will make this point clear. David Hartley's Obser- 
vations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations ( I  794) 
was frequently attacked during the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century as advocating a materialistic view of mind. His theory of 
association was adopted in some form or other by every major 
mental philosopher to follow him, but his "vibrations hypothe- 
sis" earned him the contempt or pity of these same philosophers. 
The problem in Hartley's system was, in the words of one critic, 
that "the chain of causation [vibrations from the external world 
transmitted to the mind via the sensory nerves] need not be bro- 
ken at any point, and the explanation of consciousness either 
drops out altogether or we are to assume that vibrations are 
equivalent to consciousness of vibrations" (Peters 439). The 
st;ength and breadth of the reaction against Hartley may be dif- 
ficult to understand today. His theory did not need the vibrations 
hypothesis, and in any case his expression of that hypothesis was 
limited. to the first few pages of his book. But opening pages are 
crucial for establishing cooperation between writer and reader. 
Hartley's error was not theoretical but rhetorical: he did not lead 
his readers slowly enough to the proposition that he intended 
only hypothetically and metaphorically, that the mind has a ma- 
terial component which can sense vibrations in matter. 
William Godwin7s novel The Adventures of Caleb VilLams 
(1794) generated no antagonism among the same readers who 
condemned Hartley's materialism, although the novel frequently 
draws on metaphors implying an extended and tangible mind. An 
example is Godwin's rendering of Caleb's discovery that his mas- 
ter and mentor, Falkland, is a murderer and, more heinous yet, 
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has allowed an innocent man to be executed for the crime. Once 
the possibility occurred to Caleb that Falkland might be guilty, 
the idea became "fixed" in his mind, so that his "thoughts fluc- 
tuated from conjecture to conjecture, but this was the centre 
about which they revolved" (107). When his suspicion was vali- 
dated by evidence he regarded as undeniable, Caleb's spinning 
thoughts generated tremendous pressure: "My mind was full al- 
most to bursting.. . . my thoughts forced their way sponta- 
neously to my tongue." And again, to underline the existence of 
this internal pressure: "I . . . gave vent to the tumult of my 
thoughts in involuntary exclamations" (129). 
Caleb's description is exactly the kind of situation in which 
Bergmann's "broadening function" applies. The reader of this 
passage is guided by both the genre (novel) and the local context 
(a moment of introspection) to ignore most of the semantic fea- 
tures pertinent to the literal concept "mind as container" which 
informs these sentences. What the sentences literally say is that 
the mind is of limited size and so can be "filled almost to burst- 
ing"; it seems to have a shape such that thoughts can revolve 
within it; thoughts themselves are like molecules of a gas when 
heated, becoming more and more excited and finally bursting out 
through the container's weakest point. Literally the mind is no 
more like a container than Juliet is like a hot, gaseous body, but 
Godwin never allows his first-person narrator to express the re- 
sults of his internal scrutiny in a way that requires the metaphors 
to be taken literally. Unlike Hartley, Godwin never violates the 
cooperative principle, so his readers take the sentences as a valid 
but not literal representation of several physiological facts and 
subjective sensations: the tendency to flush when excited, the 
resulting sensation of a head full of blood, and the sensation of 
ideas being all in a whirl. 
Godwin7s novel represents the normal case, in which meta- 
phors of mind excite no special notice. Most of the metaphors I 
discuss in the subsequent chapters belong to this category. These 
are metaphors for which the cooperative principle operates and 
which observe the constraints of the genre "discourse about 
- 
mind," calling on a reader to accept a literal reading of metaphors 
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of mind as heuristically or esthetically valuable but not requiring 
this reading to violate our culture's belief that each mind is im- 
material and unique. In the chapters that follow these conditions 
are assumed. 
To better define these conditions, I will briefly consider several 
metaphors that do excite notice either intentionally or acciden- 
tally. There are three cases in which metaphoricity may be re- 
marked on and may either interfere with or enhance the cooper- 
ation between writer and reader: apparent inaptness, apparent 
aptness, and ironical inversion. The late eighteenth-century and 
nineteenth-century reaction to Hartley is an example of the first 
case: Hartley offended his readers' sense that the mind cannot be 
referred to as a tangible physical object infact. His metaphor was 
inapt-unsuitable-so that his readers could not ignore the lit- 
eral content of the utterance. This is the situation warned against 
by handbooks of prose style when they point out that dead met- 
aphors have a habit of coming to life when carelessly handled. 
Inaptness also has an historical and cultural aspect. For example, 
in beginning Hobbes' Leviathan we read that "Sense" (sensation) 
is caused by external objects "which presseth the organ proper 
to each Sense . . . which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, 
and other strings, and membranes of the body, [is] continued in- 
wards to the Brain, and Heart, causing there a resistance or 
counter-pressurel' The modern reader may be put off with this 
image of the brain and heart being literally impressed with 
sights, sounds, and the like from outside. But readers of the sev- 
enteenth and eighteenth centuries thought of perception as con- 
sisting of a passive mind being impressed by stimuli from the 
external world. An informed reader of Hobbes7 psychology or 
that of any other historically distant writer will have to recognize 
some metaphors as apt in their time, however inapt they seem 
now. Once the reader makes this adjustment, the metaphor can 
become a window into the set of commonplaces that constitute 
the psychology of the era. The reader who fails to adjust will not 
be able to make sense of such images. 
The second case occurs when the reader remarks on the apt- 
ness of the metaphor. In this situation, the reader cooperates by 
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taking notice of the figurative language rather than passing over 
it as an accurate but unremarkable representation of a mental 
state or phenomenon. A metaphor is especially apt when it seems 
to have been selected or devised for a given situation, when it 
shows some artfulness rather than seeming to be what came most 
readily to the author's pen. A writer not often praised for either 
psychological interest or artful language provides an example of 
an especially apt metaphor. Daniel Defoe's Moll Flanders, de- 
scribing her perplexity in choosing between two lovers, notes 
that "These things oppressed my mind so much that, in short, 
the agonies of my mind threw me into a high fever, and long it 
was that none of the family expected my life" (41). What Moll 
does not say is as significant as what she does. Had Defoe had 
her write, "My mental anguish caused a life-threatening fever," 
he would have lost quite a bit in vividness. Such an utterance, 
furthermore, would seem less true to her character, less apt, both 
because of its diction and because it does not convey the same 
focus on discrete agents and actions that is a large part of how 
she sees the world. She is always either a victimizer or a victim, 
in this case as much a victim of her mind's anguish as of the 
machinations of her first lover. An apt metaphor fulfills at least 
one of Ortony's theses of vividness and compactness especially 
well. 
In the third case, the literal content of a normally dead meta- 
phor is emphasized for ironical effects which occur because the 
literal content is incongruous in the context. As in the second 
situation, the reader is led to react with "Aha," although here the 
metaphor's use may constitute a criticism of the view of mind on 
which the metaphor is based. Thomas Reid, while no more able 
to avoid metaphors than his contemporaries, nevertheless seized 
every opportunity to illustrate the problems caused by metaphor- 
ical language used to talk about the mind. Two of his favorite 
targets were Locke7s view of the mind as occupying a "presence 
room" and hypothetical physiologies such as Hartley's. Reid im- 
plicitly criticized both when he wrote that the optic nerves con- 
sist of empty tubes which transmit light rays from the retina to 
"the very seat of the soul, until they flash in her face" (Inquiry 
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199). Reid's readers would have seen as absurd the suggestion of 
empty tubes, would not have automatically passed over the state- 
ment as an accurate but unremarkable representation of the pro- 
cess of perception, and thus would have joined Reid in rejecting 
the concept of the soul occupying an actual chamber in the head 
and having eyes that might even be temporarily blinded. 
This range, of possible responses by readers to metaphors of 
the mind and of degrees of cooperation between reader and text, 
- 
is worth emphasizing, because it indicates that such metaphors 
may constrain but do not control how we conceive of the mind. 
While there are certain expressions and formulas that come more 
easily and quickly when we describe a mental process, we are 
also free to create new figures. This freedom must be kept in 
mind when considering the relationship between metaphors of 
mind, concepts of mind, and psychological theory. The meta- 
phors from Godwin, Hobbes, Defoe, and Reid all bear a family 
iesemblance to what George Lakoff and Mark Johnson refer to 
in Metaphors E Live By as "MIND-AS-ENTITY," a metaphor which 
characterizes the mind as tangible, localized, and discrete (27). 
Moll Flanders' mind, like a living being, can suffer agonies and 
fever. Not only is Caleb's mind like a container, his thoughts are 
like molecules of gas, exerting more pressure as they become 
heated by his increasing suspicion and final discovery of his mas- 
ter's crime. Reid took Locke to task for representing the soul as 
having a seat within the mind. 
The term "mind as entity" will be extremely important for this 
- - 
study; it succinctly characterizes the set of "commonplaces and 
connotations" associated with representations of mental phe- 
nomena during this period. But I do not want to grant it the 
power to shape perceptions and conceptions, as Lakoff and John- 
son do when they define mind-as-entity as an "ontological met- 
aphor" (27). By this they mean that our mental metaphors "are 
so natural and so pervasive in our thought that they are usually 
taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena. 
The fact that they are metaphorical never occurs to most of us" 
(28). Such metaphors are "lived by" to the extent that they are 
"reflections of systematic metaphorical concepts that structure 
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our actions and thoughts. They are 'alive' in the most fundamen- 
tal sense" ( 5 5 ) .  The weakness in this position is the connection 
drawn by Lakoff and Johnson between the surface aspects of lan- 
guage (for example, various expressions such as "I'm going to 
pieces" and "His mind snapped") and a type of metaphor (here 
an ontological metaphor) that is said to structure both how we act 
and how we conceive of what we do when we act. When the 
authors note that, in referring to a concept being structured by a 
metaphor, they mean "partially structured" ( I  g), they only call 
attention to the slippery character of that verb "structure." 
As a skeptical reader, I am impressed by Lakoff and Johnson's 
data and the metaphors they infer from the data, but I remain 
unpersuaded that the metaphors always control how we actually 
conceive ofthe particular aspect of experience. That the metaphors 
can control conceptions I accept, but not that they must. The 
term "ontological metaphor" does not allow for changes in the 
relationships between metaphors of the mind and concepts of the 
mind from one era to another, from one author to another, even 
within one author's career. If a special term were needed, "root 
metaphor" would be more flexible and useful. A root can be bo- 
tanical or etymological; it can constitute a starting point, a limit- 
ing factor, an anchor, a source or conduit for nourishment. (It can 
also carry a much broader meaning, that given it by Stephen 
Pepper in his V~rIdH~otheses.) However, I prefer to do without 
the adjective; in my discussion I have tried to make clear through 
context when I am using "metaphor" to mean a specific utterance 
and when I am using it to mean the more general concept that 
served all of the "root" functions during the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries. Mind-as-entity was not strictly lived by and was 
not the exclusive structuring principle within the psychology of 
these two centuries. Precisely because it was not an ontological 
- 
metaphor, there was room for other metaphors to be introduced 
and elaborated as interest developed in leis well understood psy- 
chological phenomena. The most important of these new meta- 
phors, as I show in Chapter 6, were web-of-relations and mind- 
in-landscape. Both have more to do with the increasingly 
prominent concept mind-as-a-living-being, which by the end of 
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the nineteenth century achieved an acceptance approaching that 
of mind-as-entity. 
Within the domain of psychological theory, metaphor may 
play a more sharply defined role. It has been suggested that met- 
aphors serve three functions for psychological theory: commu- 
nication, generation and elaboration, and analysis (Nash 337). A 
more accurate arrangement would place analysis and elaboration 
under one head, and generation under another. In both elabora- 
tion and analysis, the metaphor serves to explain or extend some- 
thing that is already more or less known, whereas generation 
entails creation or exploration. A metaphor that serves the func- 
tion of elaboration is what Richard Boyd calls a "theory- 
constitutive metaphor." Such metaphors, according to Boyd, 
c< provide a way to introduce terminology for features of the 
world whose existence seems probable, but many of whose fun- 
damental properties have yet to be discovered. Theory-constitu- 
tive metaphors, in other words, represent one strategy for the 
accommodation of language to as yet undiscovered causal fea- 
tures of the world" (364). 
Boyd also says that such metaphors are one of many strategies 
by which the scientific community arranges language "so that 
our linguistic categories 'cut the world at its joints"' (3 58). These 
metaphors further articulate an existing theory or view of the 
world and thus are a component of what Thomas Kuhn describes 
as "normal science": "research firmly based upon one or more 
past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the 
foundation for its further practice" (10). 
Generation is a different process. It is possible that in attempt- 
ing to arrange language, by means of metaphor, so that language 
corresponds with the existing theory, scientists will discover new 
phenomena and will be forced toward a conceptual revolution. 
But the new theory that emerges is not likely to be constituted by 
the earlier metaphor. More likely, a new metaphor will be discov- 
ered during the pre-revolutionary ferment, will gain adherents 
during the revolution, and will then help generate the new 
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theory. A metaphor that participates in this process is what Don- 
ald Schon labels "generative metaphor." He explains this term 
not with metaphorical language but with a story. Some research- 
ers were attempting to better understand how a paintbrush picks 
up and distributes paint. The breakthrough came with the insight 
that a paintbrush is like a pump; following this discovery, the 
researchers arrived at "new perceptions, explanations, and inven- 
tions," all of which were generated by the metaphor and by the 
exploration of the similarity implied by the metaphor. Schon in- 
sists that a generative metaphor does not result from the percep- 
tion of specific similarities between the pump and the paintbrush, 
that is, between the tenor and the vehicle. Rather, it results from 
the attempt to account for the "pre-analytic detection of similar- 
ity"-the scientist recognizes that the two objects or phenomena 
are similar but cannot yet say exactly how, and in attempting to 
specify how, the scientist is generating a theory. 
In short, a generative metaphor is the bridge between a hunch 
and a new theory, whereas a theory-constitutive metaphor is ap- 
plied according to the dictates of an existing theory. A theory- 
constitutive metaphor is a tool for surveying a territory whose 
boundaries are known; a generative metaph.or is a means for ori- 
enting oneself during a new exploration. This distinction could 
have so many exceptions and grey areas as to be nearly useless 
for a general theory of metaphor and theory change, but it is 
quite useful in understanding the changes in the depiction of 
mental events during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As 
I show in the following chapters, the metaphor mind-as-entity 
often performs a theory-constitutive function in both fictional 
and psychological writings during the eighteenth century: writ- 
ers were limited in what mental phenomena they could represent 
and how they could represent them. The new metaphors used by 
some nineteenth-century novelists, however, suggest the pres- 
ence of another "root" metaphor, sentience-as-life, which was 
serving a generative function. In Schon7s terms the "pre-analytic 
detection of similarity" between life and the mind had begun to 
result in "new perceptions, explanations, and inventionsv-and 
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also in new metaphors that effectively began to express the new 
emphasis on mind as something other than a relatively static, 
impressible entity. 
Janet Soskice offers a useful insight into the relationship be- 
tween metaphors and models in disciplines that are not as well 
defined as the hard sciences but that nevertheless rely on meta- 
phor's theory-constitutive and generative functions. Writing 
on metaphors and religious language, she defines a theory- 
constitutive metaphor as one that proposes a model; it is to be 
distinguished from "metaphorically constituted theory terms," by 
which she means the "metaphors which are the linguistic projec- 
tions of such a model" (102). Soskice emphasizes the role of 
models in processing metaphors: a reader will construe an odd 
expression as metaphorical if he is able to "see it as suggesting a 
model or models which enable him to go on extending the sig- 
nificance of what he has read or heard" (5 I). More precisely, "an 
originally vital metaphor calls to mind, directly or indirectly, a 
model or models," but "as the metaphor becomes commonplace 
[or dead], its initial web of implications becomes, if not entirely 
lost, then difficult to recall" (73). Soskice's key phrase is "go on 
extending the significance," because it indicates that model and 
extended metaphor are two components of a single process serv- 
ing to elaborate and communicate concepts. To regard extended 
metaphors and models as related in this way is more helpful in 
the study of pre-twentieth-century psychology than to adopt 
Black's distinction between metaphors and models, a distinction 
most applicable to twentieth-century hard sciences but often car- 
ried over uncritically by metaphor theorists to other areas. 
Nevertheless, Black has something to contribute to the study 
of metaphors of mind. His five "conditions for the use of a theo- 
retical model" can be extended beyond modern science. The con- 
ditions are these: 
I .  In an "original field of investigation" there exist "some facts and reg- 
ularities.'' 
2. "A need is felt for further scientific mastery of the original domain." 
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3. Some aspect of a "relatively unproblematic, more familiar, or better- 
organized domain" is described. 
4. There must exist "explicit or implicit rules of correlation" allowing 
translations of statements about the secondary field into statements 
about the original field. 
5 .  "Inferences from the assumptions made in the secondary field are 
translated by means of the rules of correlation and then indepen- 
dently checked against known or predictable data in the primary do- 
main." [Modeh and Metaphors 2 30-3 I ] 
"The key to understanding the entire transaction," Black contin- 
ues, "is the identity of structure that in favorable cases permits 
assertions made about the secondary domain to yield insight into 
the original field of interest." Metaphor-making and model- 
making differ in that "a metaphor operates largely with common- 
place implications. You need only proverbial knowledge, as it 
were, to have your metaphor understood; but the maker of a 
scientific model must have prior control of a well-knit scientific 
theory" (239). 
Black's conditions are appropriate for describing pre-twen- 
tieth-century endeavors, if they are applied cautiously. In partic- 
ular, the concepts of scientific mastery and independent verifica- 
tion must be understood in the context of the divine organization 
of the universe that was accepted as a self-evident fact. Within 
this context, discovery and elaboration of analogical relation- 
ships among various domains would be considered scientific as 
soon as the initial connection was made, as long as some identity 
- 
of structure was present. Independent verification was provided 
simply by God's having organized the universe in a logical way 
and having designed the human perceptual and cognitive appa- 
ratus to be able to discover this logic. Because of the relative 
- 
inaccessibility of mental phenomena, model-making was essen- 
tial to pre-twentieth-century psychology. (I do not mean to im- 
ply that it is any less essential in the twentieth century, but that 
would be another book.) 
To help preserve the integrity of the term "model," I will refer 
to "extended metaphors" in the history of psychology, but I in- 
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tend that such metaphors be understood as functioning very 
much like Black's models. Hence within the "original field" of 
pre-twentieth-century psychology there existed many "facts and 
regularities," chief among them being the principle of association 
and the tendency of mental operations to fall into certain classes; 
these classes suggested distinct "faculties" of the mind, although 
the mind itself was held to be an indivisible entity. Psychologists 
agreed that these regularities in themselves could not account for 
the complexity of mental phenomena. There were two well- 
understood secondary domains, Newtonian physics and biology, 
with physics being especially influential on psychological theo- 
ries (Lowry I 5-21). Psychologists agreed that between the inter- 
nal and external realms (the mental and the physical) there ex- 
isted an "identity of structurel' Thus Hartley could feel perfectly 
safe in applying Newtonian mechanics to the assumed vibrations 
in sensory nerves in order to explain sensation; his problem was 
that he applied the "rules of correlation" too explicitly and 
seemed to equate human consciousness with mechanical vibra- 
tions. Likewise, Reid could call for an "anatomy of the mind" as 
a substitute for the impossible-to-obtain "natural history" of the 
mind (Inquiry 5, 8). Both Hartley and Reid believed that the mind 
was fairly well understood, that "further scientific mastery" was 
nevertheless possible and desirable, and that such mastery would 
result from making the study of mind more like the study of 
physics and biology, which were "relatively unproblematic" and 
<( better organized." Reid commented that only with Newton did 
natural philosophy gain maturity, "and it need not appear sur- 
prising, if the philosophy of the human mind should be a century 
or two later in being brought to maturity" (IntellectualPowers 62). 
It is true that these psychologists were operating primarily 
with proverbial knowledge about both the primary and second- 
ary domains, and neither rigorously applied the methods of the 
secondary domain. For Hartley, it was enough to know the prin- 
ciple of inertia; no calculus enters into his psychology. For Reid, 
mental anatomy meant introspection into the mature male mind 
in repose, with neither functional nor comparative analysis form- 
ing more than an aside. Nevertheless, despite the reliance on 
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commonplace implications and proverbial knowledge, these psy- 
chologists' metaphors are similar in function to models in the 
harder sciences. 
I do not intend the terms "extended metaphor," "theory- 
constitutive metaphor," and "generative metaphor" to neatly di- 
vide up the linguistic space they encompass; the meanings do 
overlap. For example, a theory-constitutive metaphor is probably 
present in the language used by a psychologist to develop an 
extended metaphor, such as Thomas Brown's attempt to regard 
the "science of mind" as "rnentalptiysioloD~ analogous to that 
other science "relating to the structure and offices of our corpo- 
real frame" (Lectures 12). A generative metaphor could not be 
presented as an extended metaphor, since by definition it first 
occurs as an intuition, before there is any question of construct- 
ing "rules of correlation" between the two domains. When such 
rules are constructed, the metaphor becomes extended. A gener- 
ative metaphor may become theory-constitutive, as happens at 
the end of the nineteenth century when functionalism came to 
dominate American psychology through the work of William 
James. In their surface manifestations, however, all three types 
will always fulfill Ortony7s three theses of inexpressibility, com- 
pactness, and vividness. This is the condition of their being met- 
aphors: they are figuring forth the phenomena of thought, which 
by common consent cannot be described literally. 
One further domain must be mentioned: physiology. The 
inexpressibility thesis applies as well to most physiologists' writ- 
ings on the mind at least until the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. While physiology in principle can be described empirically, 
hence literally, almost all neural physiology before the nineteenth 
century and a good deal of it even into the middle of that century 
drew on the metaphor mind-as-entity and was hypothetical. Un- 
til enough concrete data about nerve impulses and the structure 
of the brain was collected, verified, and analyzed, all physiology 
was metaphorical according to Ortony's inexpressibility thesis- 
figuring forth what could not be described literally. Such physio- 
logical writings are thus within my scope. Nevertheless, I do not 
discuss how these hypothetical, metaphorically constituted theo- 
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ries were replaced with theories based on data gathered by scien- 
tific means acceptable to twentieth-century researchers and theo- 
rists. Bringing in this additional topic would add only details, no 
major points, to my picture of the changes in metaphors of mind. 
I11 
CORPUSCULAR THOUGHTS, 
TANGIBLE MINDS: 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
PSYCHOLOGY AND FICTION 
Although there are no clear demarcations between historical pe- 
riods in the understanding of the mind, there is a stretch of time, 
from the beginning of the eighteenth century through the first 
third of the nineteenth, when the language and the concepts used 
for talking about the mind remained relatively unchanged. For 
convenience in discussion I refer loosely to this period as the 
eighteenth century, to indicate that the dominant metaphor of 
mind and the primary psychological theories remained constant. 
Psychology from the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
whether the explicit psychology described in textbooks, the im- 
plicit psychology dramatized in novels, or the psychology on 
which empiricists based their philosophical works, was a well- 
defined endeavor. There was a general goal: discover the laws of 
thought and thereby improve human life; a standard methodol- 
ogy: introspection, analogy, and classification; and a set of ex- 
planatory procedures: especially associationism and faculty psy- 
chology. Most discussions of the human mind during this period 
were carried on within the constraints established by Descartes 
and Locke and dwelt at length on the problems and strengths of 
their two systems, just as philosophy in general centered on 
46 Metaphors of Mind 
"criticisms of the Galilean-Cartesian-Newtonian world-view" 
(Morris 28). 
The most important feature of psychological systems during 
this period was the metaphor mind-as-entity, which attributed to 
the mind the traits of tangibility, passivity, impressibility, simplic- 
ity of structure, and specificity of location. Caleb Williams7 mind 
is presented as a container for thoughts; as such, it is of limited 
size, occupies a definite area of space, and seems unable to exer- 
cise will power to control the thoughts it contains. The thoughts 
themselves are imaged as atoms. The mind of Moll Flanders is 
<< oppressed" by external conditions and causes in her a fever; she 
speaks of her mind as she might speak of her liver. Even the 
criticisms of metaphorical language used to discuss the mind 
convey the impression of mind-as-entity, as in Brown's desire to 
institute a "physiology of the mind." 
The  language associated with this metaphor remained viable 
until nearly the middle of the nineteenth century. Poe's Narrative 
of Arthur Gordon Pym (1838), for example, is not emphatically 
psychological, but the psychology it does contain conforms to 
the period. Pym seems to have been composed as Poe claimed to 
have composed "The Raven," to affect readers7 emotions in a 
particular way. The narrator, Pym, is caught up in a series of 
nautical adventures each one more harrowing and fantastic than 
the last: he stows away on a ship that is taken over and terrorized 
by mutineers, later witnesses the massacre of another shipload of 
compatriots by a primitive tribe, and finds himself on a small boat 
being drawn toward the South Pole and a wall of white mist out 
of which a tremendous figure looms. Such adventures and their 
effects on the mental states of the characters concerned were the 
lifeblood, so to speak, of the Gothic tales Poe was in part emulat- 
ing. Where Pym describes mental events he focuses on sensa- 
tions, portraying his mind as passive and impressible. The fol- 
lowing examples are representative: 
I experienced a sudden rush of blood to my temples-a giddy and over- 
powering sense of deliverance and reanimation. [25] 
[The note's full meaning could not] have imbued my mind with one 
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tithe of the harrowing and yet indefinable horror with which I was 
inspired by the fragmentary warning thus received. [34] 
I shall never forget the ecstatic joy which thrilled through every 
particle of my frame. [88] 
And now I found these fancies creating their own realities, and all 
imagined horrors crowding upon me in fact. [ I  851 
These four examples are typical of the period in their correlation 
between idea and physiological sensation ("rush of blood" ac- 
companying "sense of deliverance"), the powerful and precise 
effect of external stimuli (the fragmentary note imbuing Pym's 
mind with horror), the specificity of physiological description 
(joy thrilling through every particle of Pym7s body), and the abil- 
ity of ideas of the imagination to tangibly impress the mind. 
There is nothing in these examples that would have been out of 
place in Moll  Flanders or Caleb WilZiams. 
Unlike those other first-person works, however, Pym contains 
relatively few such utterances. Poe was clearly aiming for a cer- 
tain effect by drawing on the same psycho-physiology of fright 
used by Godwin; the mind-as-entity metaphor is fundamental to 
the technique. But his relatively minimal attention to mental 
events suggests that he was aware of the limitations either of the 
language or  of the concept of mind the language embodied. Pym 
literally rushes through his adventures (the novel is quite short); 
descriptions concentrate on what he does rather than on what he 
thinks and feels. The passivity of Pym7s mind, as implied by the 
figurative language, is unimportant to the story compared to his 
physical activity. At the end of Pym's narrative, when he seems 
to be entering a supernatural realm, the novel records only what 
the hero sees, when readers might expect a great deal of attention 
to his mental impressions. Perhaps no language would have been 
fully adequate to the job. Poe's silences about certain mental 
events, like those of Austen I discuss at the end of this chapter, 
can be read as an indication that the set of concepts and terms 
based on the mind-as-entity metaphor could not encompass 
mental events like Pym7s; as these events moved from the fringes 
of psychological interest toward the center, the writer either had 
to remain silent about them or find new metaphors. 
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In order to understand how the figurative language of psy- 
chology developed to accommodate this shift, however, it is es- 
sential to understand how well the mind-as-entity metaphor 
worked when such mental events were not of much interest, that 
is, through the first third of the nineteenth century. In this chap- 
ter I discuss the metaphor's theory-constitutive function in the 
psychological explanations and fictional representations of two 
central phenomena: the formation of ideas and the development 
of the mind. The phenomena themselves cannot be separated, 
but treating them as separate topics helps illustrate an important 
element in psychology during this period: the mind, although a 
unity, was held to have two rather distinct aspects. The passive, 
impressible, tangible aspect is seen most clearly in references to 
the formation of ideas; the more active aspect is seen in refer- 
ences to the mind's development. 
Psycholog;Fts on the Formation of Heas 
During the period from the end of the seventeenth century 
until the second third of the nineteenth, the theory of the forma- 
tion of ideas was based on relatively mechanical and automatic 
processes. Locke was regarded as essentially correct in tracing all 
ideas to sensations and therefore all knowledge ultimately to 
combinations of sense impressions, although his discussion of 
- 
the formation of ideas was seen to present problems. Locke's 
language was usually agreed to be, in Sir William Hamilton's 
words, "the most figurative, ambiguous, vascillating, various, 
and even contradictoryv of any philosopher (Philosophy ofsir E l -  
liam Hamilton 2 I 2). The following list is representative of Locke's 
- 
metaphors in the Essay: 
Mind is "white Paper, void of all Characters" [IO~]. 
Our senses "convey into the Mind" perceptions [IO~]. 
The brain is "the mind's Presence-room" [I 2 I]. 
Knowledge begins by the mind "laying in, and storing up those 
Ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of," 
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and "the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from 
light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible Re- 
semblances, or Ideas of things without." [162-631 
These figures of speech illustrate the aptness of Hamilton's criti- 
cism. How could the mind be like both white paper and a mon- 
arch? How could it both possess a presence-room and be a closet? 
If we follow Hamilton's lead and read the sentences simply as 
revealing a capricious use of language, we have to wonder how 
Locke manages to seem for most of the length of the Essay so 
reasonable and analytical. If Locke had had a steady and clear 
view of the human understanding, surely he would not have at- 
tributed to the mind mutually exclusive analogues. But the fig- 
ures also show that the mind, for Locke, was relatively passive, 
was capable of receiving and sometimes forced to receive impres- 
sions from the external world through the agency of the senses, 
and received these impressions in an organ akin to a monarch's 
presence-room. These more general features are not mutually 
contradictory or ambiguous. They are manifestations of mind- 
as-entity, and the fact that Locke's actual figures all share the 
same features shows the metaphor functioning in a theory- 
constitutive fashion: Locke was not really free to explore totally 
new ways of representing perception, the acquisition of knowl- 
edge, and memory. The superficial contradictions and ambigui- 
ties of his figures are those inherent in any attempt to express the 
inexpressible, and their shared features imply a common source: 
the mind-as-entity metaphor. 
David Hartley took the Lockean system a step farther, at- 
tempting to ground it on physiology. The opening sections of his 
Observations on Man draw on the concept of mind as a relatively 
passive, impressible entity. Hartley agrees with Locke that while 
the mind has some ideas which "appear to spring up" on their 
own accord, the truth is that "ideas ofsensation are the elements of 
which all the rest [of a person's ideas] are compounded" (ii). 
Hartley says that he took his theory of perception "from the 
hintes concerning the performance of sensations and motion" at 
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the end of Newton's Princjoia ( 5 ) ;  the hints result in his first four 
propositions (8-1 I). First, "the white medullary substance of the 
brain, spinal marrow, and the nerves proceeding from them, is 
the immediate instrument of sensation and motionl' Second, "the 
white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate in- 
strument, by which ideas are   resented to the mind: or, in other 
words, whatever changes are made in this substance, correspond- 
ing changes are made in our ideas, and vice versa." Third, "the 
sensations remain in the mind for a short time after the sensible 
objects are removed." Fourth, "external objects impressed upon 
the senses occasion, first in the nerves on which they are im- 
pressed, and then in the brain, vibrations of the finall, and, as one 
may say, infinitesimal, medullary particles." 
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, the causal connection from the 
object of sensation to the mental image of the object is continu- 
ous in Hartley's system. A person might perceive, for example, a 
red block of wood. The qualities of redness and squareness in the 
block itself are transmitted to the eye, where they occasion vibra- 
tions of particular frequencies in the nerves leading from the eye 
to the white medullary substance of the brain; vibrations in the 
medullary particles cause the ideas of redness and squareness to 
be presented to the mind. This causal chain is possible only if the 
mind is an entity, yet the mental entity in this case need not be 
material, as proposition 2 makes clear: "whatever changes are 
made in this substance, corresponding changes are made in our 
ideas." An immaterial as well as a material entity can be changed; 
the only requirement is that it have enough points of impression 
to preserve the one-to-one correspondence from the external im- 
pressions, through the organs of sense, and then through the 
white medullary substance. Because that substance itself is the 
immediate instrument of sensation, it must be able to present to 
the percipient principle a series of stimuli corresponding exactly 
to the original impressions in number, intensity, succession, and 
so forth, and the percipient principle must be able to receive each 
stimulus. If the correspondences are to hold, that principle must 
be an entity, although Hartley's system may be more progressive 
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than Locke's in that he does not immediately turn to physicalistic 
metaphors to represent the mental events. 
This relatively mechanical process did not stop with the 
mind's reception of impressions; it continued with the formation 
of ideas within the mind. The two basic steps in the formation of 
ideas depend on the mind-as-entity metaphor: perception occurs 
by means of the impressions of sense data oft a passive mind, and 
association ofperceptions into ideas occurs according to categories 
determined by the external world. 
Karl Figlio has described eighteenth-century theories of per- 
ception as built on a "simple model," which "incorporated the 
passive impression notions of the mind in relation to its environ- 
ment and created the sensorium as a 'natural object"' (zoo). This 
model was developed by analogy with the theory of the impres- 
sion of external objects upon nerves; it "did not emerge from the 
study of the nervous system, but was a presupposition" of such 
study (200). What Figlio calls a "model" I call an "extended 
metaphor." The "passive impression notions" were part of the 
mind-as-entity metaphor and contributed to its theory-constitu- 
tive function, helping psychologists account for the formation of 
ideas. According to the psychology of the eighteenth century, 
impressions were organized into ideas by the mechanism of as- 
sociation. The descriptions of this mechanism are of special in- 
terest because they relate the shape of ideas either to physical 
processes in the nerves and brain or to the structuring of events 
in the external world. 
The autonomy thesis as a theoretical principle was not strong 
enough to offset the mind-as-entity metaphor and inspire a way 
of explaining the formation of ideas that did not depend on anal- 
ogies with the physical world. Hume's explanation of how the 
association mechanism works illustrates this point. He begins his 
Seatbe in the standard fashion, like Locke and Hartley dividing 
"the perceptions of the human mind" into two kinds, impressions 
and ideas, which differ "in the degrees of force and liveliness, 
with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into 
our thought or consciousness," impressions being the more 
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forceful. In this category Hume includes "all our sensations, pas- 
sions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the 
soul." Ideas are "the faint images of these [impressions] in think- 
ing and reasoning" (I). 
Thus far his description embodies the passive-impression 
theory, and he continues in the same vein when he describes how 
an impression can be derived from an idea. "An impression," he 
writes, "first strikes upon the senses. . . . Of this impression there 
is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression 
ceases; and this we call an idea." This copy can give rise to other 
impressions, for instance those of "desire and aversion"; these 
impressions too are copied, and may "in their turn give rise to 
other impressions and ideas" (7-8). The phenomenon of the as- 
sociation of ideas results from the same kind of mechanistic op- 
eration of the mind, and in fact Hume asserts that one of the three 
main kinds of association, contiguity in time or place, is created 
by the operation of the senses: "as the senses, in changing their 
objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them 
as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long 
custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the 
parts of space and time in conceiving its objects" ( I  I). This is a 
radical suggestion, that the operation of the senses creates not 
only the mind's ideas (its contents) but also its structure-the 
preference for linking ideas contiguous in space and in time. 
Yet the suggestion is perfectly in keeping with the conceptual 
limitations imposed by the mind-as-entity metaphor functioning 
in a theory-constitutive manner. Neither the passive-impression 
theory nor the principle of association logically requires the 
mind to be conceived of as an entity that takes copies of impres- 
sions. It is possible to imagine other means than those desciibed 
by Hume to account for the ability of ideas to give rise to other 
ideas. Likewise, there is no compelling reason why the imagina- 
tion "must run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its 
objects." The assumption that memories of the external world are 
stored so as to replicate that world underlies this statement, but 
the assumption lacks proof or logical necessity. However, it does 
conform to the metaphor: an entity (in the everyday sense of the 
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term) has extension in both space and time, and since the mental 
entity has these features they may well be used for organizing 
impressions. The metaphor does not provide Hume with proof 
for his "must run," but it makes the suggestion more plausible 
and reduces the need to seek additional explanations. 
This is not to say that a concept of the mind as an entity is 
part of Hume's theoretical understanding of the mind. Indeed he 
makes clear in the Teathe that any attempt to describe "the sub- 
stance of the soul" (by which he here means "mind") cannot be 
understood: "All our perceptions are not susceptible of a local 
union, either with what is extended or unextended; there being 
some of the one kind, and some of the other: And as the constant 
conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and 
effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of 
thought, as far as we have any notion of that relation" (250). He 
continues, in discussing the question of personal identity, to as- 
sert that human beings "are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an incon- 
ceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement" 
(252). Thus it is absurd to insist that the human mind has any 
sort of simplicity or identity (253). And earlier, he defines "a mind" 
as "nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, 
united together by certain relations, and suppos7d, tho7 falsely, to 
be endowed with perfect simplicity and identity" (207). 
Clearly, Hume's theoretical predisposition is to deny the mind 
any separate status-it certainly cannot be described as an ex- 
tended substance, nor can perceptions be localized in the physical 
frame. Yet Hume's language for describing mental phenomena is 
solidly rooted in the mind-as-entity metaphor. This is the same 
kind of contradiction that I described in Chapter I between asser- 
tions of the autonomy thesis and expressions relating the mind 
to various physical operations. The writer's theory and practice 
contradict each other; the theory advocates the autonomy thesis 
and draws on the concept of substance defined metaphysically, 
while the practice relies on physicalistic language derived from 
everyday senses of "substance" and "entity." It has been sug- 
gested that Hume was not able to follow up on his own sugges- 
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tions toward a so-called "relational theory of mind . . . because 
of an inconsistent retention of the very categories which he 0s- 
tensibly opposedv-the categories of substance and cause (Mor- 
ris 103). 
Hume's retention of these categories is implicit in his lan- 
guage; in fact, the language of the mind-as-entity metaphor made 
such retention inescapable. For example, the creation of the sen- 
sorium as a "natural object," in Figlio's apt phrase, follows di- 
rectly from that metaphor: in order for ideas to be formed at all, 
there has to exist a specific, tangible place where spirit and matter 
can meet. These qualities can be seen in definitions such as that 
given in Rees's Cyclopaedia: mind is the sensorium plus a con- 
scious or percipient principle, the sensorium being "that orga- 
nized substance, which, without any farther medium, furnishes 
to the conscious or percipient principle the objects of conscious- 
ness or percipiency" ("Philosophy, Mental" n.p.). Rees probably 
means "substance" in what Morris calls the "metaphysical 
sense" as traditionally applied to the mind: "an immaterial 'that,' 
capable of continued and independent existence, and analyzable 
into qualities and a substratum which has relations and supports 
these qualities, without itself being a relation or quality or sum 
of qualities" (8). Rees would reject any attempt to read "orga- 
nized substance" in its everyday sense, which would connote tan- 
- - 
gibility (having substance), extension, and thus a specific loca- 
tion. The everyday sense implies that with the right instruments 
one could actually investigate the sensorium in operation as one 
would investigate any other "natural object." The "metaphysical 
sense" runs counter to that implication, on the reasonable 
grounds that no material instruments but only the mind can per- 
ceive what the sensorium is doing. Unfortunately, the same kind 
of argument can be made against the existence of a sensorium 
defined as Rees defines it. How can a "substance" in the every- 
day sense provide "ideas" to the "conscious or percipient prin- 
ciple," and how can "substance" in the metaphysical sense re- 
ceive sense impressions from tangible external objects? 
This problem does go beyond terminology; it also derives 
from an insurmountable discrepancy between an individual's 
subjective experience and what can be demonstrated objectively 
about perception and knowledge. But the theory-constitutive 
function of the mind-as-entity metaphor is also an important 
cause. This function results from the inability of human beings 
to limit their discourse to "metaphysical" meanings of terms. 
<c Everyday" connotations will slip in and will shape our predis- 
positions: the mind-as-entity metaphor predisposes us to con- 
ceive of the entire mind as an entity and not just as a "substance" 
in the metaphysical sense defined by Morris. Rees explicitly di- 
vides the mind into a thing and a principle, but if the principle is 
not to remain an abstraction, it must take on the attributes of the 
thing. When this happens, it becomes difficult to explore further 
the ideal nature of that "conscious or percipient principle" as 
well as the principle's active nature. Rees probably intends "the 
conscious or percipient principle" to be regarded as active and to 
be taken as the more significant component of the mental system. 
- 
However, most readers will more easily imagine the sensorium 
(because it is defined as a substance), hence that component 
stands out in the definition and renders the whole system rela- 
tively passive. Most of the activity that does occur takes place 
when the sensorium transmits sensations to the percipient prin- 
ciple. 
The theory-constitutive power of the mind-as-entity metaphor 
is striking in descriptions of the process by which ideas of the 
sublime are formed. According to Ernest Tuveson, the Lockean 
system was revolutionary in its insistence that "even the most 
abstract and sublime ideas . . . even the idea of God, are composed 
of-not refined from-discrete impressions7' (Imagination 20- 
21). Psychologists after Locke were concerned to rescue these 
particular ideas from his system, yet the method they settled on 
still required a mental entity that could receive impressions and 
replicate external processes and states in an internal space. 
Dugald Stewart, in his representative essay "On the Sublime," 
proceeds by identifying "a few of the natural associations at- 
tached to the idea of what is physically or literally Sublime" 
(394). In particular, he points out those associations "arising 
from the tendency which the religious sentiments of men, in 
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every age and country, have had to carry their thoughts upwar&, 
towards the objects of their worship" (394-95). The problem 
with this "poetical" usage is that, since we now know the earth 
to be spherical, "the natural association cannot fail to be more or 
less counteracted" in every' mind familiar with the facts (397). 
But even this counteraction can have a positive effect: "the con- 
clusions of modern science leave the imagination at equal liberty 
to shoot, in all directions, through the immensity of space; sug- 
gesting, to a philosophical mind, the most grand and magnificent 
of all conceptions" (398). 
Stewart's language displays the typical problems of attempts 
to apply the autonomy thesis without scrutinizing every word of 
every sentence that purports to describe a mental process. On 
the one hand the upward tendency of thoughts is a "natural as- 
sociation," one which derives from and correlares to the actual 
structure of the external world. On the other hand it is a learned 
association, because it is "counteracted" by modern knowledge. 
Stewart reconciles this apparent contradiction by metaphorically 
representing the mind as containing a space shaped by all of a 
person's knowledge, that acquired through perception and that 
acquired through study and reflection. Within this space, 
thoughts move in directions determined by the metaphoric loca- 
tion of the percipient principle, either at the center of a solid 
celestial sphere or at the center of infinite space. In either case 
the actual movement of the thoughts creates in the mind the sub- 
lime sensation, and the movement itself is stimulated by an exter- 
nal source, either a tangible scene or the written word. 
As an example of the movement and the resulting sense of 
sublimity, Stewart olTers religious writing, which is "beautifully 
accommodated to the irresistable impressions of nature; availing 
itself of such popular and familiar words as upward and down- 
war&" (407). These writers have taken note of "the frailty of the 
human mind, governed so much by sense and imagination, and 
so little by the abstractions of philosophy. Hence the expression 
of fallen Angels, which, by recalling to us the eminence from 
which they fell, communicates, in a single word, a character of 
Sublimity to the bottomless abyss" (407). The writers, according 
Corpuscular Thoughts, Tangible Mind-s 5 7 
. to Stewart, recognized that because of its early and long-lasting 
reliance on sense data, the mind cannot help being "im- 
pressedn-shaped by the hierarchical structure of nature. It is a 
66 natural bias of the imagination" to see natural phenomena as 
physically connected; we tend to "conceive the firmament to be 
something solid, in which the sun, moon, and stars are mechani- 
cally fixed." Modern readers familiar with such "abstractions of 
philosophy" as the laws of gravity and inertia also experience a 
"sentiment of Wonder" in addition to the emotion "excited" by 
perceiving the vastness of the sky (419); this sentiment enhances 
the sublime sensation stimulated by the movement of the 
thoughts within the mental entity. Fortunately for the natural 
philosopher, early impressions from sense data will always be 
stronger than knowledge about intangible concepts which the 
mind simply cannot encompass, such as infinity and action at a 
distance. 
Stewart's description conveys an image of thoughts moving 
within a static mental space; the thoughts themselves are not 
created by the mind but are stimulated from without. Thomas 
Upham uses a more refined image to show how thoughts can 
represent processes outside the mind concurrently with those 
processes. This image occurs in Upham7s description of the dif- 
ference between the emotions of beauty and sublimity. He asks 
his reader to consider the person 
who is supposed to behold a river at its first rise in the mountains, and 
to follow it, as it winds and enlarges itself in the expanse of the ocean. 
For a time the feelings, which are excited within him, as he gazes on the 
prospect, are what are termed emotions of beauty. As the small stream, 
which had hitherto played in the uplands amid foliage, that almost hid 
it from his view, increases its waters, separates its banks to a great 
distance from each other, and becomes the majestic river; his feelings 
are of a more powerful kind. We often, by way of distinction, speak of 
the feelings existing under such circumstances, as emotions of grandeur. 
At last it expands and disappears in the immensity of the ocean; the vast 
illimitable world of billows flashes in his sight. Then the emotion, wid- 
ening and strengthening with the magnitude and energy of the objects, 
which accompany it, becomes sublime. [IntellectualPhilosophy 4071 
58 Metaphors of Mind 
This extended metaphor accurately represents what Upham and 
other psychologists of his time believed to be taking place in the 
mind of a perceiver. The flow of the feelings is directly propor- 
tional to the size of the river beheld by the perceiver. Even more 
specifically, the objects and processes perceived are reproduced 
within the mind, as the final sentence makes clear; it is this inter- 
nal representation which actually generates the emotions. 
such exact parallelism between-what is seen-the flow of the 
river-and what is felt-the flow of the emotions in a smooth 
increase from "beautiful" to "sublime"-can exist only if the 
mind contains a duplicate of the external scene, which means that 
the mental entity must have real dimensions both in space and in 
time, thus must have substance and extension. The extended meta- 
phor does not state this in so many words, but over the full 
length of the description the implications accumulate that the 
writer's thoughts about the subject are being shaped by mind-as- 
entity operating as a theory-constitutive metaphor. Upham was 
surely aware that his extended metaphor violates the autonomy 
thesis so important to his mentors Reid and Stewart. On the 
other hand, it vividly and compactly expresses the otherwise 
inexpressible. This practical virtue was more important for 
Upham, especially for Upham the educator and writer of text- 
books, than any theoretical defect. 
Among modern writers on the theory of the sublime in the 
eighteenth century, Tuveson has noted this underlying current of 
implication in the language used by the theorists. In tracing the 
development of the concept of the imagination as a "means of 
reconciling man, with his spiritual needs and his desire to belong 
to a living universe of purpose and values, with a cosmos that 
begins to appear alien" (Imagination 97), Tuveson sees this con- 
cept as requiring that the mind's ability to expand or rise be "not 
entirely metaphorical." The language of writers on the sublime 
implies that the "contemplation of a physically vast object" in- 
creases "the physical extent of the mind." This "physical enlarge- 
ment" corrects a problem of Lockean psychology, the restriction 
of the mind to a narrow chamber, a "cabinet," a restriction which, 
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combined with Locke's elimination of the innate idea of God, 
seemed to leave no possibility of "grace" (101, 105). 
Tuveson describes a revolutionary change from this view, 
which by the middle of the eighteenth century had become what 
he calls the "orthodox moral aesthetic," to a view which required 
neither a parallel physical process in the mind nor the actual 
existence in nature of qualities that the mind could respond to in 
a sublime way. Tuveson labels both Burke and Alison revolution- 
aries in this sense. Burke insisted that the imagination had no 
cause that human beings could understand and that the feelings 
of sublimity arose from the mechanical process of repetition 
rather than from an elevation or enlargement of the mind (166, 
I 70). Alison's revolutionary work was his Essays on the Prin+le of 
Taste, which traced sublime emotions to associations between 
certain sensations and certain qualities, associations formed early 
in life; the emotion of sublimity is a response not to a natural 
existent but to a sign or symbol, and it is a response conditioned 
in youth (188). What Tuveson fails to remark is that these revo- 
lutionary theories preserve the metaphor of mind-as-entity. 
Burke's mental entity may not enlarge, but it still replicates the 
external phenomenon; Alison's mental entity responds as it does 
because of shapes impressed on it in youth. Near the end of his 
book Tuveson asks why there were so few technical innovations 
in the arts during this period. He suggests that "the teleological 
theory of imagination" kept interest focused on showing "the 
goodness of human nature" and likewise held back any impetus 
to study the mind "for its own sake" and to look at "the real 
problems of the personality" (178-79). I offer a second explana- 
tion. The continuing dominance of mind-as-entity contributed to 
the belief that the mind was pretty well understood and that not 
much was to be gained by studying the individual human being 
rather than "the mind" in general. 
Novelists on the Formation of Ideas 
It is well known that the novelists of the eighteenth century 
frequently refer to trains of association, the example most often 
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cited being Laurence Sterne. Less well known are two important 
facts: the novelists were as interested as their philosopher con- 
temporaries in the more general topic of the formation of ideas, 
and the key features of the mind-as-entity metaphor-passivity, 
impressibility, and extension-are as ~revalent in the novels as 
in the psychological treatises. These features can be explored 
in three novels frequently mentioned as showing psychological 
interest and insight: Samuel Fbchardson's Pamela (1740-44), 
Charles Brockden Brown's meland, or The Eansformation (1794)' 
and Sterne's The L+ fend Opinions of Trirtram Shandy, Gentleman 
( I  760-67). 
What makes Pamela psychological in the eyes of most readers 
is the moment-to-moment view into Pamela's thoughts, in partic- 
ular her unintentional revelations of her attraction to Mr. B as 
that attraction grows into love. This is obviously the novel's 
strength. Its weakness is Pamela's almost complete inability to 
reflect and her correspondingly passive and superficial self- 
awareness. Both the weakness and the strength may result from 
the theory-constitutive role of mind-as-entity. By "theory- 
constitutive" here I don't mean that Richardson consciously ap- 
plied theories of psychology when constructing his novels. But 
his explorations of Pamela's character do have the limits that are 
associated with mind-as-entity; the novel may be read as if Rich- 
ardson consciously set out to apply the psychology of his time 
to a fictional case study of the mind of a young servant girl 
threatened with the loss of her virtue. 
For such a reading, the first point is that while Pamela's letters 
are not devoid of reflections, those she presents consist almost 
entirely of simple comparisons between a present condition- 
not a state of mind-and a previous one. This kind of reflection 
conforms to the mind-as-entity metaphor in that it implies the 
formative connection between the mind and the external world. 
Richardson shows Pamela's life as a succession of conditions; her 
triumph is that she preserves her condition of chastity while add- 
ing the condition of honored, beloved, honest wife. Ian Watt 
gives Richardson "the central place in the development of the 
technique of narrative realism" (26)' because he defined the "pri- 
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mary convention" of "formal realism": "that the novel is a full 
and authentic report of human experience" including "the indi- 
viduality of the actors concerned, the particulars of the times and 
places i f  their actions" (32). 
There is no question that Pamela's report is incredibly de- 
tailed, but it can be called psychologically authentic only within 
the context of the psychology of the eighteenth century. Watt 
correctly notes the belief of post-medieval philosophical realism 
that "truth can be discovered by the individual through his 
senses" (12); it is equally important that two important manifes- 
tations of this belief, the passive-impression theory of perception 
and the principle of the association of ideas, required the individ- 
ual mind to be shaped ("impressed by") the external world 
through the agency of the senses. As a relatively passive entity, 
the mind will be unlikely to engage in reflections that do more 
than compare conditions. Thus Pamela's reflections are seldom 
very personal, seldom fully described, usually general and super- 
ficial: "I gave myself over to sad Reflections upon this strange 
and surprising discovery of John'sn-that he had been showing 
Mr. B her letters to her parents-"for now 1 see, as he says, my 
Ruin has been so long a hatching" (I I 1-12). Richardson effec- 
tively portrays Pamela's confusion at this new discovery by hav- 
ing her shift from proclaiming her own worthlessness in one sen- 
tence to wondering in the next why her master wants to ruin her 
if he really does love her. But the result of her reflection is noth- 
ing more than a stark contrast between virtue as she has been 
taught to understand it and the likely outcome of Mr. B's "devil's 
work." 
The mental entity as imaged by Hartley, Hume, and Locke 
was a corpuscular system: each impression was discrete, each 
idea was a unit, and consciousness consisted of a string of ideas 
and impressions or a train of thoughts, coupled together but still 
separate. Pamela's mind is no different, hence her more detailed 
retrospects remain collections of specific impressions juxtaposed 
against her present impressions. Each succeeding situation is to 
be measured point for point against definite preceding situations. 
One of her more dramatically effective retrospects serves to ac- 
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quaint both Mrs. Jewkes (who functions as her jailor) and the 
reader with some details of her past, in order to dramatize her 
present dilemma: "So I have lived above sixteen Years in Virtue 
and Reputation, and all at once . . . I must renounce all the Good 
. . . for a Pair of Diamond Ear-rings" and a few other treasures 
(174). We are pleased that the usually timid Pamela speaks so 
forcefully, but we should also notice that she sees the two condi- 
tions as simple contrasts; it seems as if for Pamela and for Rich- 
ardson her virtue and the earrings are equally discrete and tan- 
gible. 
She performs a similar measurement of dramatically contrast- 
ing conditions when she has finally accepted Mr. B's protesta- 
tions of love and realizes that the marriage will really take place: 
"What a different Aspect every thing in and about this House 
bears now, to my thinking, to what it once had! The Garden, the 
Pond, the Alcove, the Elm-walk. But, O! my Prison is become 
my Palace!" (291) These examples show that Pamela's awareness 
of herself is literally superficial-limited to the surface of her 
mind and the tangible details of her existence. The awareness is 
also passive; it is not something she seeks but something that 
comes to her from the external world. The passive-impression 
theory even seems to apply to a feeling that can only have come 
from within her, her developing love for Mr. B: "I know not how 
it came, nor when it begun; but creep, creep it has, like a Thief 
upon me; and before I knew what was the Matter, it look'd like 
Love" (214). She may be using the pejorative simile because in 
this one case she does not have access to the discrete perceptions 
and associations which make up the feeling; she lacks the precise 
details of how and when. Without this knowledge she can only 
regard the feeling negatively, although at the same time she is 
powerfully influenced by it. 
Richardson's strength and weakness as a psychologist in this 
novel are two sides of the same coin: he concentrates exclusively 
on his heroine's moment-to-moment conditions and treats them 
as discrete, each having a particular impact on Pamela's passive 
mind. That mind, after Mr. B asks her to remain just one fort- 
night longer, is "tortur'd with twenty different Thoughts in a 
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Minute," and her final decision, to deny his request, follows on 
this detail: "and the odious frightful Closet [where he had hidden 
himself] came into my Head" (84). In this passage her mind is 
simply a "presence-room" for recording the reversals of her 
opinion, simplistically signaled with a series of contrastive words 
and phrases ("but" and "but then" three times each, "well" and 
"well then" once each), and the final series of thoughts that leads 
to the decision, just as simplistically signaled with a series of 
and%. My point is not to deny Pamela status as a psychological 
novel but to identify those aspects which are rightly called psy- 
chological. When we praise Richardson for recording the minute 
fluctuations of Pamela's thoughts and even more for creating the 
method he called "writing to the minute" which makes possible 
such recording in the first place, we need to understand that these 
thoughts are the reactions of a relatively passive mind to exter- 
nally imposed or impressed stimuli, that Pamela's mind is as 
much a prisoner of the external world as she is a captive of Mr. 
B, that her concept of herself as virtuous has been totally shaped 
by her parents and her early religious training, and that as a re- 
sult her mind has nothing which could properly be called its own 
life. 
It is also necessary to understand that in choosing a young 
servant girl as his protagonist, Richardson could not avoid the 
limitations attributed by his era to a woman's ability to form 
ideas. The mind-as-entity metaphor required that all minds be 
somewhat passive, but within this general rule women were 
viewed as more open than men to external impressions, more 
likely to form casual, false associations, and less able to engage 
in fruitful reflections. Stewart presents this standard view in a 
section of his Elements, titled "The Sexes," in which he concen- 
trates on women and mentions men only by contrast. His con- 
trolling assumption is that woman's "delicacy of frame" leaves 
her not just physically but mentally susceptible to external pres- 
sures. For this reason women's minds are "more open to the ef- 
fects of casual impressions, and of such associations as regulate 
the train of thought in a mind which has no particular object in 
view" (4:240). Because women tend to be more driven by their 
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passions than men, he continues, they are also inferior "in a 
power of steady and concentrated attention.'' Stewart voices the 
common belief of his period when he states that of all fields of 
action the one least accessible to women was "the philosophy of 
mind". . LC for as their early habits invite their attention constantly 
to sensible objects, their minds become singularly alive to things 
external, and of consequence more liable to those habits of inat- 
tention to the phenomena of the internal world, which, while 
they damp their curiosity with respect to these phenomena, pre- 
vent the cultivation of that power of reflection, without which it is 
impossible to study them with success" (4:242). This passage 
effectively summarizes the supposed natural limitations of the 
female mind. Where the woman is young, not well educated, and 
in a situation that constantly forces her to experience the strong- 
est passions of fear, hope, and love, it is not surprising that her 
mental activity consists almost solely of recording the impres- 
sions of the moment and that her reflections cbnsist of simple 
contrasts. 
Brown's Fieland exhibits the same focus on details as Pamela, 
but where Richardson records minutia of time, place, and event, 
Brown stresses the sensations that arise from events and the 
ideas generated by the sensations. Brown wrote that "An accurate 
history . . . of the thoughts and feelings of any man, for one hour, 
is more valuable for some minds than a system of geography" 
(quoted by Pattee in his introduction to the novel, xxxviii). Vie- 
land embodies this goal fairly successfully. Clara Wieland, the 
narrator, is exceedingly impressible, especialy when the stimulus 
has something about it of the sublime or mysterious. She gives 
the following description of her state of mind after an appareritly 
(6 super-human" event occurs: "My heart was scarcely large 
enough to give admittance to so swelling a thought. An awe, the 
sweetest and most solemn that imagination can conceive, per- 
vaded my whole frame. . . . An impulse was given to my. spir- 
its. . . . I was impressed with the belief of mysterious, but not of 
malignant agency" (7  I). This is an excellent example of the phe- 
nomenon that Hume described: an idea (Clara's "thought") giv- 
ing rise to a whole series of sensations and ideas. And her reac- 
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tions when she first hears Carwin's voice demonstrate how 
powerless she is to resist external impressions: "I cannot pretend 
to communicate the impression that was made upon me by these 
accents. . . . [The voice] imparted to me an emotion altogether 
involuntary and incontroulable [sic]" (59). When she sees the 
man's face, the same thing happens: "The impression that it made 
was vivid and indelible" (60); the face "continued for hours to 
occupy my fancy, to the exclusion of almost every other image" 
(61). This series of events, as Clara narrates it, reveals both the 
impressibility of her mind and her susceptibility to different kinds 
of stimuli, not only visual and aural but also the inner stimulus 
of a thought. 
Clara's mind is not unusually passive in the context of the 
novel. Her descriptions of her brother's mental processes show 
that mental passivity is actually part of Brown's systematic psy- 
chology. We see this as early as her description of Wieland's re- 
action to the first strange voice (39-40). Clara's great fear was 
that he would respond to the event rather than remain indifferent, 
since any reaction would indicate "a diseased conditon of his 
frame." Her basis for this belief is that "the will is the tool of the 
understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the notices 
of sense.,' If Wieland's senses were in some way "diseased," they 
would carry stronger than normal impressions from the event to 
his passive mind, adversely affecting his understanding and thus 
his will. This is exactly what happens, as subsequent events re- 
veal-Wieland is strengthened in his conviction that he has been 
chosen by God for some great test of faith. This event also makes 
an impression on him because of his "ardent and melancholy" 
character: he tends to fasten on certain abstract ideas, which ob- 
tain "an immovable hold upon .his mind" because through fre- 
quent repetition they have been "rendered familiar, and, in some 
sort, palpable to his intellect." His mind, like Clara's, is equally 
impressible by external phenomena and his own thoughts, so it 
is not surprising that her fears are realized. The event does have 
(6 a visible effect in augmenting his gravity." Clara remarks that 
"when we sifted his thoughts, they were generally found to have 
a relation more or less direct with this incident" (40). 
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Implicit in the attempt to "sift" someone's thoughts is the con- 
cept of thoughts themselves as discrete units which can be sepa- 
rated out according to size or weight, as if they are atoms or 
corpuscles. Thoughts are separable from the individual mind. 
They are the elements upon which the mental entity performs its 
operations; like the mind itself, they are entities. This concept 
accounts for such passages as the following: "Order could not 
readily be introduced into my thoughts. . . . I strove to give a 
slower motion to my thoughts . . . but my efforts were nugatory" 
(105). Even more significant than thoughts from external events 
having an independent existence is the implication that those 
generated by the mind also become independent-independent 
of the will. This phenomenon helps explain the subjective im- 
pression of the mind being divided against itself. Clara's moment 
of division comes when she is trying to decide whether or not to 
keep a suggested rendezvous with her tormentor: "What was it 
that swayed me? I felt myself divested of the power to will con- 
trary to the motives that determined me to seek his presence. My 
mind seemed to be split into separate parts, and these parts to 
have entered into furious and implacable contention" ( I  59). 
It was a first principle of the psychology of this period that the 
mind was indivisible. Nevertheless, the psychologists could not 
deny the subjective reality Clara describes; even in the eighteenth 
century people experienced the sensation of a mind split into 
separate parts, contending against itself. In the nineteenth cen- 
tury, this sensation became one of the ingredients in portraying 
the life of the mind, but then in the nineteenth century the link 
between the mind of man and the mind of God was weakened or 
done away with altogether. The eighteenth century accounted for 
the sensation by granting thoughts the same separate-entity sta- 
tus as mind. Each thought could exert a separate influence on the 
mind, one thought impelling the will in one direction, the next 
thought impelling the emotions or the intellect in another. As 
Hume had explained, the copies of impressions taken by the 
mind can give rise to other impressions and ideas, and each idea 
generated will be linked by association to the generating idea or 
impression. As Clara's thoughts whirl through her mind, each 
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one will call up a different set of associations, including asso- 
ciated emotions, while the "I" is buffeted like a small boat in a 
tempest. 
Yet the impressibility of the human mind, as dictated by the 
mind-as-entity metaphor, helps Clara return to health after the 
havoc wreaked by her brother. The destruction of her house 
breaks "the monotonous and gloomy series" of her thoughts; "A 
new train of images," she relates, "disconnected with the fate of 
family, forced itself on my attention" (266). Thus she accedes to 
her uncle's request to accompany him to Montpellier and finally 
does find a fulfiling life. Her sick mind could be impressed with 
new sensations, which would result in new associations and 
ideally a whole new cast of character. This kind of regeneration 
may not be possible for minds in which deluded ideas have be- 
come "palpable," such as Wieland's, because these minds have no 
way to distinguish between the deluded ideas and impressions 
from the external world. 
Unlike Richardson and Brown, Laurence Sterne seems to have 
been aware that the concept of mind-as-entity held problems as 
an explanation of the formation of ideas. He took both the 
passive-impression theory and the principle of associaton to log- 
ical and comical extremes. Yet his critical ploy is consistent with 
mind-as-entity in its theory-constitutive role: the metaphor will 
be explored and its limits defined, but it will not generate any 
new concepts. Sterne7s criticisms did not lead him to new under- 
standing of the formation of ideas; no less than the minds of 
Pamela and Clara Wieland, Tristram Shandy's mind is shaped by 
the external world. 
It is clear from the presentation of Walter Shandy's hypothesis 
concerning the best manner of birth that Sterne was dissatisfied 
with the passive-impression theory's view of the mind as a phys- 
ical entity. The hypothesis was based on Walter's post-Cartesian 
decision that the seat of the soul is not the pineal gland. Rather, 
"the chief sensorium, or headquarters of the soul, and to which 
place all intelligences were referred, and from whence all her 
mandates were issued,-was in, or near, the ~erebellum.~' He was 
also convinced that "the subtlety and fineness of the soul de- 
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pended upon the . . . finer net-work and texture in the cerebellum 
itself," which means that Caesarean section was the preferred 
method of birth, and failing that, then feet first rather than head 
first. Of  normal birth, Father Shandy remarked, "what havoc and 
destruction must this [~ressure  on the head during the process of 
birth, which he estimates at 470 psi] make in the infinitely fine 
and tender texture of the cerebellum" (163-64). Walter found it 
even more alarming that "this force, acting upon the very vertex 
of the head, not only injured the brain itself or cerebrum,-but 
that it necessarily squeezed and propelled the cerebrum towards 
the cerebellum, which was the immediate seat of the understand- 
ing!" (164). For Walter this amply explained why "so many of 
our best heads are no better than a puzzled skein of silk,-all 
perplexity-all confusion within-side" ( I  6 5 ) .  
Each sentence in this discussion, taken alone, seems relatively 
reasonable. Walter Shandy is certainly correct in discarding Des- 
cartes7 hypothesis about the pineal gland, but he does not ques- 
tion the principle that "the chief sensorium" has a specific loca- 
tion. Does Sterne question it? Sterne certainly makes fun of 
Walter's pseudo-exact location of the sensorium-"in, or near, 
the cerebellumn-but he says nothing against specifying some 
location. Walter is not unreasonable in believing that the defor- 
mation of the skull during birth may deform the brain, but Sterne 
implies that it is something else again to hold that the "fine and 
tender texrure of the cerebellum" can be damaged by the pressure 
and that squeezing together the cerebrum and cerebellum during 
birth may cause confusion in the adult. What Sterne seems to be 
criticizing here is not the assumption that the mind is a tangible 
entity or  that it is marked by vibrations from the external world 
transmitted through the senses, but the hubris of those who 
would specify its location within the cranium and regard it as 
directly impressible by gross physical forces. 
The basic components of the metaphor-passivity, impressi- 
bility, and extension-remain intact; Tristram's moral character 
is formed by the action of external events transmitted through 
vibrations to his mind and imprinted there. One of the most im- 
portant of these events is Uncle Toby's freeing of the fly when 
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the boy was ten years old. Tristram describes .the result thus: 
"The lksson of universal good-will then taught and imprinted by 
my uncle Toby, has never since been worn out of my mind" 
(13 1). The  incident found "a passage" to Tristram's "heart" as a 
result of his nerves setting his "whole frame into one vibration 
- 
of most pleasurable sensation," which tells us that the process 
was a mechanical one, like that described by Hartley, but also 
that Tristram was already so formed as to find the vibration 
pleasing. Not only was the lesson "imprinted" on his mind but 
the impression endured through the wearing-down actions of 
everyday life. This description contains none of the comical ex- 
aggeration of his father's hypothesis about the sensorium; it 
seems to represent Sterne's view of the formation of fundamental 
ideas that make up an individual's character. 
Tristram's attempt to draw his uncle Toby? character is in 
keeping with this view of mind and character being shaped by 
individual events. And here too Sterne illustrates the problems 
without offering an alternative view. Tristram's narrative method 
in general, as he describes it, is digressive and progressive "at 
the same time," allowing him to introduce and reconcile "two 
contrary motions." He has "constructed the main work and the 
adventitious parts of it with such intersections, and has so com- 
plicated and involved the digressive and progressive movements, 
one wheel within another, that the whole machine, in general, 
has been kept a-going" rather than proceeding haltingly, as do 
the stories of many less fortunate authors, first a bit of the "main 
work" and then a digression (95). The two wheels of Tristram's 
portrait of his uncle are Toby's modesty and his hobbyhorse. The 
relationship between the wheels is comphcated, in that there is 
no point-for-point connection between Toby's mental furniture 
andthe  significant events of his life, yet simple in that his mod- 
esty and his hobbyhorse together provide the motive force of the 
(< machine": the hobbyhorse, a model of the siege of Namur, is 
intended to relieve Toby of the difficulty of explaining verbally 
(especially to the opposite sex) how he received his groin injury. 
The  digressive method is how Tristram (and Sterne) attempt 
to reflect the complexity not only of such seemingly simple situ- 
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ations and characters but also of the actual attempt to illustrate 
accurately and literally. A structure of wheels within wheels, of 
intertwining progressions and digressions, is a promising way to 
capture the non-linear, non-corpuscular nature of experience. 
The structure itself could be a metaphor in that it gives us (in Dr. 
Johnson's phrase) two ideas for one, the tenor being that literally 
inexpressible aspect of mental experience. In this particular in- 
stance there are no clear signals to tell a reader to adopt such a 
perspective, yet that very lack could be regarded as part of the 
structural metaphor. But a problem arises with this reading. In 
attempting to get at the essence of Toby through the wheels that 
move him, Tristram resembles the scientists of Schon7s paint- 
brush-as-pump story, with one important difference: the pump 
metaphor did help the scientists generate a new description of 
how a paintbrush works to pick up paint, whereas Tristram'sl 
Sterne's structural metaphor remains constrained by the old met- 
aphor of mind-as-entity. The wheels-within-wheels metaphor al- 
lows him to tell the story so that it embodies the confusion 
within Toby's mind, but it does not lead him to a better grasp of 
how Toby is moved. It is like an attempt to modify the crystal 
spheres model of the heavens, or like Hartley7s adoption of New- 
ton's concepts without the attendant calculus-important details 
remain inexpressible both literally and metaphorically. 
One of the novel's pleasures (and difficulties) is trying to fol- 
low Tristram as he tries to trace various lines of reasoning to 
explain Uncle Toby. Indeterminacy is the rule, as we see in Tris- 
tram's association of Uncle Toby's modesty with his reticence in 
using words. Early in his story Tristram first connects one of 
Toby's character traits to a physical event: his modesty, which 
was almost equal to that of a woman, "if such a thing could be" 
(go), is shown to be a result of the groin injury he suffered during 
the seige of Namur. The injury took four years to heal, in part 
because Toby became so perplexed in attempting to explain the 
history of his wound and the history of his part of the battle that 
his cure was retarded and his life endangered (101). The problem 
was that "when he could not retreat out of the ravelin without 
getting into the half-moon, or get out of the covered way without 
falling down the counterscarp, nor cross the dyke without danger 
of slipping in," his mind became fretted, which led to "sharp 
paroxysms and exacerbations of his wound" (104-5). Tristram 
then exhibits the same problem. Having gone this far with one of 
the main wheels, he launches into a digression by asking if his 
imagined critic has read Locke7s Essay Concerning the Understand- 
ing, his purpose being to describe three causes of "obscurity and 
confusion, in the mind of man.'' Like Walter's belief about the 
best method of birth, the three causes are all based on a concep- 
tion of the human mind as a physical system: "dull organs," 
"slight and transient impressions," and "a memory like unto a 
sieve, not able to retain what it has received" (106-7). There 
follows a digressive analogy relating one Dolly, her thimble, and 
her sealing wax to impressions made or not so well made on the 
memory. But the only purpose of this analogy and the reference 
to Locke, Tristram finally announces, is, "after the manner of the 
great physiologists," to show the world what Uncle Toby's con- 
fusion was not caused by (108). The cause was words, especially 
"the unsteady uses" of the words relating to Toby's hobbyhorse. 
Tristram's own attempt at explanation seems exceedingly un- 
steady until he comes to this point about the power of words to 
impress Toby's mind. Here the digression ends, as Tristram begs 
his "gentle critic" to "drop a tear of pity upon his scarp and 
counterscarp;-his glacis and his covered way;-his ravelin and 
his half-moon: 'Twas not by ideas,-by heaven! his life was put 
in jeopardy by words" (108). Yet the first mention of the scarp, 
the glacis, and so forth made explicit the point that whether the 
mental excitement derives from words or ideas, the result is 
physiological-"exacerbations of his wound.'' While the digres- 
sion effectively satirizes "the great physiologists" in their attempt 
to explain mental processes by strictly physical means, Toby 
clearly believes that the problems of explanation were harming 
his health: although he "could not philosophize upon it;-'twas 
enough he felt it was so" (105). Tristram, and through him 
Sterne, betrays no doubt that the mental entities of "covered 
way" and "half-moon" were having an adverse effect, or that 
Trim's suggestion of actually modeling the battlefield caused To- 
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by's bowling green to be instantly "painted" upon the "retina" of 
his "fancy" and thus brought the hobbyhorse into being at one 
stroke. 
The overall effect of these wheels within wheels should be that 
we understand how a physical event (Toby's injury) affected his 
mind, led to the externalization of his memories in the form of a 
model, and contributes to his verbal difficulties with the widow 
Wadman. We understand this interaction just as we understand 
how Toby's modesty is revealed during the story of Aunt Dinah 
and the coachman-not with "great contours" but with "some 
familiar strokes and faint designations" (94). That is, we remark 
Toby's gentleness and modesty in his expressions, expostula- 
tions, and whistling of "Lillabullero" while his brother narrates 
the elopement. 
Sterne was well aware that, as Locke, Reid, and others had 
said, it was impossible to obtain a record of all that had passed 
within a given mind since birth. The best that could be achieved 
was a general understanding of the processes by which ideas 
were formed, and a record of the contents of a few individuals' 
minds for an hour or so. For these ends, the passive-impression 
theory of perception and the association theory of the formation 
of ideas were sufficient. With the story of Walter's hypothesis, 
Tristram and Sterne show that it is not-valid to apply the theory 
in a coarse way, and with the story of the origin of Toby's hob- 
byhorse they show allegiance to mind-as-entity by recording the 
momentary fluctuations of Tristram's ideas and the formative ef- 
fect of discrete external events on his and Toby's characters. 
Such a reading of Sterne's approach to the topic of the forma- 
tion of ideas helps resolve a major critical-historical question: the 
extent to which he is Lockean or anti-Lockean. On a strictly ver- 
bal level, notes W G. Day, Sterne borrows from over sixiy au- 
thors, uses the language of Locke7s Essay eight times, and by 
these direct borrowings to some degree satirizes Locke. Day con- 
cludes that Locke should not be taken as the key to the novel. 
Looking more at concepts, Howard Anderson concludes that 
Thtram Shandy constitutes a significant criticism of Locke7s view 
of associationism as an "unnatural" process. Anderson believes 
Corpuscular Thoughts, Tangi%le Minds 73 
that associationism leads us to an understanding of the passions 
and principles that dominate Tristram7s mind (10~). TO-be sure 
these are "ncn-rational connections," and Locke did identify 
them as aberrant, but in the context of the novel they are compre- 
hensible and above all natural: "they are the common associa- 
tions of the human mind," although given a unique cast by being 
part of Tristram's mind (103-6). 
Given the preponderance of these non-rational connections 
in the novel, Arndld Davidson suggests that not Locke but Hume 
is the psychologist whose thought "pervades the novel" (18). 
Tuveson just as cogently holds that Sterne uses "association of 
ideas" in the Lockean sense ("the combinations which by chance 
form outside the reflective activity of the understanding") but 
- 
intends no serious criticism of that theory ("Locke and Sterne" 
268). Neither Locke nor Sterne conceive of mental activity as 
"the mere setting up of connections in a neural machine" (261). 
Marco Loverso agrees, finding Locke and Sterne aligned in their 
approach to consciousness and self-knowledge through the con- 
cept of the train of ideas. Much earlier, Kenneth MacLean called 
Sterne "the most industrious of all Locke's literary apostles" 
(17). The most convincing proponent of this position is Helene 
Moglen, who sees Locke's epistemology and theory of language 
as fundamental to the characterization of Tristram, to the struc- 
ture of Thitrarn %andy, and finally to the psychology implicit in 
the novel. But it is Locke creatively interpreted, Moglen correctly 
- 
insists: "Tristram, in his search for identity, attempts to rise above 
the mechanism of his responses by ordering his impressions- 
attempting to trace them to their source, discovering in memory 
the unifying self that is the sum of its experiences. That Tristram 
is hindered at every point by the conditioning forces that propel 
him, even at the moment of his seeking to become master over 
them, is the tragi-comic paradox of the human dilemma. But the 
affirmation is posited in the attempt" (17). And in her concluding 
chapter, Moglen sees Sterne's interpretation of Locke as pro- 
phetic of the "contemporary vision," looking forward to Berg- 
son, William James, Joyce, and the absurdists. 
There are several explanations for these different readings of 
74 Metaphors of Mind 
the Locke-Sterne question, chief among them being the difficulty 
of pinning either author down to a single position. With Sterne 
the possibility of irony is ever present, and with both authors 
what they say on one page may be directly or implicitly contra- 
dicted on the next. While we cannot easily determine their like- 
mindedness either by looking strictly at Sterne's direct borrow- 
ings or by attempting to interpret the psychology of each, we can 
notice the significant similarity in their figurative language. This 
approach reveals that Sterne is aware of the problems inherent in 
the mind-as-entity metaphor but does not improve on that meta- 
phor. His reference to an image being painted on Toby's fancy is 
not qualitatively different from the Lockean school's sieves and 
impressions. This is a perfect instance of the metaphor operating 
in a theory-constitutive way. The experiential problem that 
Sterne is dealing with (language's impact on mind and body), his 
structure of wheels within wheels, and his willingness to experi- 
ment with language and narrative structure could lead to a con- 
ceptual revolution or at least to a new generative metaphor. In- 
stead he carries on with normal science, as it were, adding to the 
existing theory of how ideas are formed (by substantive externals 
and by the mind itself) another component: ideas painted by 
words. As James Swearingen observes, "Locke does not realize 
the full promise of his initial insight [into the formation of ideas] 
because he studies the mind as an empirical object" and thereby 
<< misses the richly complex processes of consciousness available 
to a reflective method" (3 7-36). Sterne succeeds, "albeit in a ten- 
tative and philosophically unsystematic way," where Locke fails: 
he creates a narrator who "engages in the reflective explication 
of his own consciousness as rooted in a particular time and 
place" instead of trying to construct a consciousness on the basis 
of a few limited principles. 
Development of Idem and the Active Mind 
The developmental psychology of the eighteenth century 
combines a view of the mind as a relatively passive entity with a 
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view of the mind as active in its own formation. These two views 
are balanced differently by different writers, but the general out- 
lines are clear. Ideas are formed by the laws of association oper- 
ating on perceptions impressed by the external world and on per- 
ceptions and ideas generated by the mind itself. As the mind 
matures, it becomes able to select among experiences which will 
yield impressions, and it becomes able to reflect on its own op- 
erations. If the mind develops in the normal way it will achieve a 
healthy balance between reliance on and independence from ex- 
ternal impressions. Normal development requires that the young 
mind be well stocked with the right kind of' impressions-those 
from the natural and human realms-and that mental exercise be 
suited to age: younger minds should not engage in speculation 
and reflection. 
A mind shaped according to these principles would necessarily 
be impressed with accurate ideas about the external world and 
about its own relationship to that world; such a mind could then 
take an active role in its own further development. Failure to 
understand this possibility has led literary historians to oversim- 
plify all of pre-twentieth-century psychology as built on a strictly 
passive, impressible mind. (See for example, Ryan.) True, the 
mental entity was most likely to be represented as passive in 
discussions of the early formation of ideas, but when the psy- 
chologists considered, as they sometimes did, the development 
of the mental entity itself, they attributed to it a certain amount 
of active power. 
It was a fundamental tenet of the psychology of the period 
that the relationship between the mind and the external world 
was not accidental but had been designed by God to serve His 
ends. As Upham describes the relationship, "We have seen the 
mind placed in the position of a necessary connexion with the 
material world through the medium of the senses, and in this way 
awakened into life, activity, and power. Inanimate matter seems 
to have been designed and appointed by Providence as the hand- 
maid and nurse of the mind in the days of its infancy; . . . Material 
eyes were given to the soul . . . that it might see . . . and material 
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hands, that it might handle. . . . By means of these and other 
senses we become acquainted with whatever is visible and tan- 
gible, and has outline and form" (MentalPhilosophy I 19). 
One of the more curious aspects of this passage is that a mind 
can be talked about without referring to the person to whom it 
belongs. This concept is conveyed by the presence of the mind 
or the soul as the subject of nearly every clause and nearly every 
proposition implied by the embedded sentence elements. Only 
one clause uses the personal pronoun: "we become acquainted 
with whatever is visible and tangible." A second curious aspect is 
Upham7s easy shift from "mind" to "soul," a shift that suggests 
equivalence. Upham seems equally comfortable with suggesting 
that the SOUL was awakened into life, activity, and power by the 
material world. The mind can exist in relation to the external 
world independently of a person, so it seems, and the soul has an 
infancy and can be awakened. Both points reveal the theory- 
constitutive pressure of the mind-as-entity metaphor. Even this 
divinely designed process must conform to the model of the mind 
as an entity, albeit in this case not the passive entity implied by 
the simple model of perception and the association principle. 
The  point could also be expressed from the perspective of the 
natural sciences. Sampson Reed's goal is to show how "the nat- 
ural sciences, the actual condition of society, and the Word of 
God, are necessary to the development of all minds" (81-82). In 
other words, "the natural sciences are the basis of all useful 
knowledge" ( 3  5 ) .  TO develop this point Reed relies on an explicit 
simile, mind as a physical system: "The actual cohesion of the 
human mind is, as it were, the solid substance, in which the laws 
of moral and intellectual philosophy and political economy 
(whatever may be their quality) exist embodied, as the natural 
sciences do in the material world. A knowledge of those laws . . . 
is the natural consequence of the development of the affections 
by which a child is connected with those that surround him" 
(54). If the mind is brought by careful stages to an encounter 
with something like one of the abstract sciences, it can become 
like "an active solvent" of the subject, which then falls to pieces 
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and recrystallips (the term is Reed's) in "an 'arrangement agree- 
able to that of the mind itself" (68). 
Implicit in Reed's and Upham7s descriptions is the responsibil- 
ity of individuals and society in general to provide conditions in 
which impressions accurately represent the external world and 
thus contribute to the formation of healthy minds. Stewart con- 
siders this relationship several times in his Elements. He identifies 
education's first priority as making sure that "the understanding 
is well stored with particular facts," for example those from 
chemistry, physics, and history; only then can one profit from 
introspection and examination of one's own mental faculties 
( ~ 4 2 1 ) .  Education should attempt to "impress truth on the mind 
in early infancy," because we see on a daily basis "how suscep- 
tible the tender mind is of deep impressions" (~73-74) .  The most 
valuable task of education is to associate an infant's first concep- 
tions of the Deity with "the early impressions produced on the 
heart by the beauties of nature" (2374-75). The almost certain 
result of such association will be to make the mature individual 
sensible of the "innumerable proofs" of the universe's "harmony 
of design.,' This harmony "forces itself irresistably on the 
thoughts of all who are familiarly conversant with the phenom- 
ena either of the material or of the moral world" (3:289). 
The language of this program carries its own justification in 
the form of the concept of an impressible mind. It was simply not 
open to question that the external world could be accurately rep- 
resented or  that invisible moral realities were as tangible as the 
visible physical realities. According to Stewart, the unquestion- 
able presumption of every thoughtful individual had to be that 
66 there is one great moral system, corresponding to the material 
system; and that the connexions which we at present trace" 
among the objects composing the material system intimate 
"some vast scheme, comprehending all the intelligent beings 
who compose the other" (3:296). Although the youthful mind is 
naturally passive, structured to take whatever impressions are 
presented to it, maturity brings the ability to exercise some con- 
trol over the impressions to be received. The mind never out- 
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grows its essentially passive nature but rather develops a comple- 
mentary "active power." 
The passive-active relationship is expressed by Wordsworth in 
the following familiar lines from "Expostulation and Reply," 
which can be regarded as a mind-as-entity paradigm: 
The eye-it cannot choose but see; 
We cannot bid the ear be still; 
Our bodies feel, where'er they be, 
Against or with our will. 
Nor less I dream that there are Powers 
Which of themselves our minds impress; 
That we can feed this mind of ours 
In a wise passiveness. 
As Wordsworth expresses the concept, it is paradoxical: How can 
the mind be fed by passiveness, and how can a person feed a 
mind when the mind is the person? Yet Wordsworth's point is 
exactly that the mind as an entity can relax itself and admit im- 
pressions from the "powers17 For the psychology of this period, 
a person's development is fundamentally complete when the 
mind can exercise significant control over its impressions. Thus 
Stewart on "good sense in the conduct of life": "that temper of 
mind which enables its possessor to view . . . with perfect cool- 
ness and accuracy, all the various circumstances of his situation; 
so that each of them may produce its due impression on him, 
without any exaggeration arising from his own peculiar habits" 
(Elements 2:4~9-60). Wordsworth and Stewart are making the 
- 
same point as shown by their figurative language, and it is a point 
common to all theorists of the mind contemporaneous with 
them: once a person has reached that high stage of development, 
the feelings and emotions should be held in check so that the 
mind can take impressions. To understand that the mind will take 
impressions is to achieve maturity; once the impressions have 
been taken, they can then be calmly viewed in the mind's 
presence-room or sensorium and can be acted on in accordance 
with the principles of good sense. This intrinsic activity of the 
mind is part of the development of every normal human being 
Corpuscular Thoughts, Tangible Mindc 79 
and is an essential component of the psychology of the period, 
an aspect which is too often overlooked by historians who see 
the passive-impression theory as a full and complete description 
of pre-modern psychology. Such oversight has the effect of cre- 
ating sharp historical discontinuities, as Robert Langbaum does 
when he oversimplifies post-Lockean associationism in order to 
dramatize the "new certainty about self and the self's percep- 
tions" established by Wordsworth and the other "romanti- 
cists" (46). 
An excellent example of the novelistic presentation of mental 
development as governed by the mind-as-entity metaphor is 
found in Brown's Eeland. The narrator specifically notes that the 
elder Wieland7s character was formed as a young man, when he 
<c spent all his time pent up in a gloomy apartment, or traversing 
narrow and crowded streetsl' The result was that "His heart 
gradually contracted a habit of morose and gloomy reflection" 
which only became stronger as he progressed through life to his 
dramatically mysterious ending-spontaneous combustion (8). 
Likewise, his son's temper, characterized by "a sort of thrilling 
melancholy," has been solidified by the active efforts of his intel- 
lect: "All his actions and practical sentiments are linked with long 
and abstruse deductions" (25,  39). The characters of both men 
were warped because their education was exactly the opposite of 
that recommended by Stewart. Both entered on reflection and 
introspection before their minds were strong enough for those 
arduous tasks. As a result, each was particularly susceptible to 
u exaggeration [of impressions] arising from his own peculiar 
habits." Despite the mal-formative influences of their youth, both 
father and son developed minds of extraordinary active power. 
Both minds are powerful enough to create hallucinations, and the 
father's possibly generates a self-consuming fire. Their active 
powers take these particular forms, the language makes clear, 
because their youthful experiences "contracted" their "life, activ- 
ity, and power"; their environments were their handmaids and 
nurses, but indifferent ones. 
Eeiand is also typical of the novels of the eighteenth century 
in treating the characters7 early years with relative brevity. The 
80 Metaphors of Mind 
novelists were not particularly interested in the development of 
the mind as such. They considered that no complete history was 
possible-they could not record every impression. It was pos- 
sible either to record or to infer the impressions that combined to 
form a given idea; it was also possible to record the hue of the 
impressions taken by a young mind, to relate them to a particular 
cast of character, and to show how this cast brought about a 
particular state of mind in a mature individual. Richardson was 
not interested in the formation of Pamela's mind but wanted to 
show how her moment-to-moment experiences impressed them- 
selves on her mind. Similarly, Sterne did not try to trace the 
growth of Tristram's mind but concentrated on showing that 
mind's moment-to-moment ebullitions. Tristram's description of 
the processes in Dr. Slop's mind is a perfect model of Sterne's 
conception of his task with respect to Tristram's mind: "The 
thought [of Mrs. Shandy lying in bed about to give birth] floated 
only in Dr. Slop's mind, without wail or ballast to it, as a simple 
proposition; millions of which, as your worship knows, are 
everyday swimming quietly in the middle of the thin juice of a 
man's 'understanding, without being carried backwards or for- 
wards, till some little gusts of passion or interest drive them to 
one side" (179). For Slop, the gust is provided by a noise over- 
head, near Mrs. Shandy's bed, and he is reminded of a task more 
important than simply getting his medical bag opened. 
The novelist can proceed quite effectively by noting the direc- 
tion taken by the mind in response to any given gust of passion 
or interest. It is neither possible nor necessary to describe how 
each of those millions of simple propositions came to exist in the 
mind: one need only describe the tendency imparted to the mind 
by a particular stimulus, in the same way that one need not know 
the behavior of each molecule in a gas-filled chamber in order to 
know how the pressure in the chamber will change as the tem- 
perature is changed. Once the general shape of the youthful mind 
has been sketched by indicating the tone and timbre of early im- 
pressions, the novelist is free to assume that shape as a given in 
depicting the character's later life. 
The mind-as-entity metaphor continued to influence the fic- 
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tional portrayal of mental development well into the nineteenth 
century, although the changing view of the balance between the 
mind's passivity and activity was creating some tension in the 
language. We can see this tension develop in three novels of Jane 
Austen: Northanger Abbey (written in I 797, published in I 8 I 8), 
Emma (I  8 16), and Persuasion (written in I 8 I 7, published in I 8 I 8). 
Austen's two final novels are striking because they lack much of 
the language associated with mind-as-entity although they dwell 
on events whose significance lies totally in the minds of the char- 
acters concerned, that is, on events that invite and even seem to 
require the use of the language. Her first is as much at ease with 
this metaphor as the final two are not. 
Austen's sparing use of sensationalist language in Emma indi- 
cates her awareness of how much the mind-as-entity metaphor 
does not account for. She presents Emma going through changes 
and being defined in the context of characters around her. Emma 
makes errors of interpretation and then learns from each error, 
her greatest error being her failure to see that Mr. Knightley is 
her destined husband. The references to Emma's mind assume 
the mind-as-entity metaphor, for example when she discovers 
that Mr. Elton is wooing her and not Harriet Smith: "her mind 
had never been in such perturbation, and it needed a very strong 
effort to appear attentive and cheerful till the usual hour of sepa- 
rating allowed her the relief of quiet reflection" (133).  This de- 
scription is different only in degree from those in meland and 
Pamela; Emma's thoughts, like those of Clara and Pamela, are in 
a turmoil, and the pressure can be relieved only by reflection. 
But that difference in degree is important. Austen does not 
attempt to show her heroine's mind as a series of changes of state 
caused by impressions and associations; she does not engage in 
the kind of anslysis characteristic of the earlier writers. When 
Mr. Elton declares his love for Emma, Austen writes, "It would 
be impossible to say what Emma felt, on hearing this-which of 
all her unpleasant sensations was uppermost. She was too com- 
pletely overpowered to be immediately able to reply" (131). 
cc Uppermost" and "overpowered" are typical of the psychologi- 
cal language of the time, indicating the physical nature of the 
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mental event: the sensations are occupying space in her mind 
(hence one must be uppermost, although she cannot say which) 
and have a force of their own independent of her will. 
But whereas Richardson or Brown would have continued in 
this vein, Austen regards it as impossible to present the chaos of 
Emma's emotions and sensations. Of less interest to her than the 
chaos are the actions which follow this momentary state: what 
Mr. Elton says and how Emma responds. Nor does Austen delve 
into Emma's mind when the heroine is alone and able to indulge 
in the relief of quiet reflection. She presents Emma's thoughts 
fully, alternating between having Emma speak her thoughts 
aloud and describing those thoughts with the same dispassionate 
narrative voice she used to describe Emma's actions. There is no 
description of the physiological impact of these thoughts; there 
are no references to Emma's heart, brain, or blood, to vibrations, 
upwellings, effusions, and so forth. We might say that these ref- 
erences are lacking because of the type of person Emma is-she 
is restrained, phlegmatic, definitely not as susceptible as Clara 
Wieland to rushes of wild feeling. However, to account for the 
differences in this way is not particularly compelling. We can 
know characters only through the language with which they are 
presented to us; we can base our judgment that Emma is re- 
strained rather than passionate only on the terms used to describe 
her. It is at least as plausible that the differences between Austen's 
language and that of Brown or Richardson, for example, result 
from the inability of the mind-as-entity metaphor to represent 
the mental phenomena that were becoming interesting in Aus- 
ten's era. 
The existence of an inner chaos, the ease with which a suppos- 
edly mature mind could deceive itself-these facts of mental life 
could be referred to in general, as Austen does, but the psycho- 
physiological language of the earlier writers was not adequate to 
her goal. This goal can be described as the presentation of an 
individual who develops in a smooth, continuous manner-who 
is slowly molded by events that might cause discontinuities or 
cracks in the mental clay of an earlier author's character. The 
difference is analogous to the difference between "ebullitions" 
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and "the relief of quiet reflection": both connote mind as an ex- 
tended substance, but the latter conveys an impression of conti- 
nuity in contrast to the former's impression of discontinuity. Aus- 
ten in fact concludes her presentation of this period of Emma's 
perturbation with an ordinary statement of the relationship be- 
tween a young person's spirits and the cycle of day and night: 
"To youth and natural cheerfulness like Emma's, though under 
temporary gloom at night, the return of day will hardly fail to 
bring return of spirits. The youth and cheerfulness of morning 
are in happy analogy, and of powerful operation; and if the dis- 
tress be not poignant enough to keep the eyes unclosed, they 
will be sure to open to sensations of softened pain and brighter 
hope" (137-38). The message here is clear: Emma's is a daylight 
personality, thus any gloom is a relatively insignificant aberra- 
tion, an ebullition. 
Emma's conversations with herself always sound rational and 
dispassionate. Her mind is definitely active, perhaps even over- 
active from Austen's perspective, since her penchant for match- 
making is one of the objects of the novel's irony. Still, it is a 
limited activity, not comprising significant reflection on or explo- 
ration of those impossible-to-represent tumults but evincing the 
powerful operation of her naturally cheerful disposition. Most 
important to Austen is the continuity of Emma's character. Em- 
ma's mind and physical organization do undergo perturbations in 
response to impressions and ideas, but despite her youth her 
mind is rather more active and less susceptible to the pressures 
of the external world than the minds of the other characters I 
have discussed so far. Thus Emma represents one possible modi- 
fication of the earlier focus on mind-as-entity; that metaphor is 
still present in the novel but is less dominant than the considera- 
tion of the whole human being. Emma is a discrete entity herself; 
Clara Wieland in comparison is a collection of impressions and 
reactions. 
Austen had not always focused on continuity rather than ebul- 
litions, as her first novel, Northanger Abbey, shows. One of Aus- 
ten's distinctive attributes, her concern with precise language, is 
already easily visible in this work. The hero, Henry Tilney, 
84 Metaphors of Mind 
serves as her mouthpiece when he criticizes Catherine Morland 
for referring to a book as "very nice"; his point is that the adjec- 
tive "nice" has come to be used in "every commendation on 
every subject," with the result that no precise meaning remains 
attached to the word (108). Austen practices the desirable preci- 
sion in her own descriptions, for example writing of General Til- 
ney that he was "past the bloom, but not past the vigour of life" 
(80); without attributing to him a specific age, she places him 
precisely in a time of life. She pays similarly careful attention to 
states of mind: "Catherine's feelings, as she got into the carriage, 
were in a very unsettled state; divided between regret for the loss 
of one great pleasure, and the hope of soon enjoying another, 
almost its equal in degree, however unlike in kind" (86). The 
pleasure she has lost is that of walking with the Tilney family; 
the one she will gain is a visit to a castle that has been repre- 
sented to her as delightfully Gothic. Austen is clearly criticizing 
Catherine for her willingness to accept the second pleasure, 
whose kind, having been shaped by the Gothic tales Catherine 
loves to read, is inferior to the pleasure to be derived from social 
intercourse. 
This passage is noteworthy for its suggestion that Catherine's 
feelings are as easily described, discriminated among, and cate- 
gorized as the "times of life" of her main characters. Other pas- 
sages convey the same confidence in describing mental states: 
"Catherine's understanding began to awake; an idea of the truth 
suddenly darted into her mind" ( I  I 7); and this: "Northanger Ab- 
bey!-These were thrilling words, and wound up Catherine's 
feelings to the highest point of extasy [sic]. Her grateful and grat- 
ified heart could hardly restrain its expressions within the lan- 
guage of tolerable calmness" (140). Austen's language implies 
that it is also relatively easy to correlate external influences with 
ideas and predispositions. Catherine comes to the painful aware- 
ness that the attitude she carried to Northanger Abbey "might be 
traced to the influence of that sort of reading" she had "indulged" 
in while at Bath. The result of the reading had been to create a .  
"del~sion.'~ More specifically, her "imagination" had determined 
to view "each trifling circumstance" with alarm, and her "mind," 
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which had been "craving to be frightened," had bent all impres- 
sions "to one purpose" (199-200). Except for points of style, 
these descriptions could have come from Defoe, Godwin, or for 
that matter Hume or Thomas Brown; they conform to the terms 
and concepts of the eighteenth century. 
Austen became much less certain about how to describe men- 
tal operations during her later years, a development that corre- 
lates with her tendency in her late works to look at "a region of 
character that is not really expressible in social or moral terms," 
a region that is "asocial" and includes the "qualities of respon- 
siveness, openness to being moved" (Bodenheimer 622). Persua- 
sion, her final novel, carries the hesitation of Emma even farther. 
O n  the one hand, Austen focuses almost exclusively on the 
thoughts and emotions of her heroine, Anne Elliott, and on those 
events that cause her strong sensations. O n  the other hand, the 
mental states are frankly confused and confusing-confusing for 
Anne, and presented as confused: "It was agitation, pain, plea- 
sure, a something between delight and misery" (185). This typi- 
cal sentence stands in striking contrast to the self-assured "past 
the bloom, but not past the vigour of life"; the best Austen can 
do is call the sensation "a something" and indicate what it is not. 
The limitations of the usual language of the mind may also be 
the reason for one of Austen's infrequent lengthy syntactic meta- . 
phors, when Anne meets her former lover after a separation of 
eight years: 
Her eye half met Captain Wentworth's; a bow, a curtsey passed; she 
heard his voice-he talked to Mary, said all that was right; said some- 
thing to the Miss Musgroves, enough to mark an easy footing: the room 
seemed full-full of persons and voices-but a few minutes ended it. 
Charles shewed himself at the window, all was ready, their visitor had 
bowed and was gone; the Miss Musgroves were gone too, suddenly 
resolving to walk to the end of the village with the sportsmen: the room 
was cleared, and Anne might finish her breakfast as she could. [84-851 
This choppy string of clauses and verb phrases suggests that 
everything happens too quickly for Anne to do more than regis- 
ter impressions. It is not as if Austen cannot render a two-minute 
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event in controlled, detailed, syntactically ordinary sentences and 
paragraphs; such is her usual practice when she feels she can 
adequately represent the feelings associated with impressions. 
Here she apparently feels she that language cannot represent the 
irrational quality of Anne's mental events. As Anne realizes after 
the visit, "with all her reasonings, she found, that to retentive 
feelings eight years may be little more than nothingv-reasoning 
is not able to control these feelings. Austen may also be doubting 
the method of analysis of sensations on which the psychology of 
her time was based: in such a charged and complex situation the 
method can scarcely identify the components of the mental 
event, let alone explain why they combine to produce the given 
sensation. 
Anne's observation about her mind's relative independence 
from the passage of time and its shaping pressures correlates 
with a mental phenomenon that was receiving increasing atten- 
tion from psychologists in the first third of the nineteenth cen- 
tury-the felt impression that the mind has sufficient power of 
its own and resources within itself to develop far beyond the 
shaping influence of the external world. The passage from 
Thomas Upham quoted a few pages earlier continues as follows: 
"but there are also inward powers of perception, hidden foun- 
tains of knowledge. . . . In other words, the soul finds knowledge 
in itself which neither sight, nor touch . . . nor any outward forms 
of matter, could give" (MentalPhilosophy I 19). Anne Elliott dis- 
covers that her love for Captain Wentworth has scarcely aged a 
day, and this is very much a discovery of inner knowledge, not 
imparted to her but only activated by an external event. 
Nevertheless, the language of Austen and Upham remains 
within the limits of the metaphor mind-as-entity. For the soul to 
be able to find knowledge within itself, it must have both a 
searching faculty and something that is to be sought-both "in- 
ward powers of perception" and "hidden fountains" which those 
powers discover and from which they imbibe knowledge. The 
image suggests that the interior of the mind is no longer the 
simple space presented by Hume and Hartley but a textured place 
with localized features within which a percipient principle can 
experience certain impressions unavailable from the external 
world. It had always been agreed that "the mind begins very 
early to thirst after principles which may direct it in the exertion 
of its powers" (Reid, Inquiry 40). But this activity was not re- 
garded as valid evidence about the nature of the mind itself, for 
the reason Berkeley gave: ideas are "passive and inert" and thus 
(6 cannot represent unto us by likeness or image that which acts" 
(272). During the eighteenth century, the mind was generally 
regarded as a "thinking, intelligent, active being" (Reid, Intellec- 
tual Powers 473), a "perceiving, active being" or "thing" (Berke- 
ley 258). Upham preserves this view: he suggests a specific prin- 
ciple of development that places more value on the mind's 
activity, but he phrases the principle in metaphorical language 
that still allows the mind the qualities of extension and impressi- 
bility. He still represents the mind as localized, hence extended, 
although here it is living, active, and willful rather than passive. 
Upham's metaphorical description fulfills Ortony7s three the- 
ses: it expresses the literally inexpressible, is vivid, and is com- 
pact. It brings to life and makes tangible the abstract definitions 
of Reid and Berkeley. It is an excellent instance of the theory- 
constitutive role played by the mind-as-entity metaphor. Austen 
may have been aware of the problems and limitations of that 
metaphor; Upham, as a philosopher, was certainly aware of them. 
The problems had been well known for a century. Neither the 
novelist nor the psychologist solved them. Both writers fore- 
shadow developments in psychological concepts and language 
that take place later in the century, Austen hinting at the myster- 
ies of the mind (these will come to play a much greater role in 
fiction) and Upham creating an early instance of the mindscape 
metaphor. These developments and others that I discuss in sub- 
sequent chapters radically revise the concept of mind as a "per- 
ceiving, active being" and point toward the creation of "mind-as- 
a-living-being" as a generative metaphor. Such a revision was 
impelled and informed by the increasing influence of develop- 
mental psychology, aberrant psychology, neurophysiology, and 
the like in nineteenth-century thought. 
IV 
MIND AS ENTITY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Most psychological works during the first two-thirds of the nine- 
teenth century continued to draw on the mind-as-entity meta- 
phor and to display the limitations of that metaphor in its theory- 
constitutive function. The novelists of the same time span, 
discussed in the following chapter, were seeking a means of 
representing the life of the mind, that is, mind as a living being 
identical with the character in whose brain it exists, whereas 
the psychologists, despite some general theoretical pronounce- 
ments in this direction, continued to treat the mind as a separable 
entity-localizable and discrete although "in substance" imma- 
terial. They continued in this vein despite major changes both 
within psychology and across the culture-the theological con- 
nection became less important, and the physiological and what 
we now call functional and behavioral connections became more 
important. 
In this chapter I illustrate the continuing dominance of scien- 
tific psychology by the mind-as-entity metaphor, first in two 
practical applications and then in scientific and academic psy- 
chology. I show that whether the genre is handbooks of what we 
now call psychiatry, school texts, psychological treatises with an 
avowedly physiological orientation or those with a more overtly 
introspective and analytical approach, the mind-as-entity meta- 
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phor is a notable feature of the language. I also show that one of 
the philosophical psychologists, George Henry Lewes, identified 
and developed a metaphor that could have helped him achieve 
a dramatic new understanding of the mind if he had not held 
so strongly to language that presented the mind as a physical 
system. 
The first approach, physiological psychology, has been de- 
scribed as "an almost forgotten chapter in the history of psychol- 
ogy" (Danziger I 19), but it has received at least tangential atten- 
tion in Robert M. Young's Mind, Brain, andAdaptation as well as 
in studies of the history of mesmerism and phrenology. The sec- 
ond approach, which I call philosophical, has been even more ne- 
glected because it had no easily demonstrated impact on the ma- 
jor developments of twentieth-century psychology. When the 
philosophers are considered it is in light of their contributions to 
or (more usually) their inhibitions of the development of twen- 
tieth-century concepts. For example, Herbert Spencer is studied 
almost solely as a forerunner of the evolutionary component of 
modern psychology and not as a psychologist with a system 
thoroughly grounded in the major philosophical questions of his 
age. 
This presentist approach, especially in its lack of interest in 
the philosophical psychology, does not do justice to the historical 
reality. David Leary has clearly demonstrated this point in the 
case of German-language psychology from the time of Wilhelm 
Wundt: "There was no necessary conflict between science and 
philosophy, particularly as regards psychology" (233). Leary 
goes on to say that Wundt held psychology to be the 'ff;ndamen- 
tal science supporting the natural sciences, the social sciences, 
and philosophy"; he notes Wundt's fondness for pointing out 
that "all the natural sciences abstract their subject matter from 
immediate psychological experience" (234-3 5 ) .  The same points 
can be made for Wundt's English-speaking contemporaries. 
They shared the conception of psychology as the fundamental 
discipline or science, the one that gave meaning to all others. 
One of the most erudite historians of psychology observes that 
Alexander Bain was typical of his age in this regard: "Though he 
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did not declare psychology to be the one foundation of philoso- 
phy, in practice he gave it that position," since his Logic, his En- 
gZkh Grammar, his ethics and his metaphysics "were all suffused 
with the colour of his psychology" (Peters 465). It was a psy- 
chology that continued to regard the mind as an object of study 
no less suitable (and isolable) than a chemical reaction or a prob- 
lem in classical mechanics. 
Mind-as-Entity in Psychiatry and School Tmts 
The mind-as-entity metaphor remained dominant until well 
into the nineteenth century because it was useful. It contributed 
to a relatively enlightened approach to psychiatry (then referred 
to with such locutions as "mental hygiene") and relatively com- 
prehensible presentations of mental science in texts designed for 
schools and colleges; these were areas in which a vivid, compact, 
and expressive metaphor could make a difference in the concep- 
tion and presentation of problems. Ruth Caplan points out that 
early nineteenth-century American psychiatrists justified their 
"moral treatment" of the insane by citing the "malleability of the 
brain surface": their treatment consisted of trying to erase path- 
ological conditions in the brain's surface (9). The same general- 
izations hold for British psychiatry. The psychiatrists did not 
deny the immaterial nature of the soul, according to Caplan; 
most of them "posited a dualism between brain and intellect. . . . 
The intellect was a spiritual potential, which became act through 
the medium of the limbs. If the brain were diseased, the intellect 
would be denied its avenue to act. . . . The intellect, however, 
could never be diseased, because . . . like the soul of which it is 
part, [it] is immortal and hence immutable7' (6). For those indi- 
viduals who were "mental aliens," who suffered from "alienated 
minds," cure was to be sought by "education and the imposition 
of regular habits of life and work, appropriate mental stimulation, 
orderly thinking, and correct values"; these treatments would re- 
- 
construct "damaged brain tissue" and thus make the organ of 
mind once again able to perform its duties (26). Caplan notes 
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that after mid-century there was increasing belief in the primacy 
of purely physical causes and methods of cure, a shift related to 
the trend away from "natural philosophy" and toward "natural 
science" as well as to "clinical experiences that cast doubt on the 
universal applicability of moral treatment theory" (126). Despite 
this shift, mind retained its status as an entity, only becoming 
somewhat more physical and less immaterial. The picture had a 
less happy side, as Andrew Scull has shown. The continuing in- 
sistence by asylum directors and doctors in England on the "le- 
sion" theory, despite absence of evidence that such lesions had 
anything to do with most mental illnesses, was an economic and 
political phenomenon. These medical persons were interested in 
preserving their share of the "growing market or trade in lu- 
nacy." If there really were such lesions, these professionals ar- 
gued, then inhouse care was necessary (Scull 43, 167-68). 
A leading figure in American psychiatry was Isaac Ray, whose 
book MentalHygiene (1863) elaborates the theories of moral psy- 
chiatry in language reflecting the mind-as-entity metaphor. Ray's 
( C  general principle" of mental hygiene is that "whatever improves 
the physical qualities of the brain also improves, in some way or 
other, the qualities of the mind; and that judicious exercise of the 
mind is followed by the same result" (121). Anything that brings 
fresh blood or a "fresh impulse of the nervous current" can be 
helpful for the brain, as long as the stimulation is carefully ap- 
plied (120). On  the other hand, "whether excited or depressed, 
the mind is strongly exercised by the strange thoughts and emo- 
tions that possess it" in the early stages of mental illness; "it 
needs rest, repose, withdrawal from excitement" (135). The ill 
mind is so susceptible to impressions from the physical world 
that mentally ill people need to be kept away from their ordinary 
routines and previous associations in order for cure to be effec- 
tive. This is one of the observations frequently made in asylums, 
Ray states. For instance, "the sight of a bundle of old clothes 
from home is sufficient to reproduce all the original excitement 
and agitation in many a patient, calm, quiet, and apparently con- 
valescing" (140). This is why hospitalization of the insane is so 
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important: only in the institution can the mentally ill person be 
protected from "circumstances that maintain the morbid activity 
of his mind and strengthen his aberrations" (147). 
However inadequate it may have been as a basis for theory, 
the metaphor of mind-as-entity at least supported humane treat- 
ment of the mentally ill as necessary to reshape their minds. It 
does not account for the onset of aberrant behaviors in the men- 
tally ill-why, for example, D r .  Manette in Dickens' Tale of Two 
Cities became fixated on shoe-making. But it provides a way of 
talking about how mental illness can worsen-when Manette re- 
ceives a powerful emotional shock, he immediately reverts to his 
cobbler's bench and shuts out all external stimuli. 
Mind-as-entity also provided a clear framework for carrying 
out the important work of training the mind. The principles as 
enunciated by leading psychologists during the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries-the mind receives and is shaped by 
impressions, associations form pathways in the mind, the mind's 
operations are grouped into faculties or powers-formed the ba- 
sis of school and university courses during the nineteenth cen- 
tury as well as the texts which often grew out of these courses. 
An excellent example is Dr. John Abercrombie7s Inquiries Concern- 
ing the Intellectual Powers, and the Investkation of Tmth ( I  833), as 
abridged by Jacob Abbott of Harvard, for use by schools and 
academies. In his introduction Abbott notes that the work's "use- 
ful tendency is most decided, both in making the pupil ac- 
quainted with his powers, and in guiding him to the most efficient 
and successful use of them" (4). The book's aim is "to exercise 
and strengthen the thinking and reasoning powers,-to enable 
the mind to grasp abstruse and perplexing subjects,-to think 
clearly and to reason correctly" (I I). The mind-as-entity meta- 
phor provides both the rationale and the method for this ap- 
proach: the rationale, because as an entity it can, like a muscle, 
be strengthened and shaped, and the method, because if the mind 
is really an entity it will respond not only to exercise but also to 
the impression of "true relations" among facts of the external 
world (264). 
Joseph Haven, like Abbott an important educator, published 
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his Mental Philosophy in 1857, a text based on lectures on psy- 
chology he had given at Amherst for years. This book is note- 
worthy for its systematic application of the mind-as-entity meta- 
phor to the three main faculties of the mind: intellect, 
sensibilities, and the will. Haven consistently focuses on the 
mind's faculties and operations, the mind's perception of impres- 
sions, and the meaning of consciousness (the state when "the 
- 
mind is aware of its own operations," 39). Haven's method is 
introspective: "In psychology, the observer has within himself 
the essential elements of the science which he explores; the data 
which he seeks, are the data of his own consciousness; the sci- 
ence which he constructs is the science of himself" (19). Char- 
acteristic of Haven's use of mind-as-entity are his statements that 
the mind can focus the "mental eye" and that it has a "mental 
canvas" (48, I 14). The mind that can do such focusing and paint- 
ing is an active entity; compared with most writers of the period, 
Haven attributes rather more active power to the mind. His im- 
agery, however, also suggests limitations on the mind which 
seem a direct result of mind-as-entity, for instance spatial limits. 
In describing why human beings cannot perceive infinity, Haven 
writes that thought normally "passes around" the object thought 
of "with its measuring line. . . . But the infinite, the uncondi- 
tioned, the absolute, in their very nature unlimited, cannot be 
shut up thus within the narrow lines of human thought": they 
may be true and real, but we can't "properly conceive them" (54). 
In other words we can't get within our heads the concept of 
something infinite because the space within our heads is finite. 
Yet Haven also insists that no physiological theory can explain 
how memory actually happens. He quotes Malebranche's theory 
of memory as depending on impressions made on brain fibers 
and then discusses various "metaphors" used to describe the pro- 
cess of memory, such as "type imprinted on the soul, impression 
made on it as of a seal on wax, image, picture, copy," and he 
grants the possibility that sensation may result from a physical 
effect produced on the sensorium. Nevertheless, no physiological 
theory, Haven writes, can explain how the phenomenon of mem- 
ory actually comes about (136). 
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As these examples show, Haven was giving his students at 
Amherst the portrait of a mentai entity that on the one hand was 
more than the sum of its physiological operations and on the 
other was limited like any finite system. This portrait was an 
accurate rendering of the period's beliefs about the mind; the ap- 
parent inconsistency within this portrait can be directly related 
to the differences between metaphysical and everyday senses of 
the term "mental substance." Haven's is a noteworthy attempt to 
balance physiological and psychological knowledge about the 
mind; it shows that the conceptual edifice built on the mind-as- 
entity metaphor lasted well into the nineteenth century. 
Haven was typical; the more physiologically oriented psy- 
chologists did not exclude "moral" knowledge, and those with a 
more philosophical orientation did not exclude physiological 
knowledge. They were held to this center ground by the theory- 
constitutive operation of the metaphor. The physiologists were 
continually reminded that they were after all dealing with mind 
as it had been traditionally conceived since the eighteenth cen- 
tury-the attribute of the human being that makes spiritual life 
possible. The philosophers were reminded that they were dealing 
with something that apparently could not exist independently of 
the brain, spinal cord, and nerves, despite its lack of substance 
and extension. 
The Mind as a Physiological Entity: Carpenter and Bain 
Although in 1820 Thomas Brown called for a "physiology of 
the mind7' analogous to the physiology of the body, he did not 
depart from the standard introspective approach to the mind's 
functions and components. Brown was trained in medicine, but 
little was then known of neural physiology; we might expect later 
psychological writers with more special training in physiology 
to better adapt their language to the developing emphasis on that 
area. That this did not happen can be seen in how William B. 
Carpenter and Alexander Bain deal with the most nagging prob- 
lem of psychology, the interaction between mind and the physical 
world. 
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The various editions of Carpenter's Prinaples of Human Physi- 
ology, first published in 1842, were "the standard works in medi- 
cal education in the mid-nineteenth century" (Jacyna I 12). His 
main psychological treatise, PrinGles of Mental Physiology, was 
first published in I 874 but was based on ideas Carpenter had put 
forth at least since the fourth and fifth editions (I 8 52 and I 8 55) 
of his Human Plysiofogy, in the section titled "Of the Mind, and 
Its Operations." This section sets out to correct two fallacies, 
which Carpenter identifies as materialism and spiritualism, each 
of which relies on an incomplete set of data about mental phe- 
nomena. According to Carpenter, materialism is supported by the 
obvious connections between thoughts and the brain but runs 
against the universal conviction that humans possess "a self- 
detenniningpower" which is partially able to "mould external cir- 
cumstances to its own requirements, instead of being completely 
subjugated by them" (Human Physiology 538-39). The spiritualist, 
however, ignores inescapable physiological facts, for instance 
that the mind's actions can be disordered by corporeal conditions 
(540). The correct view, rather, is that mind and matter interact 
by means of "nerve-force": "the power of the Will can develope 
[sic] Nervous activity," just as "Nerve-force can develope Mental 
activity" (542). Carpenter preserves the most important spiri- 
tualist concept, that human beings do have an innate sense of 
something greater than themselves, by extending this relation be- 
tween mind and body to "the relation of the Mind of the Deity 
to that Universe, whose phenomena, rightly interpreted, are but 
a continual revelation of His ceaseless and universal presence" 
(544). 
Carpenter's assertion that the mind's two sets of properties, 
the spiritual and the material, are equally important might sug- 
gest that he has a clear and relatively complete understanding of 
both sets. But such is not the case. Consider Figure I,  a diagram 
from Mental Physiology ( I  2 5 ) .  
This diagram shows that there is an ordinary "upward course" 
from impressions to intellectual operations and a corresponding 
downward course of influence from the Will to motor impulses. 
About the upward course Carpenter is explicit. If the upward 
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Intellectual Operations 
+CEREBRUM 
centre of Emotional and Ideo-motor reflexion 
Ideas 
Sensations SENSORY GANGLIA  
t centre of Sensori-motor reflexion Motor Impulse 
Impressions - SPINAL CORD 
centre of Excito-motor reflexion 
Figure I. Carpenter's Diagram of the Flow of Impulse 
course is interrupted, "the impression will then exert its power in 
a transverse direction, and a reflex action will be the result; the 
nature of this being dependent upon the part of the Cerebro- 
spinal axis at which the ascent had been checked" (124). 
This degree of detail itself raises problems, as Lewes notes in 
commenting on such diagrams and discussions. Lewes begins by 
observing that "the assignment of even Thinking to the cerebral 
hemispheres is purely hypothetical" ("Mind as a Function of the 
Organism" 65).  He continues: 
This may seem incredible to some readers, accustomed to expositions 
which do not suggest a doubt-expositions where the course of an 
impression is described from the sensitive surface along the sensory 
nerve to its ganglion, from thence to a particular spot in the Optic 
Thalamus (where the impression is said to become a sensation), from 
that spot to cells in the upper layer of the cerebral convolutions (where 
the sensation becomes an idea), from thence downwards to a lower 
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layer of cells (where the idea is changed into a volitional impulse), and 
from thence to the motor-ganglia in the spinal cord, where it is reflected 
on the motor-nerves and muscles. 
Nothing is wanting to thepeckion of this description. Everything is 
wanting to its proof:. . . not a single step of this involved process has 
ever been observed; the description is imaginary from beginning to end. 
[661 
Lewes does not deny the possibility that there is some truth to 
such descriptions and models, but he insists that the evidence is 
not yet sufficient to identify which functions are played by the 
various parts of the central nervous mass. 
An even more revealing problem in Carpenter's diagram is the 
difference in the amount of detail between the two courses. The 
left and center columns summarize the prevailing assumptions 
about how ideas develop and how reflex actions occur, based on 
knowledge of the various levels of the nervous system and the 
types of actions (reflex and willed). But how does the "downward 
course" operate? What happens when a willed act is blocked? 
Where does the force go? Are there various levels or possible 
outlets? At what physiological level is the will's power -actually 
transformed into nerve-force? Carpenter does not ask these ques- 
tions, and the diagram does not develop into something more 
detailed and potentially revolutionary. Instead, Carpenter's im- 
pelling metaphor seems theory-constitutive rather than genera- 
tive; despite his ostensible emphasis on nerve-force, his concept 
of the mind continues to be informed by the mind-as-entity met- 
aphor. The model serves the attempt of Carpenter and other Vic- 
torian physiologists to "naturalize" the mind, as Jacyna explains, 
to integrate mind into nature and thus repudiate the "conven- 
- 
tional metaphysical and theological view which regarded the hu- 
man, and by implication the divine mind, as super-natural"; at the 
same time the model allows Carpenter to preserve something of 
the mind's transcendent spirituality (Jacyna I 10-1 I). If the model 
itself were the product of a generative metaphor, it would not just 
present common knowledge but would raise questions about the 
two courses. 
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Jacyna7s point of course is that conceptual revolution is not 
Carpenter's goal. The mind-as-entity metaphor is perfect for the 
task of naturalizing the mind while preserving its spirituality. 
Everyday connotations associated with the metaphor easily allow 
for the naturalization of the entity, and the aspect of transcend- 
ence is preserved by placing the will figuratively over the cerebral 
hemispheres, assigning it the ability to stimulate the hemi- 
spheres, and thus giving it power over motor impulses. The dia- 
gram accurately represents the will's ascendancy, as Carpenter 
conceives it. It is assigned a definite article and printed in upper- 
case letters, and it is shown as a faculty in the singular whereas 
the other items on the subjective side of the diagram are either 
products (sensations, emotions) or processes (intellectual opera- 
tions). Clearly, the will is part of mind, but a superior part. Al- 
though the "Correlation between Mind-force and Nerve-force is 
shown to be complete both ways, each being able to excite the 
other" (MentalPhysiology 14), the will's force appears to be sepa- 
rate from either one. The mind is an entity; as such, it receives 
nerve-force and generates mind-force. "Force" is here the con- 
nection between substance and mind that makes perception pos- 
sible: human beings can only experience force, and both mind 
and force are "essentially active" in Carpenter's system ( I  1-12). 
The will is something else again. Carpenter stresses "the great 
fact of Consciousness," that "we have wzkhin us a se(f-detemzining 
Power which we call Will"; this fact plus the "intimate relation be- 
tween Mental activity and Physical changes in the Brain" may 
lead the investigator to believe that "the phenomena of the Ma- 
terial Universe are the expressions of an Infinite Mind and will, 
of which Man's is the finite representative" (28). Carpenter fur- 
ther insists that the Will is able to shape the "physiological 
mechanism" by the way it habitually exercises that mechanism; 
hence "not only its automatic but even its unconsnous action comes 
to be indirectly modified by the controlling power of the Will" 
(15). A final point indicating the qualitative superiority of the 
will is that it is only influenced by intellectual operations. Car- 
penter's diagram does not allow any of the lower products to 
have a direct influence on the will; all must be processed through 
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the intellect. The diagram correlates perfectly with Carpenter's 
identification of the will as "a self-determining Power.'' 
As Jacyna explains, Carpenter was always concerned to "qual- 
ify his physiological naturalism . . . the cerebral hemispheres 
were not only ganglia acting reflexively: they were also the agents 
by which an immaterial principle exerted its will in the world" 
(113). For this reason, according to Jacyna, Carpenter also "in- 
sisted upon a hierarchy of faculties. 'While the lower functions 
were performed reflexively, the highest were the result of the 
determination of an immaterial principle" (124-25). The mind- 
as-entity metaphor was flexible enough to accomodate attempts 
to preserve such a principle in the system. However, it was not 
sufficiently flexible to allow for the development by psychologists 
of a wholly new concept that would take immateriality and 
agency as first principles while still accommodating the advances 
in neurology. 
Alexander Bain7s work was broader than Carpenter's. Bain 
concerned himself more fully with the traditional problems of 
psychology and incorporated physiology into his solutions. In 
Young's words, "Bain's analysis of motor phenomena was the 
first union of the new physiology with a detailed association psy- 
chology in the English tradition and he thereby laid the psycho- 
logical foundations of a thoroughgoing sensory-motor physiol- 
ogy" (Mind, Brain I 14). Bain was also highly influential as a 
teacher in the new protoscience of psychology, with his two vol- 
umes Senses and the Intellect and Emotions and the rill serving as 
"the major texts in the English-speaking world until James's Prin- 
+les" (Robinson, The Mind Unfolded 86). To one of the tradi- 
tional problems, that of the interaction between the mind and the 
body, Bain devoted an entire book, Mind and Body ( I  875). This 
extended treatment displays the same limitations as does Carpen- 
ter's MentalPhysiology: it combines a detailed and coherent meta- 
phorical description of the physiology of the mind with vague, 
admittedly paradoxical descriptions of the mental components of 
the mind-body unity. In Bain even more than in Carpenter the 
problems of the mind-as-entity metaphor are manifest. 
IOO Metaphors of Mind 
The question with which Bain opens his text seems to promise 
a balance between the psychological and the physiological: 
"What has Mind to do with brain substance?" He then lists the 
conceivable answers and arrives at the reasonable conclusion that 
the two work in parallel, although we cannot say exactly how. 
The final paragraph of the chapter, however, has the study of the 
Brain as its sole topic. The best method for this study, Bain writes 
confidently, is to "begin at the outworks, at the organs of sense 
and motion, with which the nervous system communicates; we 
can study their operations during life, as well as examine their 
intimate structure; we can experimentally vary all of the circum- 
stances of their operation; we can find how they act upon the 
brain, and how the brain re-acts upon them. Using all this knowl- 
edge as a key, we may possibly unlock the secrets of the anatom- 
ical structure; we may compel the cells and fibres to disclose their 
meaning and purpose" (4-5). 
The promise of that statement, that Bain will proceed by such 
a scrutiny, is violated in the next chapter, where Bain offers little 
more than folk wisdom as evidence for the interdependence of 
mind and brain. Is it really true that "the memory rises and falls 
with the bodily condition; being vigorous in our fresh moments, 
and feeble when we are fatigued or exhausted" (g)? Or that "Pro- 
tracted and severe mental labour brings on disease of the bodily 
organs" ( I  I)? These propositions cannot survive reflection. Is it 
true that "in all cases of pronounced mental aberration, disease 
of the brain is present in a marked form" ( 1 4 )  Certainly not, as 
research even before 1875 was showing. The point is that Bain is 
really not interested in examining the evidence. Instead, he is 
elaborating a metaphor that has physical processes and sub- 
stances as its vehicle and the mind-body relationship as tenor. 
In his fifth chapter, "The Intellect," Bain draws at length on 
neural physiology, some factual and much admittedly hypotheti- 
cal, to prove that the brain can accommodate complex intellectual 
life; his endeavor makes sense only in light of an underlying 
conception of a mental entity that has location and extension and 
operates as a physical system. Bain asserts that our "complex and 
modified consciousness" results from "the separate conscious- 
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ness of separate nerves [for example optic nerves cannot receive 
sound impressions], and the changing intensity of the currents," 
plus "the countless combinations of these simple elements" (85- 
86). Physical reality and memory both suggest that renewed feel- 
ings occupy the same brain parts "and in the same manner as the 
original feeling" (89), although the "re-induced currents" are 
seldom "equal in energy" to the original (91). Bain contends that 
the physical system makes localization possible: his calculation 
of the number of "Acquisitions" in a person's mind and the num- 
ber of nerve cells and fibers in the brain proves there can exist 
( 6  an independent nervous track for each separate acquisition" 
(107-8). ~e makes an estimate of the number of "cerebral 
growths" required for bodies of knowledge such as the multipli- 
cation table, the repertoire of a good musician, the written char- 
acters of the Chinese language, and finds that even for the "most 
retentive and most richly-endowed minds" with a likely total of 
200,000 acquisitions, there are "for each nervous grouping 5,000 
cells and 25,000 fibres" (107). The physical system also makes 
possible the fixation of trains of thought: there must exist "a 
strengthened connexion or &minded obstruction" where the related 
- 
nerve-currents meet, "a preference track for that line over other 
lines where no continuity has been established" ( I  17). Bain's 
next statement indicates how strongly he is impelled to ground 
mental phenomena on this hypothetical physiology: "This is 
merely a hypothetical rendering of the facts: yet it is a very prob- 
able rendering. In the nature and number of the nerve elements, 
and their mode of connexion, there is nothing hypothetical; and 
there is no departure from fact or strong probability, in assigning 
special and distinct tracks for the currents connected with each 
separate sensation, idea, emotion, or other conscious state" 
(1 17). 
Although he does not equate mind with these neurological 
- 
phenomena in so many words, his concern to link them with 
mental phenomena suggests that he sees mind as constructed like 
a physical system, as the mind-as-entity metaphor suggests. He 
definitely expects to find, in the mind, phenomena and structures 
like those in the body; he does not investigate the physiological 
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system for analogues to mental phenomena. He assumes that if 
( 6  complex consciousness~7 is composed of the consciousness of 
individual sensations combined in varying ways, then a place or 
substance or entity must exist wherein the combinations can oc- 
cur. The same reasoning holds for the supposed likelihood of 
<( renewed feelings" occupying the same place in the brain as the 
original, and for the correlation between "nervous tracks" and 
<c acquisitions." And it holds for more mundane phenomena such 
as the "seemingly inseparable association" between facial ges- 
tures and states of feeling (6). 
In describing the capacity of the physiological organ, as in 
discussing the Laws of Relativity and Diffusion, Bain demon- 
strates the acceptability of hypothetical reasoning based on the 
mind-as-entity metaphor. Unlike the psychologists of the eigh- 
teenth century, Bain does not assert the autonomy thesis, but like 
them he views the mind-body problem as at least partially a lan- 
guage problem: although "there is something unique, if not re- 
markable, in the close incorporation of the two extreme con- 
trasted facts, termed Mind and Matter, we must grant that the 
total difference of nature has rendered the union very puzzling to 
express in language" (Mind and Body 134). He goes on to say, 
"When I speak of mind as allied with body-with a brain and its 
nerve currents-I can scarcely avoid locaL@ng the mind, giving it 
a local habitation.'' But in fact he attends no more consistently to 
the problem than did Hobbes and Reid. In one section he points 
out that we can use analogies such as the telegraph wire or the 
electric circuit to discuss the locale of consciousness, but if we do 
so "we are not speaking of mind, properly so called, at all" ( I  34- 
3 5). The reality is that "Our mental experience, our feelings and 
thoughts, have no extension, no place, no form or outline, no me- 
chanical division of parts" (I 3 5 ) .  But in his earlier description of 
two fundamental principles, the Law of Relativity and the Law of 
Diffusion, he conveys the opposite impression, that if we had the 
right instruments we could observe our mental experience in the 
brain: "Change of impression is necessary to our being con- 
scious" (45) and "When an impression is accompanied with 
Feeling, the aroused currents h z e  themselves freely over the 
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brain, leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well 
as affecting the viscera" (52). These two principles combine to 
cause "the really fitful nature of the mind; t h e  stream of con- 
sciousness is a series of ebullitions rather than a calm or steady 
flow" (yo). 
These descriptions imply that we should be able to measure 
the changes of impression either directly or by measuring their 
associated currents, hence that we should be able to measure the 
type or amount of consciousness associated with any given exter- 
nal or internal stimulus. But this logical extension would be un- 
- 
acceptable to Bain, who asserts that "mental and physical pro- 
ceed together, as undivided twins" (I  3 1). The mind-as-entity 
metaphor, operating here hand in hand with rapidly expanding 
knowledge about the nervous system, leads the psychologist to 
create an extended metaphor using terms from the harder sci- 
- 
ences. The internal consistency of this extended metaphor con- 
vinces the psychologist that he-has described the system scientif- 
ically, when he has actually failed to heed his own caution about 
descriptive language. 
What then is the language most appropriate to the "unique 
conjunction" of mind and body? How can the psychologist re- 
solve the "paradox" or "contradiction" in our experience, that 
<( we understand union in the sense of local connexion; here is a 
union [of mind and body] where local connexion is irrelevant, 
unsuitable, contradictory" ( I  3 6 )  How can we best describe what 
happens when we shift between what Bain calls the "object atti- 
tude" (in which our attention is directed outward, to objects) and 
the "subject attitude" (in which we are simply feeling)? Bain's 
answer: 
The only adequate expression is a CHANGE OF STATE a change from the 
state of the extended cognition to a state of unextended cognition. . . . 
When, therefore, we talk of incorporating mind with brain, we must be 
held as speaking under an important reserve or qualification. Asserting 
the union in the strongest manner, we must yet deprive it of the almost 
invincible association of union in place. An extended organism is the 
condition of our passing into a state where there is no extension. A 
human being is an extended and material mass, attached to which is the 
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power of becoming alive to feeling and thought, the extreme remove 
from all that is material; a condition of rrance wherein, while it lasts, the 
material drops out of view-so much so, that we have not the power to 
represent the two extremes as lying side by side, as container and con- 
tained, or in any other mode of local conjunction. The condition of our 
existing thoroughly in the one, is the momentary eclipse or extinction 
of-he other. [ I  371 
This section has for its controlling metaphorical vehicle the 
theme of change-of-state. The tenor is twofold: what happens in 
the mind, and the mystery of what happens. This second aspect 
is embodied in such odd images as the human being consisting 
of a mass and a power, and the equally odd possibility that con- 
ditions are extinguished and recreated from one moment to the 
next. Supporting and elaborating this metaphor are terms drawn 
from the physical realm but used in a non-physical sense. Bain's 
contention is much like that of Reid a century earlier concerning 
the term "substance" applied to mind. Although the terms here 
are "union," "association," and "change of state," rather than 
"substance," the point is the same-the terms cannot be avoided 
but must be used in the special metaphorical sense: "union" can- 
not mean "union inplace," just as for Reid "substance" applied to 
mind did not mean "having extension and mass." "Change of 
state", like "diffusion," derives from the scientific language in use 
at the time and enhances the pseudo-scientific quality of the de- 
scription while conforming to the mind-as-entity conception of 
thoughts as corpuscles and minds as containers. 
In contrast to Bain's description of the physiological condi- 
tions of consciousness, this presentation of his theory is meta- 
physical in the negative sense often attached to that word in the 
nineteenth century: vague, complex, speculative, unrelated to 
how mental phenomena are actually experienced and described. 
The contrast itself indicates that Bain is more comfortable with 
describing the mind first as a physical entity and only second as 
the complex of feeling, willing, and thinking experienced by hu- 
man beings. His conclusion to the chapter makes this point even 
clearer: "without the extended consciousness the unextended 
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would not arise. Without certain peculiar modes of the ex- 
tended-what we call a cerebral organization, and so on-we 
could not have those times of trance, our pleasures, our pains, 
and our ideas, which at present we undergo fitfully and alter- 
nately with our extended consciousness" (I 38). It does not seem 
to occur to Bain to stress the dependence of the extended on the 
unextended. Mind-as-entity functioning as a theory-constitutive 
metaphor does not readily permit or invite such a perspective. 
The metaphorical language is most conducive to a habit of 
thought that consistently regards the mind as an extended sub- 
stance, which means that while Bain in theory advocates the 
equality of the two modes, in practice, unless he attends closely 
to the words he uses, he departs from his preferred explanation 
of "the line of mental sequence" as "mind-body giving birth to 
mind-body" and lapses into what he calls the less "intelligible" 
explanation of "a constant interference, a mutual influence be- 
tween the two" (130, 132). And from this unsteady position he 
tends to attribute more influence to the side of the extended. Bain 
fails to give equal voice to the mental aspect for the same reason 
that Carpenter failed to wonder about that large blank space be- 
tween "the Will" and "motor impulses17 Although two hundred 
years separate them from Descartes, Bain and Carpenter still ac- 
cept the Cartesian focus on extension and substance and do not 
attempt to introduce new language that would conform to their 
new characterization of the mind as other than a limited entity. 
The discrepancy in Mind andBody between clear, albeit hypo- 
thetical, statements about the physiological conditions of con- 
sciousness and the apparent paradox that the mind, being exten- 
sionless, can have no "local connexion" with matter, is one 
manifestation of the continuing influence of the mind-as-entity 
metaphor. A second manifestation can be seen in the structure of 
Bain7s first text, Senses and the Intellect (1855). This work begins 
with neurology, a detailed discussion of the Bell-Magendie law, 
the speed of nerve impulses, and other purely physiological phe- 
nomena. As one of the first works thus to anchor "empirical as- 
sociationism to the science of physiology" (Robinson, Intellectual 
Hktory 325), Senses holds an important place in the history of 
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psychology. But the neurological and physiological section, Bain 
labels "introductory." The first chapter of the body of the text 
begins thus: "We now commence the subject of ~ i n d  proper, or 
the enumeration and explanation of the States and Varieties of 
Feeling, the Modes of Action, and the Powers of Intelligence, 
comprised in the mental nature of mind" (1st ed. 65). 
This small but significant rhetorical detail suggests the diffi- 
culty of representing a connection between physiological and 
mental phenomena. While working on the first version of Senses, 
Bain had written to John Stuart Mill that his greatest wish was 
(c so to unite psychology and physiology that the physiologists 
may be made to appreciate the true ends and drift of their re- 
searches into the nervous system" (quoted by Robinson, Intellec- 
tualHistory 324). He was hoping t ~ - ~ r o v i d e - a  system or theory 
by which the physiologists would see that their work was funda- 
mental to an understanding of "the subject of MIND properv- 
providing a physiological basis for characterizing the operations 
of the immaterial entity, mind. It was a vain hope and would 
remain so until the development of language that would permit a 
new characterization of what had traditionally been represented 
as the mental entity. 
Some differences between the first two editions of Senses sug- 
gest that Bain may have recognized that he did not yet un- 
derstand psychology and physiology well enough separately 
to effectively combine them. The concluding pages of the 
introductory section of the first edition are strident. Bain asserts 
that "there is no such chamber" as the sensorium, "where im- 
pressions are poured in and stored up to be reproduced in a fu- 
ture day." We must dkcard this notion, Bain declares; current 
knowledge is "sufficient to destroy the hypothesis that has until 
lately prevailed as to the material processes of perception.'' The 
present view of "current action" is not perfect but is "more ex- 
act" than the receptacle hypothesis (61). The second edition is 
moderate by comparison. There Bain urges that the notion of a 
sensorium be "modified and corrected," and instead of writing 
- 
that we may now "say with great possibility, no currents, no 
mind" (1st ed. 61-62) he writes that "it seems as if" the state- 
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ment is valid (2d ed. 66). A further retreat occurs in the final 
paragraph of this section. In his first edition, Bain insists that the 
natural course of the nervous currents is to influence action, 
hence that "the brain is only a part of the machinery of mind" 
with other parts extending "throughout the body" (62). The sec- 
ond edition makes the same point but much less forcefully: the 
brain alone could not generate movements and receive sensa- 
tions, and "it is uncertain how far even thought, reminiscence . . . 
could be sustained without the more distant communications be- 
tween the brain and the rest of the body" (66). 
A third manifestation of the influence of the mind-as-entity 
metaphor in Bain is pointed out by Daniel Robinson: Bain7s in- 
ability to describe experience credibly. Despite his praise for Bain 
as the designer of the first really thorough '>psychological system," 
Robinson concedes that when Bain moves from discussing the 
physiology of sensation to mental phenomena, his analysis be- 
comes "very dated, hesitating, sometimes foolish, and generally 
tortuous" (The Mind Unfolded 70, 79-80). Young makes the same 
criticism of Bain's Study of Character. In Young's words, the book's 
character descriptions "are pale shadows of individual human 
beings and bear little relation to the complex attributes of real 
men." Bain relies on anecdotes, introspection, and "the biogra- 
phies of great men"; he includes "no original observations of the 
behavior of other men and no comparative data" (Mind, Brain 
I 3 I). These limitations are present in all of Bain's work. His de- 
scription of why we tend to repeat ourselves, for instance, could 
be directly borrowed from Hume or Sterne: 
Everything that we have ever done, we have a disposition or tendency 
to repeat. . . . The co-existence of thousands of such tendencies in the 
brain is sufficient to cause neutrality, until something occurs to deter- 
mine a preference for one, or to remove the superincumbent pressure 
that all combined exert upon each. Now the existence of a present state 
formerly joined by contiguity to a past state, is one mode of opening 
up the crowd to allow this past state to re-assert itself. The other mode 
is when the past state is alreadypartialh induced, which is the case when 
something similar is present to the mind. To whatever extent the simi- 
larity holds, to that extent the past state is already re-enacted: the pres- 
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sure is removed from a part, and the remainder is then able to break 
out. [Senses 2d ed. 5 571 
Sensations able to break out, a crowd of sensations able to block 
the path, thousands coexisting in the brain and each exerting an 
equal pressure-it sounds as if the mind's activities are taking 
place in a specific locale and that the ideas or sensations are tan- 
gible entities, so many billiard balls of thought. As an explanation 
of the mental phenomenon, it is both tortuous and foolish. As 
part of Bain's extended metaphor of the mind, it illustrates the 
relative unsuitability of the mind-as-entity metaphor for the 
study of mental events that lie between simple reflex actions and 
mature reflection. The  extended metaphor is vivid and compact 
but not sufficiently expressive when applied to large-scale phe- 
nomena such as memory. Bain relegates this explanation to a 
note at the end of a chapter in the second edition of Senses and 
drops it completely from the third, illustrating Robinson's point 
that he does not successfully join the physiological and psycho- 
logical perspectives. 
Mind-as-entity functioning as a theory-constitutive metaphor 
seems to limit Bain to a physicalistic conception of the funda- 
mental laws of mental action and mental physiology alike. He 
repeatedly insists on the physiological basis of thought but at the 
cost of not developing a language of the mind more in keeping 
with the new discoveries and new emphases. A subsection of 
Senses, titled "Of the Nerve Force and the course of Power in the 
Brain," illustrates this limitation in a more physiological context: 
This portable, or current, character of the nerve force is what enables 
movements distant from one another in the body to be associated to- 
gether under a common stimulus. An impression of sound, a musical 
note, for example, is carried to the brain; this impression is seen to 
produce a responsive action and excitement extending to the voice, 
mouth, eyes, head, etc. This multiplex and various manifestation im- 
plies a system of connexion among the centres of action, whereby many 
strings can be touched from one point. . . . Supposing the corpora quad- 
rigemina to be a centre for the sense of vision, an impression passing 
to this centre propagates a movement towards many other centres . . . 
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and through these various connexions an extensive wave of effects may 
be produced, ending in a complicated chain of movements all over the 
framework of the body. Such a system of intercommunication and 
transmission of power is therefore an essential part of the bodily and 
mental structure. [Senses 1st ed. 57-58] 
This physical system is essential, but that strictly mentalistic item 
the sensorium is not. Sensation takes place through the impres- 
sion and transmission of currents, and these currents "may have 
all degrees of intensity, from the fury of a death struggle to the 
langour of a half-sleeping reverie, or the fitful flashes of a dream, 
but their nature is still the same" (61). He has already demon- 
strated that enough is known about nerve-force to qualify the 
analogy between nervous and electric currents: nerve-force does 
not require a closed circuit, and neural conduction is a "wasting 
operation" (58). This second statement is especially significant 
for any theory of the relationship between mind and body: the 
nerve "influence conveyed is much more beholden to the con- 
ducting fibres than electricity is to the copper wire. The fibres 
are made to sustain or increase the force at the cost of their own 
substance" (59). 
For Bain the essential feature of the system is physical ac- 
tion-it is as essential for the "mental" as for the "bodily" struc- 
ture. He concludes this section thus: 
Nervous influence, rising in great part in sensation, comes at last to 
action; short of this nothing is done, no end is served. However feeble 
the currents may be, their natural course is towards the organs accus- 
tomed to their sway. Hence the reason for adopting language, as we 
have done throughout the present chapter, to imply that the brain is 
only a part of the machinery of mind; for although a large part of all 
the circles of mental action lie within the head, other parts equally in- 
dispensable extend throughout the body. [62]  
The mind's status as an entity guarantees it a place in the circles 
of mental action and ensures that it too participates in the action. 
As an entity, the mind quite logically has machinery and circles 
of action; Bain's chief concern is to see those circles extended 
throughout the body in a physicalistic system. 
I 10 Metaphors of Mind 
Both Carpenter and Bain share the problem that Young attri- 
butes to all of nineteenth-century physiological psychology: they 
separate "the organs of mind from motor functions" and view 
the cortex as a "unitary organ" which has as its "instruments" 
the sensory-motor centers ("Functions" 257). As Young has 
shown of this period, "when the study of mind came to be con- 
sidered in physiological and biological terms, powerful philo- 
sophic constraints . . . narrowed the issue and impoverished the 
study of the mental functions of human and other organisms" 
(252). Young credits F.J. Gall with moving psychology from the 
realm of philosophy to that of biology and with moving psycho- 
logical methodology beyond the study of brain by physiology or 
the study of the mind by introspection (254). k t  neither Gall nor 
his followers, although accepting that the brain is the organ of 
the mind, attempted to explore experimentally how the cortex 
might influence the sensory-motor centers, nor did they chal- 
lenge the traditional faculty division of memory, reason, and will 
in determining the categories of mental operations (257). As 
Young observes, "philosophic constraints narrowed their study. 
For example, the assumption of the unity of the mind forestalled 
what now seems an obvious experiment-stimulating the sepa- 
rate areas of the cortex-until David Ferrier tried it in 1873. And 
according to Young, Ferrier even further separated brain func- 
tions from the behavior of real human beings: in order to apply 
to the cortex the same physiological experiments performed on 
the lower neural levels, it was necessary to forget about human 
nature (265-66). 
The impoverishment extends down to the phrase level, as 
when Bain shifts from "enables us to say with great probability" 
to "it seems as if we might say." This small detail of language 
suggests that Young's analysis misses one essential point: those 
assumptions about the mind's unity and localization that limited 
investigations were effects as well as causes-effects of mind-as- 
entity functioning as a theory-constitutive metaphor. As long as 
psychology had as its constraining focus the substance mind, it 
was not likely to explore mental phenomena by using the lan- 
guage of the mind. In particular, it was not likely, as did the 
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novelists of the same period, to consider how web-like relations 
form among human beings. This topic called for a new vocabu- 
lary and conceptual structure. However, the way was implicit in 
the figurative language of the philosophical psychologists. 
Philosophical Psychology and Mind-as-Entity: 
Mill Morel4 Spencet; Lewes 
The philosophical psychologists may have been more aware 
than the physiologists of the problems raised by the separation 
between physiological research and the study of living human 
beings interacting with their surroundings. They differed from 
the psychologists of the previous century in their relative unwill- 
ingness to assert that the mind is a thinking substance. They 
agreed that the rapidly growing empirical knowledge about the 
nervous system was still at best only knowledge about attributes 
of the mind and not about the mind itself. They confronted on a 
daily basis the discrepancy between, first, discoveries about ner- 
vous impulses, reflex arcs, and so forth, and, second, the phe- 
nomena of mind as actually experienced by living human beings, 
a discrepancy that was hardly apparent before 1830 but was dra- 
matically evident by 1850. One set of facts will demonstrate this 
problem. Lewes pointed out that "it seems quite satisfactory" to 
know that colors are the products of wave lengths, "until we 
learn that although such vibrations [the waves] originate such 
sensations [of colors], it is through some intermediate agency 
which does not vibrate in these ways, but which is capable of 
effecting the sensations by vibrations that are demonstrably dif- 
ferent" (Study of Psychology 185). Violet, for example, has one 
wave length, but the sensation of violet can also be produced by 
blending red and blue, whose wave lengths do not add up to that 
of violet. Likewise, several different combinations will produce 
similar sensations of white but will cause dissimilar physical re- 
actions on photographic plates. 
Yet perhaps because of their rather broad perspective, the ~ h i l -  
osophical writers began to correlate their figurative language 
with their theoretical statements and thus began to resolve the 
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discrepancy between physiology and experience. Lewes was the 
most successful in this respect; John Stuart Mill, John D. Morell, 
and Herbert Spencer are instructive examples of relative failures. 
Mill deals with the topic of psychology in the context of logic, 
following the common belief that to understand the rules of logic 
it was necessary to understand the human mind's structure, its 
patterns of thought. He devotes one of the six books of his System 
ofLogic (1846) to "the logic of the moral sciences," concentrating 
on psychological matters in the first five chapters and then con- 
sidering "social science." As Mill sees it, "the science of human 
nature" is not yet an exact science (528): "It falls far short of the 
standard of exactness now realized in Astronomy," for one; the 
u ~erturbations" which make each individual unique also prevent 
the prediction of "how an individual would think, feel, or act, 
throughout life" (528-29). Nevertheless, the general "laws of 
mind" are known. Introducing these, Mill adopts the autonomy 
thesis. He will not attempt to determine how the mind might be 
distinguished from its "sensible manifestations," and he will con- 
sider only states of mind produced by other states of mind ( 5  go): 
"When a state of mind is produced directly by a state of body, 
the law is a law of Body, and belongs to physical science." In 
opposition to Comte, Mill insists that it is far from proven that 
every mental state has an immediately antecedent physical state; 
even if it were proven, he believes, "we are wholly ignorant of 
the characteristics of these nervous states." Thus knowledge of 
mental phenomena must for a long time "if not forever" be 
sought through direct study "of the mental successions them- 
selves" (5 3 I -32). 
The subject matter of psychology is therefore "the uniformi- 
ties of succession, the laws, whether ultimate or derivative, ac- 
cording to which one mental state succeeds another; is caused by, 
or at the least, is caused to follow, another" (532). The first of 
these laws is that "Whenever any state of consciousness has once 
been excited in us, no matter by what cause; an inferior degree of 
the same state of consciousness . . . is capable of being repro- 
duced in us, without the presence of any such cause as excited it 
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at first. . . . This law is expressed by saying, in the language of 
Hume, that every mental impression has its idea" (732). 
In stating the second general law, Mill again follows Hume in 
his phrasing: "These Ideas, or secondary mental states, are ex- 
cited by our impressions, or by other ideas, according to certain 
laws which are called Laws of Association," including the laws of 
contiguity and similarity (532). This sounds very similar to 
Thomas Brown's insistence on the possibility of a mentalphysiol- 
ogy that would focus on the mind's states and changes of state. 
Brown however would have opposed Mill's admission that the 
laws of mind "may be derivative laws resulting from laws of ani- 
mal life, and that their truth, therefore, may ultimately depend 
upon physical conditions; and the influence of physiological 
states or physiological changes in altering or counteracting the 
mental successions, is one of the most important departments of 
psychological study" (532). Brown accepted the analogy be- 
tween the laws of mind and those of the body, between mental 
physiology and human physiology, but he would not have agreed 
that the former might "ultimately" depend on the latter. Both 
Brown's Lectures and Mill's System were popular, respected, and 
often cited by their contemporaries, which suggests that during 
the twenty-three invervening years it became more acceptable to 
suggest the mind's dependence on the body as long as the sug- 
gestion was suitably qualified-if the dependence is ultimate, it 
remains beyond human ken. 
While Mill's theoretical pronouncements thus adhere closely 
to the autonomy thesis, he uses physicalistic figures to illustrate 
certain problems; these figures conform perfectly to the mind-as- 
entity metaphor. For example, a question that has always vexed 
association psychology is how humans perceive complex ideas as 
if they are seamless wholes, if it is true that all complex ideas are 
derived from discrete sense impressions. Mill answers in a figure 
drawn from chemistry: "When impressions have been so often 
experienced in conjunction that each of them calls up readily and 
instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, those ideas some- 
times melt and coalesce into one another, and appear not several 
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ideas but one; in the same manner as when the seven prismatic 
colors are presented to the eye in rapid succession, the sensation 
produced is that of white" (533). 
This is a case of mental chemtstry because the final complex 
idea seems to be generated by the simple ideas and because it 
seems to exist in the mind as a simple idea. It would be a case of 
mental mechanics if the complex idea were perceived as consisting 
of or composed by the simple ideas. Mill continues: "Our idea of 
an orange really conszits of the simple ideas of a certain color, a 
certain form, a certain taste and smell, &c., because we can by 
interrogating our consciousness, perceive all these elements in 
the idea. . . . [But we cannot] discover those elementary ideas of 
resistance, derived from our muscular frame, in which Dr. Brown 
has rendered it highly probable that the idea [of extension] orig- 
inates" (533). I have labeled Mill's references to mental chemistry 
"figurative," but in the next several pages Mill clearly demon- 
strates his belief that "there ts such a thing as mental chemistry" 
(533). This assertion is really not necessary to Mill's treatment of 
laws of mind; deleting the discussion of mental chemistry would 
not detract from the quality of the explanation. Nor is the term 
itself helpful. The physicalistic connotations of "mental chemis- 
try" and "mental mechanics" run counter to what Mill identifies 
early in the System as the basic assumption of his method, subjec- 
tivism: "every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding sub- 
jective one" and the only meaning possessed by the label is "as a 
name for the unknown and inscrutable process by which that 
subjective or psychological fact is brought to pass" ( 5 2 ) .  This 
discrepancy between connotations and theory is one of the iden- 
tifying features of the continuing influence of mind-as-entity in 
the nineteenth century. 
It is also worth noting that these chapters remain almost un- 
changed through the eighth edition of System (1872). Mill adds 
to chapter 4, "Of the Laws of Mind," a footnote recommending 
Bain's Senses and Emotions and Spencer's Prin+le.s of Psychology, 
and he concludes the chapter with the relatively optimistic state- 
ment, "If there be really a connexion between mental peculiari- 
ties and any varieties cognizable by our senses in the structure of 
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the cerebral and nervous apparatus, the nature of that connection 
is now in a fair way of being found out" (447). These minor 
additions strengthen the work's physicalistic tendency. The figu- 
rative language went unrevised, implying that it is just as valid 
in I 872 as in I 846 to consider the mind as displaying both chem- 
ical and mechanical behaviors. 
Mill's retaining this language is significant because it is open 
to some obvious criticisms. Lewes, without referring to Mill di- 
rectly, remarks that the psychologist can never perform "real 
analysis" such as the chemist performs: feelings never exist in 
stages but only as completed states, and the very elements of the 
feeling are changed by the process, as are the "tissues which are 
its physical basis" (The Study ofPychology 180). The hypothesis 
of a mental chemistry is as erroneous as the one advanced by the 
Sensational School, which attempted to treat "the organism as a 
mosaic, or assemblage of organs . . . an error the consequence of 
which is seen in the conception of the Mind as an assemblage of 
impressions, a mosaic of experiences" (181). For Lewes, the or- 
ganism always acts as a unity; this is the most important teaching 
of biology. "The notion of a tabula rasa, on which the Senses 
inscribe their impressions, is unbiological" for this reason: "A 
percipient organism must exist before impressions can become 
perceptions" (182). And once this transformation takes place, the 
impressions cannot be recovered, so any hypothesis about the 
elements of the mental-chemical reaction must remain chiefly 
speculation. 
As I said, these criticisms are not subtle or intricate, but they 
are criticisms of concept and method rather than of language. If 
challenged, Mill would probably respond that "mental chemis- 
try" is of course not intended to stand as a hypothesis but rather 
as an analogy; he would likely agree with Lewes on the problems 
of such an hypothesis. However, the habit of thinking fostered by 
the mind-as-entity metaphor leads him to offer the suggestion as 
he does, without qualifying it as analogy. 
John D. Morel1 is almost forgotten today, but he was well 
known to his contemporaries, and his Elements of Psychology 
(1853) was the first work published in England with the word 
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"psychology" in the title. (Friedrich Rauch's Psychology, or a Kew 
ofthe Human Soul Including Anthropology came out in America in 
1840.) Elements ofPsychology is Morell's attempt to combine He- 
gelian idealism with the psycho-physical realities necessary to 
any relatively complete psychology. The two are not intrinsically 
incompatible, but problems arise when Morell relies on the lan- 
guage of mind-as-entity. 
Morell's commitment to the mind-as-entity concept is clear 
from his designating as the most important fact about the ner- 
vous system that "every individual nerve pursues its own way 
through the whole system, up to its final destination in the ence- 
phalon" (96). The nervous system is governed by a single basic 
law, "the law of nervous action," which Morell expresses in a pair 
of lengthy sentences that are almost entirely metaphorical: 
When any appropriate stimulus makes an impression upon the corre- 
sponding nerve at any point in the circumference [of the organism], the 
first tendency is for that impression to follow the pathway of the nerve 
or nerves affected, through every intermediate region up to the cerebnrm 
itseg and, then, having excited the mind's attention, and roused the ac- 
tivity of the will, to be reflected back along the motor nerves, and give 
rise to any external movements which the case may demand or suggest. 
Just as in the electric telegraph, when the magnetic current is once ex- 
cited, the impulse impressed passes all the various stations on the road, 
speeds on to its destination, gives an intelligent hint to the mind there 
located, and then elicits a response, which originates anew in that mind, 
back to the other extremity. [Elements cfp~chology 971 
Continuity of effect is the essential assumption underlying this 
description; as with Hartley, the causal chain from impression to 
idea cannot be broken. The mind comes into play with the stim- 
ulation of the cerebrum itself, from which it can reflect a nervous 
impulse to the appropriate muscle groups. Morell then goes on 
to explain what happens when "the original impression cannot 
actually reach the brain" either because of "some physical im- 
pediment to it" or because "the nerves are expending their en- 
ergy in some other direction. . . . In this case, the impression stops 
short at one of the other centres, and is reflected back from that 
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centre, through the motor nerves, without exciting the mind's 
attention or awakening the energy of the wilt' (97-98). 
Morell's description seems so straightforward and factual that 
we may not notice the many terms drawn from the mind-as-en- 
tity complex (impression, pathway, intermediate region, reflected 
back) or the shift to an explicit simile at the beginning of the 
following paragraph, "forming, as it were, a complete magnetic 
system." This shift makes it seem as if the preceding metaphori- 
cal discussion was not metaphorical but literal. The same sleight- 
of-pen was used by Locke, Reid, Mill, and the other psycholo- 
gists I have considered; like them, Morell may use the explicit 
simile because he actually believes that he has already described 
the operation of the nervous system in a literal way and now 
needs to provide an illustrative figure. 
Morell does not, however, localize the mental entity in the 
cerebrum. The title of this section of Elements is "Intelligence as 
Sensation," but there are very few references to the mind as such. 
Mind and will exist "above" the cerebrum, but this place they 
occupy may be a qualitatively different sort of space from that 
occupied by the nervous system. The verbal description permits 
the possibility of an extensionless place like the unextended men- 
tal substance hypothesized by Reid; the difference is that Morell 
leaves his description vague enough and refers so infrequently to 
the mind that he does not risk Reid's overt contradiction between 
everyday and metaphysical senses of key terms. He really is talk- 
ing about the mind, as becomes clear when he summarizes this 
section at the beginnning of the next, "Second Stage of Intelli- 
gence.-Intelligence as Intuition." Suddenly the mind is the topic 
of every sentence and the grammatical subject of most: "Hitherto 
the mind has acted only in response to some physical impulse 
. . . . What, then, we have to inquire, will be the form of the 
human intelligence, when the mind has once broken loose from 
the physical impressions of the senses, and when it can view 
itself, and the universe, as separate and opposed realities?" (122- 
23). 
The mental entity Morell most wants to discuss is precisely 
that which has "broken loose from the physical impressions of 
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the senses." Having broken away, the entity begins to become 
self-determining, becomes an entity in its own right-an active, 
living entity rather than a mere participant in the physical pro- 
cess of taking impressions from the external world. Only when 
the mind "can view itself, and the universe, as separate and opposed 
realities" does it become discrete. Without crediting Morell with 
a conceptual revolution, we should appreciate how, by limiting 
his figurative language to the physiological realm in one section 
and then asserting the presence of the mind after the fact, he 
manages to sidestep the mind-body problem. His figurative ren- 
dering of the movement of impressions through the nervous sys- 
tem allows him to conceptualize the mind more easily as another 
kind of entity, albeit still an entity. 
Morell's conceptual flexibility is also apparent in his adapta- 
tion of Carpenter's model of the movement of sensations and 
willed impulses. Figure 2 shows the model as altered by Morell 
(102). 
Although his additions are speculative, Morell is responding 
to the incompleteness of the model devised by Carpenter. His 
distinction between the partially and the fully excited cerebrum 
attempts to correlate physiological states to mental states more 
exactly than Carpenter does, and while the division between 
"Regulating ideas" and "Regulating physical efforts" relates to 
nothing factual, it does signal More117s awareness of the problems 
raised by the blankness of that side of Carpenter's diagram. With 
Morell it is at least possible that the model has begun to serve a 
generative function by pointing to questions about what it does 
not represent. Attending to those blank areas could be a first step 
toward shifting attention away from the mechanism of the flow 
and allowing the phenomena of the mind to be discussed in the 
language of the mind. A subsequent step would be to discard the 
model but preserve the concept it embodies-the interactive re- 
lations among the system's parts. 
Except for these hints of a new language of mind, Morell gains 
little ground in representing the mental and the physiological 
aspects of human life. He localizes the mental entity in an inter- 
esting figurative way relative to the flow of nerve energy, but the 
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Figure 2. Morell's Diagram of the Flow of Impulse 
entity itself still exists, still has a location, and perhaps has sub- 
stance and extension. Herbert Spencer, in the important second 
edition of his Prin+les of Psyhology (1870)~ denies the appro- 
priateness of using such attributes, even as metaphors. Introduc- 
ing his chapter on "the substance of mind," Spencer insists that 
if we understand by this phrase "Mind as qualitatively differen- 
tiated in each portion that is separable by introspection but seems 
homogeneous and undecomposable; then we do know something 
about the substance of Mind" (1:14y). If we assume "an under- 
lying something, it is possible in some cases to see, and in the 
rest to conceive, how these multitudinous modifications of it 
arise." But, Spencer continues, if we take the phrase to mean "the 
underlying something of which these distinguishable portions 
are formed, or of which they are modifications; then we know 
nothing about it, and never can know anything about it." In other 
words, although we can identify "the substance of Mind" as "re- 
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solvable into nervous shocks" and can say that these shocks "an- 
swer to the waves of molecular motion that transverse nerves and 
nerve-centres," nevertheless we still can't say "what Mind is" any 
more than we could claim to know what matter is if we could 
decompose it into its "ultimate homogeneous units" (131 56-57). 
In contending that psychology can explain mental phenomena 
but cannot say anything about "the underlying something," 
Spencer exemplifies the larger ~roblem, psychology's failure to 
articulate a coherent, non-hypothetical theory of the relationship 
between human experience on the one hand and physiology on 
the other. His movement toward such a theory represents one of 
the first sustained attempts to break free of the concepts and lan- 
guage associated with the mind-as-entity metaphor. The concep- 
tual and metaphorical distance he had to travel can be measured 
by noting how the metaphor's key components of extension and 
impressibility dominate one of his early works, his 1860 essay 
"The Physiology of Laughter." 
In this piece Spencer approaches laughter strictly as a psycho- 
physical question: "Why, when greatly delighted, or impressed 
with certain unexpected contrasts of ideas, should there be a con- 
traction of particular facial muscles and particular muscles of the 
chest and abdomen?" (452-53). His answer is based on the gen- 
eral principle that "nervous excitation always ten& to beget mus- 
cular motion; and when it rises to a certain intensity always does 
beget it"; that is, "the nervous system in general discharges itself 
on the muscular system in general: either with or without the 
guidance of the will" (453-54). Not only muscles but also viscera 
and other components of the nerve-muscle system can receive a 
discharge from an excited portion of the system; nervous dis- 
charges from one part of the nervous system to another consti- 
tute consciousness (455). It is also important that a state of ner- 
vous tension seldom if ever "expends itself in one direction only" 
(456). For example, Spencer notes, "an agreeable state of feeling 
produced, say by praise, is not wholly used up in arousing the 
succeeding phase of the feeling and the new ideas appropriate to 
it; but a certain portion overflows into the visceral nervous sys- 
tem, increasing the action of the heart and facilitating digestion." 
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Furthermore, if some channels are closed, the discharge must be 
stronger along the others, and if one direction is determined as 
preferred by the existing conditions, the discharge along the oth- 
ers will be weaker. 
Using the explanatory apparatus of nerve-force, channels, and 
preferred directions, Spencer can answer his opening question: 
Why are certain muscles involved in laughter? He explains that 
66 an overflow of nerve-force undirected by any motive, will man- 
ifestly take first the most habitual routes; and if these do not 
suffice, will next overflow into the less habitual ones" (458-59). 
The muscles around the mouth are most frequently stimulated 
by moderate flows of mental energy, and as they are small they 
are also relatively easily stimulated; hence these are the "first to 
contract under pleasurable emotion" (459). :[f the nervous energy 
is so great that these muscles cannot drain it off, the respiratory 
muscles will next be stimulated, being "more constantly impli- 
cated than any others in those various acts which our feelings 
impel us to"; if the flow of energy is greater still, the upper limbs 
will be called into play, and finally the head will be thrown back 
and the spine bent inwards (459-60). The article's concluding 
sentence puts the whole investigative method in a nutshell: "We 
should probably learn much if in every case we asked-where is 
all the nervous energy gone?" (466). 
The system of neural hydrostatics offered by Spencer as the 
cause of laughter is purely hypothetical. It is an expressive, com- 
pact, and vivid extended metaphor with a very plausible connec- 
tion to the secondary domain of fluid mechanics. Spencer con- 
structs this explanation in the essay exactly as Black says a 
scientific model is to be constructed, with one significant differ- 
ence-the model is not used to predict results which are then 
tested against new data, but instead is buttressed with well- 
known facts of everyday life. For instance, "the suppression of 
external signs of feeling, makes feeling more intense," and 
intense mental action destroys appetite and arrests digestion 
(456-57). Constructing the extended metaphor constitutes nor- 
mal science for Spencer, and the metaphor itself constitutes an 
expression of mind-as-entity. 
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"The Study of Laughter" does not display the evolutionary 
perspective that is now regarded as Spencer's main contribution 
to psychology. This perspective he first fully articulates a decade 
later in the second edition of his Pnn+les ofPycAology ( I  870), a 
substantial expansion of the first edition, which preserves "sun- 
dry of the cardinal ideas" of the first, as he mentions in the pref- 
ace, but also incorporates more Darwinian material. In develop- 
ing this evolutionary perspective, Spencer moves beyond the 
mind-as-entity concept but remains entangled in the metaphor's 
language. 
The most revolutionary statement in Prin+les is Spencer's def- 
inition of life: "the definite combination of heterogeneous 
changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence 
with external co-existences and sequences," or, more briefly, "the 
continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations" 
(1:293). In his second most revolutionary statement, he insists 
that "every proposition" in psychology must recognize the "all- 
essential" influence of "environing actions" (1:390-91). But the 
revolution extends no farther. When Spencer works out the im- 
plications of these statements he reverts to expressions that 
sound like those of Hume, Hartley, or Thomas Brown. These 
expressions neither represent mental phenomena in the language 
of the mind (Spencer in fact does not advocate the autonomy 
thesis) nor, more significantly, suggest that the definition of life 
as an adjustment of relations corresponds to a metaphor serving 
a generative function. 
One of the ways in which internal relations adjust to external 
is through "extension of space." Spencer declares: "It is a fact 
that the appearance of the higher senses, even in their most ru- 
dimentary forms, is accompanied by some extension of the space 
throughout which correspondences can be effected. It is a fact 
that the successive stages in the development of each sense imply 
successive enlargements of the sphere of space. And it is a fact 
that the advent of rationality is, among other ways, shown in the 
carrying of these enlargements still further" (1:3 18). In short, the 
( 6  progress of life and intelligence" is a function of spatial exten- 
sion. Life, Spencer goes on to say, increases in "amount" accord- 
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ing to the "extension of the correspondence in space," since such 
extension adds to the number of external relations and hence to 
the number of internal changes (1:3 19). Spencer also asserts that 
the foundation of the extension is the sense of touch and that 
there is a direct relationship between the sensitivity of this sense 
and the degree of intelligence: "the most far-reaching cognitions, 
and inferences the most remote from perception, have their roots 
in the definitely-combined impressions which the human hands 
can receive" (1:362). Only the first of Spencer's "facts" is more 
than an opinion; the others are interpretations and assertions. All 
three, as well as the correlations between the amount of life and 
spatial extension, and between the sense of touch and intelli- 
gence, preserve an important quality of the mind-as-entity met- 
aphor: the dependence of mental phenomena on physical pro- 
cesses and qualities of the external world. 
As revolutionary as is Spencer's unswerving advocacy of rela- 
tion, the relationships that he describes are all one-way, from 
space to life, "internal relations" adjusting themselves to "exter- 
nal relations." Consciousness, the irreducible center of mental 
life, is just as much a one-way relationship: "we can become 
conscious only through the changes caused in us by surrounding 
things," and our consciousness consists of these changes "com- 
bined and arranged in special ways" (2:291-92). Consciousness of 
complex things comes about the same way: "in proportion as a 
chain of such changes is consolidated into a single change, in the 
same proportion do the several sensations which form the ante- 
cedents and consequents of the changes, become present to- 
gether" into a consciousness of the "complex thing" (23295). In 
contrast to Upham's statement that there comes a time in the 
development of the individual mind when "the soul finds knowl- 
edge in itself," Spencer actually seems to deny an important hu- 
man experience, that sensation of turning inward. 
Spencer's preference for physicalistic terms is also apparent in 
his discussion of "the nature of intelligence," which is basically 
identical in the 185 5 and 1870 editions. For Spencer the key dis- 
tinction between physical and psychical life is that the former is 
characterized by successive and simultaneous changes, but the 
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latter consists primarily of "successive changes only" (1:405). He 
remarks that images of many things are always being impressed 
on the retina, "yet these are not appreciated internally" and "do 
not undergo that co-ordination with others which constitutes 
them psychical changes." The "seriality" of consciousness, 
especially "as it rises to a higher form" (intelligence), is not es- 
sential to his theory, but it is consonant with a commitment to 
mind-as-entity: one simple substance in one location, capable of 
existing in one state at a time. Spencer concludes the paragraph 
with a metaphor of consciousness as something woven: "In brief, 
we may say that while the outer strands of changes which consti- 
tute thk thiead of consciousness, are indefinite and loosely adher- 
ent, there is always an internal closely-twisted series of changes, 
forming what we may consider as consciousness proper" (1406). 
Spencer uses this metaphor casually to illustrate the seriality of 
consciousness. As he presents it the metaphor is neither very 
vivid, nor very expressive, nor very apt. 
Spencer's presentation of the concept of relation is best re- 
garded as derived from the mind-as-entity metaphor rather than 
as a new metaphor able to generate new theories. His language 
consistently connotes a mind that is impressible and localized, an 
entity in which changes in the nervous system correspond to 
changes in the external world and impressions from that world. 
Life consists in the adjustment of inner to outer; Spencer does not 
seem to ask if mental life might have its own laws and processes 
- 
radically different from those of the external physical world, or if 
the outer might adjust itself to the inner. 
Spencer is by no means isolated in his approach. All of the 
philosophical psychologists roughly contemporary with him ex- 
hibit the same discrepancy between, on the one hand, a relatively 
clear understanding of the physiology of perception and motor 
stimulation and, on the other, a vague idealistic description of the 
phenomena of experience as subjectively perceived. The discrep- 
ancy is equally present in the works of psychologists with a fairly 
strong sensationalist orientation such as Mill and in the works of 
those with a more idealistic orientation such as Morell. Spencer 
is unusual because his concept of relation occupies an important 
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position in his theoretical statements; in addition, it is a much 
more intelligible expression than for example Bain7s "mind-body 
giving birth to mind-body." Lewes moves one step closer to a 
revolutionary perspective by not only insisting on the insepara- 
bility of life and mind but embodying that inseparability in some 
of his figurative language. 
Like Spencer, Lewes classifies psychology among the life sci- 
ences; Lewes does so, as he explains in The Study of  Psychology 
(1879)~ because he conceives of the mind as an entity like other 
biological entities. According to Lewes, psychology should be 
defined as "the science of the facts of Sentience," which is a 
66 more precise and comprehensive" definition than the usual "sci- 
ence of the facts of Consciousness" (7). This latter definition is 
restricted because it ignores what to Lewes is self-evident, that 
despite the existence of "what are called spiritual facts" and al- 
though "no deductions from what is known objectively of the 
material mechanism will explain the phenomena of sensibility, as 
states of consciousness," nevertheless there can be no rational 
grounds for separating Mind from Life" (8). Thus psychology is 
correctly defined as a branch of biology and its method that of 
the physical sciences. Lewes feels that it is totally artificial to 
"classify certain phenomena as psychical, and others as vital. . . . 
all psychical phenomena are vital, and in all of them sensibility 
is a factor" (9). Taking a cue from the agreed subdivision of all 
biological sciences into two components, "Morphology, the sci- 
ence of form, and Physiology, the science of function," Lewes 
comes at the identification of psychology with biology from an- 
other direction: psychology is concerned not with the organism's 
structure or evolution but with its "sentient functions and facul- 
ties" (9). 
These general principles contain two elements with potential 
to revolutionize the concept of the mind. First is Lewes' conten- 
tion that mind and life cannot be separated and that the proper 
focus of psychology is sentience rather than the more restrictive 
consciousness. Second is his identification of psychology as a bio- 
logical science, thus a science concerned with function more than 
with form. Yet as with Spencer, the revolutionary promise is hin- 
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dered by habits of language based on the mind-as-entity meta- 
phor. Lewes begins The Study of Pkychology by defining psychol- 
ogy as a discipline that "investigates the Human Mind, not an 
individual's thoughts and feelings; and has to consider it as the 
product of the Human Organism not only in relation to the Cos- 
mos, but also in relation to Society. For man is distinctly a social 
being" ( 5 ) .  While a product can be something intangible, like a 
f;nction, the connotations of "product" and "function" are not 
entirely congruent; Lewes' characterizing the mind with a term 
that first connotes something tangible is an early hint that the 
promise will not be fulfilled in this book. 
As Lewes explains "the study of psychology" in more detail, 
he remains within the limits of the mind-as-entity metaphor de- 
spite the contradictions that result. His revolutionary tendency 
pulls him in one direction, hence he dismisses Hamilton's "met- 
empirical postulate of a 'something behind or under the phenom- 
ena"' of thought; the only way it is "permissible in a scientific 
treatise to speak of Soul or Mind, as substance or subject," is 
from the perspective of "the organism in relation to the external 
world and to the social world" (12-13). His tendency to remain 
within what was then considered normal science in psychology 
leads him to insist on the "identity of molecular and sentient 
changes" (rq), so that psychology should be considered as "the 
science of the products" generated by the operation of physio- 
logical mechanisms. It would be methodologically unsound to 
separate the two sciences psychology and physiology, he writes, 
because that would mean "excluding all the processes known to 
be physiological and known to be unconscious" (19). 
Lewes also holds with the physicalistic hypothesis of a senso- 
rium, and he uses physicalistic language to describe its operation: 
'C Subjected to varying stimulations, and combinations of stimu- 
lation, it acquires new aptitudes, new modes of response; and is 
incessantly modified, if not in its elementary structure, at any rate 
in the fluctuating disposition of its elements. It thus forms, as it 
were, a spiritual mechanism superadded to the material mecha- 
nism" (32-33). He arrives at this description by following the 
principle of the "identity of molecular and sentient changes," 
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even though the molecular changes are "entirely hidden from our 
present means of detection" (33). Lacking any idea of precisely 
how these changes occur, Lewes nevertheless adopts the figura- 
tive language of mind-as-entity: the sensorium's "plasticity7' al- 
lows it to be modified by experience (34). The best organization 
of the study of human life is quite clear to Lewes: physiology 
must first generate a "theory of the mechanism," and psychology 
can then "trace the operation of this mechanism in the functions 
and faculties which spring into existence through its adaption to 
the Cosmos and Society" (38). The "material mechanism" gen- 
erates the "spiritual mechanism." 
In a later chapter Lewes defines "the General Mind" as the 
66 abstract conception" consisting of the shared features of all 
minds. This mind is shaped by and can be studied through lan- 
guage. An individual can only feel the emotions of the group 
"when his soul is moved like theirs; he cannot think their 
thoughts so long as his experiences refuse to be condensed in 
their symbols" (160-61). It would seem then that every mental 
phenomenon can in principle be explained as the interaction of a 
number of elementary particles, substances, or atoms of thought 
under a few general laws. This is the same atomistic approach 
characteristically induced by the mind-as-entity metaphor. How- 
ever, Lewes has earlier spoken against this kind of analysis. It 
would indeed be possible, he writes, to construct "out of the facts 
of C~nsciousness alone" an "abstract science of Feeling, to stand 
beside the abstract science of Force-an Aestheti'cs parallel with 
Dynamics. The general facts of Feeling formulated in abstract 
laws would then be disengaged from all concrete manifestations; 
the organism and the medium would be left out of account, as 
Matter and its Qualities are disregarded in Dynamics" (64-5). 
Sensations and thoughts could be reduced to "cerebral vibra- 
tions," and some "psychological Lagrange might arise who 
would reduce all these vibrations to a single equation." This 
would be a powerful instrument but would not be a psychology; 
"it would no more expound the facts of Human Nature than Dy- 
namics expounds the facts of Nature." His explicit point is that 
psychology must incorporate much more than just the facts of 
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consciousness, which do not include the facts of physiology as 
they influence unconscious mental operations. The less obvious 
point is that the concept of a general mind as Lewes presents it 
is reductive after the fashion of the psychology of the eighteenth 
century, whereas his insistence on "the organism and its me- 
dium" derives from his more revolutionary tendency. 
In The Study of Psychology, Lewes seems most consistent in his 
inconsistency: if he articulates a revolutionary premise in one 
section, he will likely advocate the normal-scientific opposite in 
another. The mind-as-entity metaphor and the concept of rela- 
tion are incompatible. Study is the first of Lewes' "Problems of 
Life and Mind." He considers three others: "Mind as a Function 
of the Organism," "The Sphere of Sense and Logic of Feeling," 
and "The Sphere of Intellect and Logic of Signs.'' In the prefatory 
note to the volume in which these appear, the editor (George 
Eliot) says that Lewes had intended to rewrite much of the ma- 
terial. He would certainly have re-ordered the chapters in the 
third problem, "the actual arrangement being partly the result of 
conjecture. The Fourth Problem, of which the later pages were 
written hardly more than three weeks before the Author's death, 
is but a fragment." Because of its title and its relatively finished 
state, "Mind as a Function of the Organism" would presumably 
contain the same level and type of inconsistency as The Study of 
Psychology. Surprisingly, Lewes' figurative language indicates 
much less constraint by mind-as-entity. In attempting to repre- 
sent certain phenomena of mind that were becoming of more 
interest to psychologists (especially those phenomena that occur 
outside immediate conscious awareness) and in attempting to 
correlate these phenomena with the "theory of the mechanism" 
constituting physiology, he is groping toward the elements of a 
generative metaphor that serves as an important structuring prin- 
ciple in the novels of George Eliot. 
The potential generative metaphor in these pages is that of the 
web of relations used to represent sentience. Lewes specifies it in 
criticizing the notion of "double consciousness": "We have seen 
that the discriminated experiences comprised under Attention 
must be regarded as a series; but the true comparison for sensorial 
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reaction is that of a wed" ("Mind as a Function of the Organism" 
217). This explicit naming draws together concepts and figures 
from the previous two hundred pages in a compact, vivid, and 
expressive metaphor. As early as the opening chapter Lewes uses 
the word "network" four times in three sentences, making clear 
in the last that the network is web-like: we cannot know an or- 
ganism's precise "disposition . . . in any one case, nor in what 
degree the various threaa5 of the network are in action" (16, my 
emphasis). Among the most important of these threads that will 
concern Lewes in the following pages are what he calls "neural 
tremors," which influence feelings and dispositions; when he re- 
fers to the "escort of nascent sensations and thoughts" he means 
this network of threads (17). It follows from this concept that a 
change in any part of the organism is transmitted throughout the 
whole (40), and it follows from the metaphor that "we cannot 
have one sentient state that is not enmeshed with other sentient 
states, so that each wave of stimulation sets going a multitude of 
connected stimulations" (41, my emphasis). One of the reasons 
this metaphor is so expressive is that the subsidiary vehicle of 
66 wave motion" describes the dynamics of the web; Lewes fre- 
quently refers to "waves" of sensation washing through the sys- 
tem, receding, and recurring. 
Likewise follows the "Law of Grouping,"' which Lewes labels 
"the fundamental law of mental action": neural tremors group 
themselves into a sensation, sensatio~ls into perception, thence 
into conception, thence into judgments (1159). True, "we are 
never conscious of theformation of any product, only of the group 
formed." This disclaimer would be enough to undercut the law of 
grouping itself except for the law's metaphorical validity. Lewes 
does not explain his derivation of the Law, but it could certainly 
be generated by a model of sentience-as-web. The physical 
model alone would not generate the law, but Lewes' examples 
stress the subjective, psychological experience in conjunction 
with what can be objectively, albeit hypothetically, inferred from 
a model. He precedes this statement of the law by reminding his 
readers that when listening to a symphony we easily and quickly 
alternate between awareness of the whole ensemble of sound and 
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awareness of the "component masses" (I 58-59). We know that 
the component masses group themselves into the ensemble, and 
this knowledge viewed in light of the sentience-as-web model 
implies the law of grouping. 
As I said, this metaphor is only potentially generative for 
Lewes. When explaining other phenomena that could be effec- 
tively described in these terms, he may use other metaphors. 
Thus personality is the psychological analogy of the influence of 
the center of gravity on the physical system: "The position of the 
centre of gravity is a continually shifting point. The attitude of 
the Personality is likewise a continually shifting point" (197). 
Thus "motives are determined by motors lying deep down in the 
mental structure," whereas unconscious cerebration can in part 
be explained by "the silent growth of tendencies" (138-39). Both 
metaphors derive from the mind-as-entity concept, and Lewes' 
easy mixing of them suggests that he has not yet really been 
struck by the relational metaphor. 
Lewes' uncertainty about the theoretical role of the relational 
concept is even visible in the sentence following his naming of 
the web metaphor: 
The attitude of the Sensorium is a fluctuating attitude which succes- 
sively traverses and retraverses all the positions of the sensorial field, 
and which thus successively brings now one and now the other point 
into the daylight, leaving the others momentarily obscured though still 
impressing the sentient organism; we can understand, then, how-among 
the numerous impressions many are so rapidly brought under focus 
that they seem simultaneous; and how two or more strands of quite 
different impressions shall be alternately fixed by the "yellow spot" of 
Consciousness, and yet, owing to their disparity, seem like two,person- 
alities. [2 I 71 
The "yellow spot" refers to the one spot on the retina capable of 
distinct vision, the spot to which by reflex we move the image of 
any object that makes a sufficiently strong impression on the 
outer zones of the retina, thus enabling us to see that object dis- 
tinctly (194). Lewes refers to research showing that the reflex 
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action can be overcome and concludes that there exists "an inner 
or sensorial visual point (BLicApunkt) which dominates that of the 
retinal point" (197). The yellow spot is a physical reality whose 
function in perception is well understood. Lewes develops this 
extended metaphor to explain our occasional sensation of expe- 
riencing a double consciousness. But the sensation could as well 
be explained by remaining within the relational metaphor; the 
physicalistic metaphor embodies assumptions about the senso- 
rium that are as hypothetical as the concept of mental chemistry 
or of the mind as a blank slate. Even more telling, the metaphor 
itself is confused. Is the "sensorial field" the one encompassed by 
the retina or a hypothetical one within the sensorium? Where are 
the "strands of impressions" located? 
That Lewes was sensitive to the problem of the language used 
to talk about the mind there can be no doubt. This is why his 
consistent inconsistencies, his repeated contradictions, may be 
viewed as symptoms of a conceptual tension that might have 
resulted in a radically new way of talking about the mind. It is 
also possible that his awareness of the key role played by lan- 
guage in human inquiry kept him from going beyond the limita- 
tions of the mind-as-entity metaphor. He understood that figu- 
rative language and hypotheses could be used as exploratory 
tools; this understanding may have prevented his seeing that a 
different type of metaphor can project us into a new realm or 
transform a perspective. He grasped the principle, as in this lucid 
discussion of the role of hypothesis and figurative language: 
What takes place in the nervous system under stimulation and reaction 
is neither demonstrable to Sense nor discernible by Intuition; it is, and 
will long remain, mere guesswork. This may seem a hard sentence to 
those who have been relying on the hypothesis of vibrations, wave- 
movements, chemical or electrical processes, cell-functions, seats of 
sensation, seats of emotion, seats of volition, and seats of thought. . . . 
All that has gained currency on this subject the student will do well to 
accept as provisional imagery which may assist exposition, not as data 
from which conclusions may be drawn. The hypotheses are not terms 
of knowledge, but terms to fill our gaps in knowledge. [Study I 841 
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This is an excellent explanation of what would be called, a cen- 
tury later, "theory-constitutive metaphor.'' Such a metaphor 
helps us, as Boyd says, accommodate our language "to as yet 
undiscovered causal features of the worldl' The psychologist 
who makes conscious use of such a metaphor, however, may risk 
forcing all data to fit the metaphor, just as normal science tries to 
fit data to existing theories. Indeed, it may be left to the fictional 
imagination, operating in a novelist or even in a psychologist, to 
reconceive the paintbrush as a pump, so to speak-to not just 
describe but represent in new metaphors a web-like sentience or 
a fully textured mind-scape. 
Achievements and Limitations ofthe Psychologists 
Most of the psychologists discussed in this chapter contributed 
significantly to the development of the discipline as we know it 
today. Bain showed that a psychological system could be erected 
on a physiological basis-that is, on the basis of an actual rather 
than a hypothetical physiology. Spencer and Lewes, along with 
Bain, helped develop the evolutionary perspective that finally 
placed psychology within the biological sciences and stimulated 
systems such as the functionalism of William James. Young 
points out that Spencer, in his psychological theories, combined 
phrenology and associationism in an evolutionary context, thus 
moving to integrate two important strands of thought in "the 
debate on man's place in nature" ("Psychology in Evolutionary 
Debate" 96). Lewes7 works also "formed an important contribu- 
tion to the later stages of the psycho-physiological trend," and 
Morel1 was "the first of a number of nonmedical writers who 
shared the basic problematic of the medical psycho-physiologists 
while analyzing its implications in a more philosophical manner" 
(Danziger 123). Mill revised and improved his father's radical 
associationism. 
Nevertheless, the psychologists remained limited by the mind- 
as-entity metaphor to the extent that they failed to develop a 
language for talking about the mind separate from the language 
used to discuss other human endeavors: they did not come much 
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closer to achieving Reid's goal of a distinct language of the mind 
than did their forebears Berkeley, Locke, Hume, and Reid. 
Rather, the main emphasis in the established psychology was 
shifted "from the extreme of allowing the terms of everyday ex- 
perience to dictate how the nervous system must be organized 
and must function, to that of allowing the categories of physio- 
logical analysis to dictate the elements from which the phenom- 
ena of everyday life would have to be synthesized" (Young, Mind, 
Brain xiii-ix). These two extremes are well represented, according 
to Young, by Gall's The Functions of the Brain ( I  826), which placed 
rhe study of mind in the context of metaphysics, and the second 
edition of David Ferrier's work of the same title, published in 
1886, which placed it in the context of biology (7). (Young notes 
that even today the methods of psychology and physiology have 
not been unified, 246-47.) Scientific research in the nineteenth 
century was dominated by the languages of physics, biology, and 
geology, which supported the theory-constitutive function of the 
mind-as-entity metaphor, both because these studies were well 
developed and accessible (useful for model-making) and because 
they were after all components of the century's normal science 
and were not until late in the century challenged to explain 
anomalous data. 
The nineteenth-century psychologists of the English tradition, 
like their earlier counterparts, remained disinterested in that 
component essential to the psychological novel, "a separable or 
at least radically distinguishable inner world7 (Williams 209). Far 
from being separable or radically distinguishable, mental phe- 
nomena were primarily analogous to if not actually driven by 
phenomena of the external world. This was the import of asso- 
ciation psychology, of physiological investigations, and of neu- 
rological chapters in works as professedly idealistic as Morell's 
Elements. The one mental faculty that was preserved from such 
external influence was the will, and this was preserved in order 
to maintain the special status of the human being within Crea- 
tion. (See Daston.) Thus Carpenter, for example, "was clearly at 
pains to preserve an area of action for the will so as to provide a 
psychological guarantee of the possibility of individual moral ac- 
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tion" (Danziger 130). Both Carpenter and Thomas Laycock, as 
well as other physiological psychologists of their era, were dedi- 
cated to solving this problem: "How to conceive the principles of 
automatic action whose existence scientific psychology had dem- 
onstrated in such a way as to leave room for the operation of a 
divinely ordained natural order" (Danziger 141). In preserving 
the will as a faculty outside the psycho-physiological network or 
at most having only one hand in that network, so to speak, the 
psychologists were not introducing an "inner world" of the kind 
Williams refers to. While Spencer and Lewes (most notably) ar- 
gued for the unity of life and mind, their physicalistic orientation 
prevented them from conceiving of the unity as implying more 
than the dependence of mind on life. 
Because of these particular features-the lack of a separate 
language for talking about the mind, the lack of interest in an 
inner world, the stress on consciousness and will, the unfulfilled 
promise of some of the metaphors used by Morel1 and Lewes- 
psychology was surpassed by fiction in one endeavor that was 
increasingly important in the nineteenth century: the develop- 
ment of a way to understand and represent the life of the mind. 
This development in fictional works is described in the next two 
chapters. There I will show how the concepts of mind-scape, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, and sentience-as-web, as embodied in 
metaphors used by the philosophical and physiological psychol- 
ogists, combined into the generative metaphor mind-as-a-living- 
being. 
v 
REVEALING SURFACES, 
PREDICTABLE DEPTHS: 
MIND AS ENTITY IN 
BRONTE AND DICKENS 
The most obvious characteristic shared by the psychologists and 
novelists of the eighteenth century and the psychologists of the 
nineteenth century is a concern with "the substance mind." This 
concern derived from the problems raised by the mind-as-entity 
metaphor. It manifested itself in the novels7 focus on how partic- 
ular ideas were formed and in the psychological works7 develop- 
ment of laws of mind analogous to the laws of the physical world. 
It was seen as well in an ongoing debate over the degree to which 
mind could be termed a substance, an entity, or a power and still 
retain the immateriality necessary for its connection with God. 
The principle of continuity, fundamental to all the sciences, im- 
posed two demands when applied to the study of the mind: to 
receive sense impressions from the physical world, the mind had 
to have a physical component, and to respond to sublime and 
divine experiences, it had to have an immaterial, divine compo- 
nent. since the mind was experienced as unified and indivisible, 
these demands were in conflict. 
In addition to this metaphysical aspect (as it was termed), the 
question of mind had a practical aspect represented by the name 
of one of psychology7s ancillary disciplines, moral science. Both 
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the novelists and the psychologists were responding to their so- 
ciety's desire for an explanation of behavior that would be inter- 
nally consistent and at the same time would contribute to the 
improvement of society. Thus both took as their starting point 
for analysis the mature mind (always male, of course) reflecting 
on the genius of God's design; that design, in turn, was mani- 
fested not only in perceivable phenomena but also in the means 
by which the phenomena impressed themselves on the mind and 
stimulated its growth. Because psychologists attempted to 
understand this interaction between the mind and the world, they 
claimed for their discipline the first place in the hierarchy of the 
sciences. Undergirding this whole structure of theories and goals 
was the mind conceived of as a thinking substance and figura- 
tively represented as a malleable, localizable, and discrete entity. 
After about the first third of the nineteenth century, people 
began to realize that this structure could not accommodate some 
mental phenomena that were becoming more and more interest- 
ing. Two particular areas of experience remained relatively inac- 
cessible: powerful, apparently innate feelings (usually character- 
ized as "the heart"), and the sense of the mind as a complex being 
governed by laws perhaps very different from those of the phys- 
ical world (a sense that now pervades everyday usage with the 
terms "the unconscious" and "the subconscious"). In this chap- 
ter I show that Charlotte Bronte and Charles Dickens attempted 
to represent the first area of experience by modifiying the mind- 
as-entity metaphor; their attempts attest to the lingering attrac- 
tiveness of that metaphor. In the following chapter I focus on the 
techniques developed by George Eliot and Henry James to rep- 
resent the second area, methods which for the first time show an 
explicit concept of the life of the mind as a living, sentient whole. 
If these four novelists were imagined as psychologists, Bronte 
and Dickens were within the limits of what I've called normal 
science, relying on the theory-constitutive metaphor mind-as-en- 
tity, whereas Eliot and James were moving toward a conceptual 
revolution with their metaphors of mindscapes and sentient 
webs. All four, however, were engaged in the "epistemological 
quest" that Michael Timko identifies as one of the main traits 
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of the Victorian era, in contradistinction to the "metaphysical 
quest" of the Romantics (610). Timko writes that the Wordswor- 
thian "certainty of knowing, this apprehension of a metaphysical 
certainty, is gone in the next generation"; the Victorians were 
more concerned to understand the human being in a pragmatic 
way-how the human body, mind, and society work together 
(613). 
The reception accorded Dickens and Bronte demonstrates the 
importance of "the heart"; their works were judged in part by 
how convincingly the life of the heart was presented. Dickens 
fared poorly in this respect, Bronte much better. Dickens was 
regarded as someone who could tell a story so well and people it 
with such interesting caricatures that the uncritical reader seldom 
noticed how untrue-to-life these caricatures really were. Accord- 
ing to one anonymous critic writing for the Rambler in 1854, the 
66 great intellectual characteristic" of Dickens was his "most ur,- 
usual power of observing the external peculiarities of men and 
women, as distinguished from all insight into that hidden nature 
whence flow the springs of their conduct" (in Ford 82). This 
critic also declared that "morally there is probably not another 
living writer, of equal decency of thought, to whom the super- 
natural and eternal world simply is not." George Eliot spoke ex- 
plicitly of Dickens' "false psychology" in her essay "The Natural 
History of German Life." She felt that he could render the exter- 
nals but was unable to render the "psychological character" of 
his figures (271). Trollope, in a masterful piece of faint praise, 
commented, "It has been the peculiarity and the marvel of this 
man's power, that he has invested his puppets with a charm that 
has enabled him to dispense with human nature" (in Ford 106). 
These negative voices were calling for the presentation of a 
single human nature, like Lewes' "General Mind," with a clear 
connection between its "hidden" component and the "eternal 
world." In his important essay "Dickens in Relation to Criticism" 
(1872) Lewes attempted to explain the source of Dickens' power 
and popularity, which he felt had not been adequately acknowl- 
edged by critics. Despite this positive approach, however, Lewes 
labeled the Dickens world "a fantastic absurdity" and its charac- 
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ters "caricatures and distortions of human nature. . . . Unreal and 
impossible as these types were, speaking a language never heard 
in life, moving like pieces of simple mechanism always in one 
way (instead of moving with the infinite fluctuations of orga- 
nisms . . .) these unreal figures affected the uncritical reader with 
the force of realityp (in Ford 61-62). Lewes' distinction between 
cc moving like pieces of simple mechanism" and "moving with the 
infinite fluctuations of organisms" implies two important criteria 
for credible characters: they must be organisms, and they must 
demonstrate finely modulated responses to slight variations in 
stimuli. In assessing the achievements of Bronte and Dickens I 
will show that their metaphors of mind did not enable them to 
meet these criteria. 
It is useful to consider a dissent from the general evaluation of 
Dickens' fictional world as unreal, in order to better understand 
what Dickens' contemporaries took to represent reality. David 
Masson, writing in 1859, placed Dickens in what he called the 
"ideal, or Romantic school" (34). What this meant, Masson con- 
tinued, was that Dickens was able to take a "hint from actual 
fact," generalize it, and develop it "into a character to match; 
which character he then transports, along with others similarly 
suggested, into a world of semi- fantastic conditions, where the 
laws need not be those of ordinary probability.. . . The Ideal or 
Romantic artist must be true to nature, as well as the Real artist; 
but he may be true in a different fashion. He may take hints from 
Nature in her extremest moods, and make these hints the terms 
of creations fitted for a world projected imaginatively beyond the 
real one, or inserted into the midst of the real one, and yet imag- 
inatively moated round from it" (35-36). As one example, Mas- 
son offered Micawberism, remarking that although "there never 
was a Mr. Micawber in nature" yet nature was pervaded with the 
cc essence," which Dickens "extracted." But in disagreeing with 
the negative evaluations Masson still accepted their reading of 
Dickens' fictional world: it is moated round from the real world, 
it contains characters that no one will ever meet in nature, and it 
is governed by other laws than those of ordinary probability. 
Masson7s description of Dickens' creative technique reminds 
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us that the term "reality" did not mean quite the same thing in 
1850 as it does today. For all of the critics, reality meant nature, 
and nature was agreed to have a component above, beyond, or 
behind the tangible everyday reality, an "eternal" component 
that correlated with the characters' "inherent necessity" and 
"hidden nature." This is John Romano's basis for contending that 
Dickens is best regarded as a realistic novelist, attempting to sig- 
nify "with only partial coherence but with great longing, the 
world that lies beyond the farthest border of his power to por- 
tray" (7). Romano believes that Dickens' works imply an episte- 
mology: "reality is forever escaping our grasp, forever going 
deeper than, forever superseding and outdistancing, the forms 
provided by the chasing mind" (47). The mind, with its forms 
derived by rational processes or else impressed in a physical way 
by the external world, can never "grasp" that larger reality. One 
element must be added to make Romano's depiction complete: 
although the intellect cannot rationally understand this deeper 
level or higher realm, the heart can sense it. Dickens knew that 
the realm of depth could not be perceived as the surface details 
could be, nor could it be rendered, but it could be sensed or in- 
tuited and could be sipt;fed. Metaphor was an indispensable tool 
for this signification; only by means of metaphor could Dickens 
express the otherwise inexpressible experience of depth. 
This is not to say that he did a particularly good job even then. 
His conception of such experience was limited by the mind-as- 
entity metaphor, which did not invite him to portray those infi- 
nite fluctuations of organisms that Lewes said were so important. 
Reality forever escapes the grasp of characters in the Dickens 
world as well as the grasp of the novelist because the greater part 
of the interaction is "always in one way," from the external world 
to the mind: mind is impressed by the world and has little if any 
life of its own. Dickens' contemporaries were dissatisfied with 
his world, insofar as it allowed little place for the sensed connec- 
tions between human depths and "the supernatural and eternal 
world"; Dickens simply asserted such connections. Dickens' psy- 
chology was primarily based on associationism and the hypoth- 
esis of an impressible mind, with the heart as a rather passive 
140 Metaphors of Mind 
kernel of goodness underneath the layers of character impressed 
by the world. Bringing the heart into the metaphorical structure 
in this relatively programmatic way allowed Dickens to represent 
powerful, irrational, benevolent feelings better than the psychol- 
- 
ogy of the eighteenth century had done, but it did not correct the 
deficiencies of the mind-as-entity metaphor. 
In contrast to the resistance met by Dickens' psychology, 
Charlotte Bronte7s psychology was regarded favorably because 
she preserved the connection between the springs of human na- 
- - 
ture and the eternal fountains while also giving her main charac- 
ters a fuller life. The reviews included in Miriam Allott's The 
Brontii frequently mention the author's skill in developing char- 
acter and her ability to focus on the workings of a single mind. 
- 
The phrases "anatomy of mind" and "anatomy of the female 
heart" occur several times in descriptions of the author's method 
and achievement (74, I 18, 141, for example). These physicalistic 
statements are usually accompanied by explanations of the moral 
value of or the moral intent behind the author's attention to par- 
ticulars. Thus, one reviewer praised Kllette for that "actuality" in 
portrayal of human beings which is "the very genius and spirit 
of modern English fiction"; actuality allows readers to feel "the 
thrill of sympathy" and learn, from the characters' thoughts and 
actions, how to "think and act" (213). According to another re- 
viewer, the "soul" of the author of Kllette saw "men and things 
with the correct glance of science, only warmed and made more 
piercing by a genial sympathy" (182-83). A third, discussing 
Shirley, emphasized Bronte7s ability to represent both the every- 
day real and the transcendent real: "A sharp relish for the beau- 
ties of external nature, no mean power of reproducing them, and 
occasional glimpses of ideal imagination of a high order, are vis- 
ible throughout" ( I  29). 
Again, Lewes' comments are instructive as an index of the 
- 
criteria upheld by the progressive psychology of Bronte7s time. 
He identified the "significant characteristic" ofJane Eye as its 
<< deep, significant reality.'' He went on to explain that the author's 
cc faculty for objective representation is also united to a strange 
power of subjective representation. We do not simply mean the 
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power over the passions-the psychological intuition of the art- 
ist, but the power also of connecting external appearances with 
internal effects-of representing the psychological interpretation 
of material phenomena" (Allott 84, 86). He praised Bronte's abil- 
ity to describe how surface appearances affect a mind and how 
the mind in turn misrepresents or misconceives the appearances 
by correlating rather precisely each fact of external appearance 
with an internal effect. In other words, Bronte was able to render 
those infinite fluctuations that Lewes regarded as equivalent to 
life. 
The second power Lewes attributed to Bronte was her re- 
sponse to the developing interest in what he would later call 
sentience-the interest in the infinite number of fluctuations ex- 
perienced by an organism, in the psychological impact of physi- 
ological fluctuations, and in the physiological impact of psycho- 
logical fluctuations. This power exceeds in degree but does not 
differ in kind from that of Defoe, Richardson, and Austen. Bronte 
gave passions a more coherent voice than did these earlier writ- 
ers, but the voice itself was still one element of a rather simply 
conceived, relatively passive mental entity. 
Bronte 4 Psychology of Surfaces and Depth 
The four novels of Bronte7s mature period show a develop- 
ment away from a psychology that assumes a straightforward 
connection between surfaces and the mind beneath, to a psychol- 
ogy that stresses the difficulty of reading surfaces accurately. In 
The Pro&ssor (the earliest of her novels but not published until 
1857) she relied on physiognomy, the revealing glance, and 
clearly defined character types to portray her characters and their 
interactions. In her later works she emphasized how characters 
develop toward self-understanding while calling into question 
the psychological truisms of that first work. Her criticism of Jane 
Austen provides the metaphorical key to her concept of the mind: 
"What sees keenly, speaks aptly, moves flexibly, it suits her to 
study, ut what throbs fast and full, though hidden, what the blood 
rushes through, what is the unseen seat of Life and the sentient 
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target of death-thts Miss Austen ignores; she no more, with the 
mind's eye, beholds the heart of her race than each man, with 
bodily vision sees the heart in his heaving breast" (in Knies 48). 
The vehicle of the metaphor here is the heart as a physical 
organ, throbbing, pumping blood, constituting the body's most 
important vital sign. The tenor is emotional life or the passions. 
With the word sentient, Bronte located emotional life outside of 
the relatively limited realm of consciousness and within the 
broader realm of sentience, which incorporates unconscious 
facts, those which "lie outside the range of Introspection" but 
can be studied through observation and inference without the 
necessity of hypothesizing a "mystic Unconsciousness" as Lewes 
explained (Srudy ofPsychology 91). The attempt to bring the realm 
of sentience within the novel form was potentially revolutionary; 
Lewes no doubt had this attempt in mind when he praised Bronte 
for "representing the psychological interpretation of material 
phenomenal7 But her continuing reliance on figurative language 
derived from the mind-as-entity metaphor prevented her fulfill- 
ing this potential. She referred to the minds of her characters as 
impressible and discrete entities; she insisted on a point-for-point 
connection between external appearances and the internal reality, 
although her characters have to learn to read the appearances; 
she conveyed no sense of a distinct inner life, although her char- 
acters discover inner springs and fountains. 
The Professor is a study in unendearing self-control. Its narra- 
tor, William Crimsworth, never allows himself any extremity of 
feeling. The passions of rapture and despair only impinge on his 
life through the agency of the young lace-mender, Frances, 
whom he comes to love. Because his feelings for her are phleg- 
matic and controlled, he is puzzled by her excesses. Only once is 
he mastered by impulse, when he asks if she will marry him: 
(6 There are impulses we can control; but there are others which 
control us, because they attain us with a tiger-leap, and are our 
masters ere we have seen them. Perhaps, though, such impulses 
are seldom altogether bad; perhaps Reason, by a process as brief 
as quiet, a process that is finished ere felt, has ascertained the 
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sanity of the deed Instinct meditates, and feels justified in re- 
maining passive while it is performed" (228). 
His mind, to Crimsworth, consists of separate entities which 
can initiate and regulate deeds. Assuming that all minds are sim- 
ilarly constructed, Crimsworth can explain Frances' outbursts of 
passion only by imagining her as two separate beings. Thus after 
their marriage he feels possessed of not one but two wives, one 
firm, active, and enterprising, the other full of "poetic feeling and 
fervour," one a "submissive and supplicating little mortal 
woman" and the other a "mere vexing fairy" whom he must 
"dose" with the "deep, serene, and sober mind" of Wordsworth 
(255, 258). Crimsworth's inability to understand that such a wide 
range of behavior can come from only one being is a character- 
istic limitation of the mind-as-entity metaphor. The mental entity 
is necessarily unified at least to the extent that Crimsworth feels 
his own miid to be-under the control of reason. A person who 
seems possessed of two dramatically different personalities must 
be two separate selves; a single mental entity could not contain 
both. 
Readers usually resist accepting Bronte's favorable view of the 
narrator, a man who understands little of other people and who 
seems to know nothing of the unseen seat of Life. Frances is not 
two persons but one, and objectively her moments of passion 
need be no more puzzling than Crimsworth's. Further, she under- 
stands that her passions are real and important. As she tells him 
after one outburst, when he asks where "all that wild vigour" has 
disappeared to, "I cannot tell where it is gone . . . but I know 
that, whenever it is wanted, it will come back again" (261). 
Bronte clearly intends readers to approve both of Frances and of 
Crimsworth, whose character is the opposite of hers. 
One explanation for Bronte7s demands on her readers is her 
desire to strike out in a direction completely different from that 
taken in her Angrian romances. She writes in her preface to The 
Profasor that as a writer she has come to prefer the "plain and 
homely," hence her hero "should work his way through life" as 
real men do: "As Adam's son he should share Adam's doom, and 
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drain throughout life a mixed and moderate cup of enjoyment" 
(3). A second explanation is that Bronte has not yet found lan- 
guage to represent the location of that "wild vigour" and the way 
it operates. When describing the impact of passions on plain and 
homely minds, she does use figures of speech that differ from 
those common in the novels of the previous century. Crimsworth 
remarks that when Frances disappeared for a time, he did not 
allow the disappointment and grief "engendered" in his mind to 
(6 grow there to any monstrous size" (164). The organic conno- 
tations are rather new here, but the image is still an extension of 
the mind-as-entity metaphor rather than a new metaphor with 
generative ~otential.  Most psychologists before Bronte adopted 
something similar to Reid's comparison of the growth of the 
mind to the growth of a plant from seed to fruit-producer: "In 
our progress from infancy to maturity, our faculties open in a 
regular order appointed by nature" (Intellectual Powers 807). 
Bronte appropriates the metaphorical concept, only changing it 
by applying it to an individual idea rather than to the faculties. 
Jane Eyre (1847) puts the passion of the main character at the 
novel's center and dramatizes the impact of her passion on her 
sentience and her conscious awareness. But the lesson the novel 
teaches is similar to that illustrated by Crimsworth: passion has 
to be brought under control. Jane the mature retrospective nar- 
rator sees that her younger self has grown in her ability to rec- 
ognize the constants in her personality and control the variables, 
which she was able to do because she always understood that her 
mind was impressible. The young Jane is always seeking ways to 
control her mental shape and thus nurture her developing sense 
of "what throbs fast and full." If she correctly represents to her- 
self the surfaces of events, she will have a much better chance of 
imprinting herself in the most constructive way. The need for this 
tactic is dramatized in her encounter with Mrs. Reed after that 
woman has slandered her to her new teacher. Jane's child-mind 
cannot defend itself against the lies, thus she feels as if her mind 
has been physically abused: "The whole tenor of their conversa- 
tion," Jane remembers, "was recent, raw, and stinging in my 
mind; I had felt every word as acutely as I had heard it plainly, 
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and a passion of resentment fomented now within me" (68). Jane 
releases this passion by shouting out the truth about Mrs. ~ e e d ' s  
injustice, but the release brings its own alienation. "My soul be- 
gan to expand, to exult," Jane remembers, yet even while speak- 
ing she was conscious of her "savage" voice and felt quite 
strange in her new "sense of freedom" (69). Jane must learn both 
how to protect herself against such attacks and how to control 
her outbursts if she hopes to preserve her sense of identity. 
Particularly useful to Jane in achieving these goals and useful 
to Bronte in presenting that achievement is the image of the mind 
as separable from the self. Describing her feelings when she first 
realizes that her friend Helen Burns is near death, Jane writes: 
"And then my mind made its first earnest effort to comprehend 
what had been infused into it concerning heaven and hell: and for 
the first time it recoiled baffled; and for the first time glancing 
behind, on each side, and before it, it saw all round an unfath- 
omed gulf: it felt the one point where it stood-the present; all 
the rest was formless cloud and vacant depth; and it shuddered 
at the thought of tottering, and plunging amid that chaos" ( I  IO- 
I I) .  The psychological event here is clear: a feeling of mental 
vertigo caused by an irresolvable conflict between a well-learned 
lesson and the reality of death. Writing "my mind" instead of "I" 
allows Jane to preserve some distance-she does not have to 
acknowledge that the confusion overwhelmed her. Likewise, the 
tactic allows Bronte to localize the confusion-it is specifically 
in Jane's mind, not generally in her self. When perched on a ridge 
or pinnacle overlooking formless cloud and vacant depth, Jane's 
mind is an entity separate from Jane herself. 
The same tactic serves when Jane explains her later attempt to 
find a way of getting out into the world and seeking "real knowl- 
edge of life amidst its perils" ( I  16). The question is, how to do 
this: "I could not tell: nothing answered me. I then ordered my 
brain to find a response, and quickly. It worked and worked 
faster. I felt the pulses throb in my head and temples; but for 
nearly an hour it worked in chaos, and no result came of its 
efforts" ( I  18). After a quick walk around her room the answer 
comes "quietly and naturally": she should advertise for a posi- 
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tion as a governess. The experience Bronte describes is a com- 
mon one, but her language is unusually specific about the pro- 
cess: giving an order to the brain and then watching it try to 
carry out this order, with the physiological sensations that folk 
psychology typically attributes to strenuous mental effort. 
This personification of the mind is a significant step toward 
representing the life of the mind as a living being in its own right, 
but its source is still identifiable as the mind-as-entity metaphor. 
Locke had represented the mind as having a "presence-room," 
and Upham represented the mind or soul as able to turn its atten- 
tion inward; the faculty of sight has always been attributed to the 
mind ("the mind's eye"). As I will show in Chapter 6, there is a 
qualitative difference between placing the self as a mind within a 
mindscape and representing the mind as even an active, willful 
entity within a landscape. Bronte retains the mind-as-entity hy- 
pothesis of separate mental faculties by representing mind as 
separate from the self and also separate from the passions. More- 
over, even this rather coarse division into self, mind, and passions 
meets the moral imperative of the psychology contemporary 
with Bronte, that the mind be able to retain a divine component 
or be in some way connected to the divine. The language df these 
passages specifies mind as that which does the work of thinking, 
leaving the "I" to occupy the divine corner. 
Jane Eyre's later development consists of learning to analyze 
her impulses and learning when and how to repress them, when 
to give them free reign. In short, she is learning to manage her 
brain, her passions, and her other mental components. And note 
that while I use the term "repression," it is not-~ronte's term and 
does not carry the negative connotations it does in our century. 
What Jane must learn is to increase her mental health by manage- 
ment of her impulses. Jane most needs to manage herself when- 
ever she is in danger of becoming emotionally involved with an 
apparently unattainable object, because otherwise she risks mak- 
ing herself too open to external impressions that will ally with 
her passions and overcome her precarious self-control. 
An example of her management occurs when she becomes 
convinced of Mr. Rochester's infatuation with Blanche Ingram. 
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Realizing how dangerous this situation is for her fragile self, she 
examines the "thoughts and feelings" of her heart and attempts 
"to bring back with a strict hand such as had been straying 
through imagination's boundless and trackless waste, into the 
safe fold of common sense" (190). This examination takes the 
form of a trial in which the "I" is prosecutor, judge, and jailor 
( I  9 I). She a r r a i p  her faculties of memory and reason and comes 
to the "judgment" that "a greater fool than Jane Eyre had never 
breathed the breath of life." She also pronounces her sentence: to 
look into a mirror, draw in chalk her own portrait, omitting "no 
harsh line" or wrinkle, and title it "Portrait of a Governess, dis- 
connected, poor, and plain," then to imagine the most beautiful 
face she can paint, and call that Blanche Ingram. This is a sana- 
tive activity for Jane; it keeps her "head and hands employed," 
and more important it gives "force and fixedness to the new im- 
pressions" she wants to "stamp indelibly" on her "heart." She 
turns to account what can be a weakness, her susceptibility to 
impressssions; having determined what new shape her heart 
should bear, she uses a pair of external, tangible, surface images 
as the press. 
In learning to manage her mind Jane achieves a greater loyalty 
to her "nature," as becomes clear when St. John Rivers proposes 
that she marry him and accompany him on his missionary work. 
She could easily dedicate her life to the mission, she realizes, but 
not as his wife. "As his curate . . . there would be recesses" in her 
mind which he could not touch, "sentiments growing there, fresh 
and sheltered, which his austerity could never blight." If they 
were married, however, she would be "forced to keep the fire" of 
her nature "continually low, to compel it to burn inwardly and 
never utter a cry, though the imprisoned flame consumed vital 
after vital-thk would be unendurable" (432-33). 
By referring to the fire of her nature and to her mental re- 
cesses, Jane shows that she has assimilated her passions into her 
self-image. Having done so, she is able to resist St. John in his 
most forceful moment, when he insists so strongly on his plan 
for the two of them that she feels physically impressed, as with 
Mrs. Reed. But this time her resistance is passive, not passionate, 
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and her reward is a kind of freedom of sensation and action: the 
very next instant she is able to "hear" the cry of the distant Roch- 
ester: "Jane! Jane! Jane!" Her intuition tells her immediately that 
the voice is not witchcraft but the "work of nature," her own 
nature. The cry she hears is not merely a plot device, an emana- 
tion from her unconscious which signals "Rochester's new hu- 
mility" as Sandra Gilbert asserts (801); the man after all did cry 
out in the words Jane hears. Nor is it the less actual because it 
represents a "truth" of Jane's "psyche" (Yeazell 128). What is 
being dramatized here is the moment when a character accepts 
the reality and strength of her passion and discovers her own 
power, stressed in the next passage by the first-person emphases: 
"I broke from St. John, who had followed, and would have de- 
tained me. It was my time to assume ascendancy. My powers 
were in play and in force" (445). 
But Bronte's use of first-person here is still within the limits 
of the mind-as-entity metaphor; she assigns different reactions to 
different faculties. Jane's heart was the specific organ that first 
perceived Rochester's cry: "My heart beat fast and thick: I heard 
its throb. Suddenly it stood still to an inexpressible feeling that 
thrilled it through, and passed at once to my head and extremi- 
ties" (444). In retrospect she attributes her "moment of ascend- 
ancy" to her "soul," which "neither feared nor shook, but exulted 
as if in joy over the success of one effort it had been privileged to 
make, independent of the cumbrous body" (447). Bronte's deci- 
sion to refer to Jane's "heart" and "soul" preserves the distance 
between her selfand these passionate responses; Bronte does not 
allow Jane, as "I," to identify her seywith that which thrillingly 
responds and exults. The self is something greater than the fac- 
ulty responsible for these inner, observable, discrete responses. 
More than this Bronte's figurative language does not permit her 
to say about Jane's progress toward self-understanding and self- 
management. The "seat of Life" remains unseen; the details of 
its sentience remain unexplored beyond the moments of crisis 
and of decision, when Bronte does very effectively render the 
<c psychological interpretation of material phenomena." 
In Shirley (1849) Bronte turns her attention more toward sur- 
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faces but still attempts to connect them with depths. She takes on 
a new task in this novel-creating a rural society with a variety 
of characters and social interactions-that requires her to attend 
more to the subtle variations of human behavior. 
Reading surfaces is an important activity in the novel. All of 
the major characters either reveal their own depths or learn to 
read someone else's, or both, during the course of the story. And 
all of the readings are presented in language that assumes an 
impressible mental entity. The proto-industrialist, Robert Moore, 
reflects that he saw only the surfaces of people and events until 
he went away to the cities, where, he says, "I looked a little into 
reality . . . I saw what taught my brain a new lesson, and filled 
my breast with fresh feelings" (5 5 5). This "new lesson" replaces 
the set of characters "impressed" on his mind by childhood ex- 
periences, characters that had clouded his eyes and his sympa- 
thetic faculty. Once they are replaced, his vision is clearer: he is 
able to see his proper role in society as well as his ideal mate, 
Caroline Helstone. Bronte's description of Caroline stresses the 
eye, the sense organ by which external appearances and internal 
effects are most often connected. Caroline's perception is of such 
a high order that she seems able to look into people's minds. She 
sees that "certain ideas" have become fixed in Robert's mind re- 
garding how best to attain happiness and how best to handle the 
local people (72). She sees that the apparent "bad spirit" of an 
elderly woman's eye is only a "figment of fancy" and that the eye 
actually reveals the presence of a "canker somewhere, and a 
canker not the less deeply corroding because concealed" (186). 
Her eyes are not only penetrating; they are also expressive, 
"gifted at times with a winning beam that stole into the heart, 
with a language that spoke softly to the affections" (75). 
Yet Caroline's perception is not so penetrating as Shirley Keel- 
dar's. Shirley possesses a deep spring of human and religious 
feeling, a "still, deep, inborn delight . . . the pure gift of God to 
His creature, the free dower of Nature to her child" (398). This 
spring complements her "piercing" eye and enables her to read 
easily and accurately the depths represented by most surfaces. 
Like Caroline's, Shirley's eyes are also expressive of what lies 
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beneath her own surface: "so long as she is calm, indolence, in- 
dulgence, humour, and tenderness possess that large grey sphere: 
incense her,-a red ray pierces the dew,-it quickens instantly to 
flame" (398). Louis Moore, as perspicuous as Shirley, is able to 
read this surface. In his journal he writes that he wants to "read 
a line in the page of her heartn-to read whether she is attracted 
to him (630). To accomplish this he sets up an actual experiment. 
While watching her face, he tells her of his plan to go to America 
and find a wife. Bronte attributes to Shirley's face the following 
statements: "I see the line which is my limit-nothing shall make 
me pass it. I feel-I know how far I may reveal my feelings, and 
when I must clasp the volume. I have advanced to a certain dis- 
tance, as far as the true and sovereign and undegraded nature of 
my kind permits-now here I stand rooted" (632). Louis reads 
these statements as easily as if they were written in words. 
Brains being taught lessons, minds afflicted with cankers, and 
reading someone's heart by reading the face-these images all 
evoke the mind-as-entity metaphor through the concepts of ex- 
pression and impression, with their physicalistic connotations of 
a force acting on a body to bring about change of motion, state, 
or shape. This is the case even with the "red ray" image-a 
visible phenomenon within the eye resulting from a change of 
mental state. But Bronte also draws on a second set of images 
that suggests an important new element in the understanding of 
the mind. This set can be seen in two passages. One describes 
what happens to Louis when he proposes to Shirley and she 
accepts: "All creation was exaggerated: colour grew more vivid; 
motion more rapid; life itself more vital: (641). The other de- 
scribes Shirley in a contemplative mood: her "eye seeks, and her 
soul possesses, the vision of life as she wishes it. No-not as she 
wishes it; she has not the time to wish: the swift glory spreads 
out, sweeping and kindling, and multiplies its splendours faster 
than Thought can effect his combinations, faster than Aspiration 
can utter her longings" (397-98). 
The language of both passages suggests that Louis and Shir- 
ley are experiencing a truth about depths. Shirley seeks and pos- 
sesses, but the vision she possesses, Bronte insists, does not de- 
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pend on her desires-the vision shows life "not as she wishes it" 
but as it is. The perception is intuitive; it takes place even before 
her pre-formed "Aspirations" would have time to color the scene. 
Louis's heightened emotional state does cause him to see exag- 
gerated color and motion, but Bronte's choice of "life itself" to 
complete the description indicates that surfaces have become 
transparent so that he sees "life itself" as Shirley sees "the vision 
of life as she wishes it." In both cases the mind is more than just 
a collection of faculties and more than a passive recipient of im- 
pressions. Although separate parts are mentioned (eyes, soul, in- 
ner spring), the whole mental being has the vision, and both 
Shirley's mind and Louis's can project themselves into the world 
and apprehend the living depths. 
What probably keeps Bronte from more fully realizing the 
potential in these images is her continuing conscious reliance on 
the language of physiognomy. This language, the single most 
notable embodiment of the mind-as-entity metaphor in Bronte's 
novels, has been fully discussed elsewhere (Jack, Senseman); I 
need only add that the language restricts action to that of the 
external world on the mind. Passages like those describing Shir- 
ley and Louis demonstrate Bronte's interest in richer possibilities 
of ex-pressing the relationship among mind, surface, and depths, 
but the relative infrequency and inarticulateness of the passages 
shows her language to be too limited. "As she wishes it. No- 
not as she wishes it" shows a writer whose conceptual reach may 
be exceeding her linguistic grasp. 
In Kllette ( I  85 3), Bronte shifts the direction of her exploration. 
Whereas inJane Eye and Shirley she is concerned to represent the 
reality and significance of the depths, of "life itself," in KlZette she 
concerns herself almost exclusively with the persistent and 
troublesome tendency to see depths where there are only sur- 
faces. The mature Lucy Snowe comments thus on the struggle of 
her younger self to come to terms with her character: "These 
struggles with the natural character, the strong native bent of the 
heart, may seem futile and fruitless, but in the end they do good. 
They tend, however slightly, to give the actions, the conduct, that 
turn which Reason approves, and which Feeling, perhaps, too 
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often opposes: they certainly make a difference in the general 
tenor of a life, and enable it to be better regulated, more equable, 
quieter on the surface; and it is on the surface only the common 
gaze will fall. As to what lies below, leave that with God" (255). 
This is a pragmatic accommodation to the demands of everyday 
existence ("the common gaze") and to the impossibility of mak- 
ing much change in "what lies below." The narrator understands 
this impossibility because she has repeatedly experienced how 
unreliable are those sensations that inJane Eyre and Shirley are 
associated with the apprehension of truth: shortness of breath, 
quickening of the pulse, throbbing at the temples. 
Each of Lucy's four encounters with what she supposes to be 
an actual ghost of a nun named Justine Marie dramatizes her 
tendency to assign too much truth to phenomena that elicit from 
her a rush of feeling. The first encounter takes place when she is 
excitedly and nervously preparing to read a letter from a man she 
has become infatuated with; it overwhelms her physically: "I 
cried out; I sickened" (351). The second occurs in the ghost's 
reputed wandering place when she is burying his letters. This 
time she faces the ghost for five minutes and then tries to touch 
it (426). She is able to remain calm because she believes that she 
has buried her dreams and passions along with the letters. But 
she still does not consider questioning what her senses tell her. 
The apparition looks like a ghost; it came upon her the first time 
as a ghost, and it causes an overwhelming rush of physiological 
sensations-therefore it must be what it seems. 
Bronte criticism frequently notes that Lucy must find her iden- 
tity in a balance between passion, including sexual passion, and 
reason (e.g., Martin I 54) and that many of her actions can be 
read as symbolic sexual acts, such as her impassioned reading 
and later burying of the letters (Goldfarb I yo, I 53). She may be, 
as Goldfarb claims, frigid in the clinical sense (157); self- 
repression is certainly part of her nature. But just as effective in 
helping her deny her passion is her projection of her inner tur- 
moil into the external world. This is what she is doing during the 
third encounter. She has just whispered a farewell to the long- 
buried letters and has been surprised by Paul, for whom she has 
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come to feel a strange attraction. He further upsets her by sharing 
his own experience of the strange "something" that haunts the 
garden and by asserting a "rapport" between himself and Lucy, 
an "affinity" that extends even to a similarity of foreheads, eyes, 
and tones of voice. Since the ghost appears at this moment, it is 
no wonder that Lucy perceives all of nature to be charged with 
special significance: "the wind rose sobbing; the rain poured wild 
and cold; the whole night seemed to feel" the ghost (534). Even 
this late in her story Lucy still does not see that it is part of her 
"natural character" to link the terrible, the thrilling, and the pas- 
sionate, so it does not occur to her to question the meaning she 
immediately assigns to the phenomena. In this encounter her 
passions are given free reign and completely transform the exter- 
nal world into a terrible and thrilling scene, where in the second 
encounter they are completely repressed and allow her to calmly 
confront the apparition. In neither case is Lucy finding a way to 
regulate the "quick" of her nature. 
Lucy's equation of emotionally colored perceptions with truth 
is the aspect of her character she has the most difficulty coming 
to terms with. In leading up to the fourth encounter, the narrator 
is much more critical than before of this weakness of her younger 
self. Lucy has been drugged by her most dangerous enemy, Ma- 
dame Beck, but instead of being knocked out she is stimulated by 
the opiate and goes wandering through Villette late at night. 
Drawn to a strange festival at the center of the city, she finds 
herself near all of her enemies. When someone cries out that 
Justine Marie is about to arrive, Lucy undergoes a "presentiment 
of discovery," certain that all mysteries are about to be solved. 
The mature narrator asks, dryly, "When imagination once runs 
riot, where do we stop?" It is not Lucy's nun who appears but a 
young woman of the same name, accompanied by Paul. Lucy's 
presentiments were "all falsities-all figments" (671-72). What 
is revealed is not a gothic mystery but an unpleasant fact of real 
life, so she assumes-that Paul and the young girl are to be mar- 
ried. Painful as the sight is, Lucy gives thanks for the drug which 
has sparked this excursion, because now she is sure she knows 
everything. The narrator, however, presents her younger self's 
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thoughts in such exaggerated diction that the effect is ironical: "I 
always, through my whole life, liked to penetrate to the real 
truth; I like seeking the goddess in her temple, and handling the 
veil, and daring the dread glance. 0 Titaness amongst deities! 
The covered outline of thine aspect sickens often through its un- 
certainty, but define to us one trait, show us one lineament, clear 
in awful sincerity; we may gasp in untold terror, but with that 
gasp we drink in a breath of thy divinity; our heart shakes, and 
its currents sway like rivers lifted by earthquake, but we have 
swallowed strength" (674). 
This passage shows that Lucy is being ridiculous to view truth 
as that which shakes her heart and terrifies her. The narrator 
remarks that she might have deliberated before drawing her con- 
clusions about the scene before her, "but far from me such shifts 
and palliatives, far from me such temporary evasion of the actual, 
such coward fleeing from the dread, the swift-footed, the all- 
overtaking Fact" (676). Her judgment is clear: the younger Lucy 
actually would have had a less distressing life if she had been able 
to overcome her submission to the constructs of her heated imag- 
ination. The judgment also constitutes a criticism of the common 
assumption that certain physiological sensations accompany a 
perception of the goddess Truth. 
Sensations, any sensations, Bronte would say at this point in 
her life and career, can only reflect the truth about states of mind, 
and even those states may not be easy to read from the surface. 
As Robert Heilman points out, the novel's style conveys this 
problem effectively: Bronte uses "sensory specifics" to present 
events in a way that can even make the reader temporarily unsure 
of their "objective reality" ("Tulip-Hood" 245). The language 
used to present the fourth encounter reinforces this point. Re- 
turning from the festival, Lucy finds the nun on her bed, or at 
least what she finds is momentarily a real entity. But then comes 
the reversal that stresses Lucy's tendency to misread surfaces: 
"In a moment, without exclamation, I had rushed on the haunted 
couch; nothing leaped out, or sprung or stirred; all the movement 
was mine, so was all the life, the reality, the substance, the force; 
as my instinct felt" (681). It was nothing but a dummy. Set 
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against the ironical exaggerations of the "shifts and palliatives" 
passage, Lucy's discovery here is the only appropriate one-not 
only are the movement, life, and force hers at the present mo- 
ment, but there has never been anything else. This is the only 
truth to be discovered. 
Robert Colby calls this event Bronte's "last word on the 
Gothic novel"; as Lucy "clears her mind of the phantoms from 
the past that have haunted it, so Bronte exorcises the gothic novel 
- 
that-once fired her imagination, even as Miss Austen had exor- 
cised it earlier in the century" in her novel Northanger Abbey 
(4 I 9). She has definitely exorcised the sensationalism and super- 
naturalism associated with the gothic. From another angle, how- 
ever, KZZette is a logical extension of the psychological perspec- 
tive taken by gothic novelists. Robert D. Hume notes that gothic 
works show a concern with "intenor mental processes" and par- 
ticularly with the experience of "moral ambiguity" (283, 285). 
He contrasts the romantics with the gothic writers in their use of 
- 
the imagination. This faculty served the romantics as "their ve- 
hicle o f  escape from the limitations of the human condition." 
Gothic writers, on the other hand, "though possessed by the 
same discontent with the everyday world, have no faith in the 
ability of man to transcend or transform it imaginatively. Their 
explorations lie strictly within the realm of this world and they 
are confined to the limits of reason" (289). 
These criteria for the gothic tale aptly summarize the psycho- 
logical components of Kllette. It concentrates on "the limitations 
of the human condition," especially the tendency to misread sur- 
face appearances and to misinterpret sensations. Lucy Snowe fi- 
nally gains enough self-understanding and self-control to influ- 
ence events in her everyday world: she is able to defend her 
fragile relationship with Paul. Before her discovery about the real 
nature of the ghost she is not able to do this. Her most dramatic 
- 
failure occurs when Paul, looking for her, is hurried out of the 
room by Madame Beck, while-lucy remains immobile and 
speechless (643). Later, after her concurrent discovery of the 
ghost's real nature and her own "force," the same situation re- 
curs, but this time Lucy's feelings deny "suppression" and force 
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her to cry out that her heart will break (695). The cry brings Paul 
to her side, and they are united from that moment on. Lucy re- 
sponds to this assault on her feelings as she did to the ghost's 
first appearance, with a cry, but at that time she was disturbed in 
her private and hopeless dream-world whereas now her possibil- 
ity of happiness is threatened by the all-too-tangible and impos- 
ing form of Madame Beck, with her eye "like a steel stylet.'' The 
rightness of her reaction is demonstrated by what follows-the 
two lovers do spend a brief happy time together. 
Lucy's emotional maturation is paralleled through the novel 
by a progression in her description of her emotions: "The 
method of exposition becomes less theatrical" in the second half 
(Martin 170). The emotional and physiological state of Lucy 
crying out to Paul is similar to states described in the earlier 
novels: she experiences a rush of tears punctuated "with many a 
deep sob, with thrilling, with icy shiver, with strong trembling," 
although this time there is also "relief" (695). The difference is 
that in Kllette such rushes of feeling do not signal a sublime 
reality but a simple personal truth about a human relationship. 
Bronte no longer needs to modulate this truth through the mech- 
anisms of a preternatural event such as Jane hearing Rochester's 
cry. 
For this reason I regard Kllette as Bronte7s best achievement 
as a psychological novelist, her most carefully thought-out pre- 
sentation of sublime emotions associated with "rapport" and "af- 
finity" among human beings. She demonstrates that sensations 
pointing to the existence of "what throbs fast and full" are valid, 
that sensations of "affinity" are generated within this hidden 
fountain, and that there is no other meaning to the term "the real 
truth." The mind-as-entity metaphor helps her in this endeavor 
by providing a language in which to render the sensations and 
discuss some of the mind's activities. The metaphor is most man- 
ifest inJane E y e  and Shirley, with their emphases on learning to 
read surfaces correctly; it is less manifest in The Professor, in 
which Bronte is still searching for the best perspective from 
which to present her themes; it is again less manifest in Kllette, 
when she becomes more critical of the metaphor's basic premise 
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that sensations can be connected point-for-point with the exter- 
nal world. 
Lucy Snowe's hard-learned lesson is that this premise is not 
always valid, especially not with sensations of the thrilling sort. 
She has unfortunately failed to learn the next lesson in her self- 
prescribed course of regulation: that when she links sensations 
with the abstract notion of the "goddess Truth," she does not 
comprehend "what lies below" her own surface. She remains 
fundamentally confused about her own nature. On the one hand 
she claims to prefer a chill and dim life. On the other hand, she 
seems to be participating in an anthropomorphic melodrama. 
When Paul sails away, Lucy knows that she has had, as she says, 
her one allotted taste of Eden; even the anticipated "Juggernaut" 
of woe at his three-year absence proves only a "chilling dimness" 
instead of an awesome, crushing force (711). This is the calm 
side of her nature. When Paul is to return, however, another 
storm shakes her quiet life, a storm more terrifying than the oth- 
ers because it endangers him. Thus it roars, "frenzied," for a 
week, until the deeps have "gorged their full of sustenance" and 
the "destroying angel of tempest" has "achieved his perfect 
workn-that is, has taken Paul's life (71 5 ) .  
The goddess Truth still lurks behind these sentences as the 
source and rationale of Lucy's references to a "destroying angel" 
and the sentient, vengeful sea; it is a distorting goddess because 
it prevents Lucy from directly observing her own reaction. The 
conclusion frames Lucy's story perfectly. She has pictured eight 
years of her early life metaphorically as a storm: it was "a long 
time, of cold, of danger, of contention" which still recurs to her 
in nightmares as a tangible sea storm ("the rush and saltness of 
briny waves in my throat") and which she claims actually did 
include a storm in which "the ship was lost, the crew perished" 
(46-47). When she found a position as companion to an elderly 
woman and thought her life would be stable and calm for the 
next twenty years, "Fate" intervened, and on a stormy night that 
accompanied the death of her first benefactress, Fate showed that 
it "would not so be pacified" ( 7 1 ) .  The language Lucy uses to 
describe these events at the two ends of her narrated life, more 
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than the events themselves, shows that her "natural character" 
has not changed significantly. 
After the emotional climax, the novel swings back to the other 
extreme, concluding with two calm paragraphs. "Here pause: 
pause at once" Lucy tells herself at the beginning of the penulti- 
mate paragraph. Instead of expressing her emotion she mocks 
the need of some "sunny imaginations" for a happy ending: "Let 
them picture union and a happy succeeding life." The final para- 
graph similarly mocks the conventional summing up by giving 
details only of the novel's despicable characters: "Madame Beck 
~ r o s ~ e r e d  all the days of her life; so did Pere Silas; Madame Wal- 
ravens fulfilled her ninetieth year before she died. Farewell" 
(71 5 ) .  To the end Lucy is caught in a rhythm of "inner passivity 
and acceptance on the one hand, emotional excitement and tur- 
moil on the other" (Hook and Hook 147). That Bronte chooses 
this kind of conclusion may indicate her own continuing uncer- 
tainty about the psychological reality she wants to portray. De- 
spite her belief in the existence of "what throbs fast and full," 
Bronte does not present a single coherent perspective on the dy- 
namics of that inner depth in relation to the rest of the individu- 
al's mental life. 
The Shaping of the Heart in Dzckens' Noveh 
Dickens7 novels, like those of Bronte, tend to portray the mind 
as a being with a life, and his psychology, like hers, was limited 
by the mind-as-entity metaphor. He conceived of the mind as 
shaped (literally "impressed") by the external world through the 
mechanism of the senses and according to the laws of associa- 
tion. His novels dramatize how an individual's mind is shaped in 
opposition to the urgings of the heart and how this shape, usu- 
ally imaged as layers, can subsequently be stripped away to allow 
the formation of a new shape that better suits the heart's best 
urges. 
Although Dickens never declared his allegiance to association 
psychology, both the language and the concepts of this psychol- 
ogy are so prominent in his character portrayals that he can fairly 
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be termed an association novelist. He made extensive use of the 
central metaphor of associationism, that the mind is a blank slate 
or piece of clay shaped by external forces. But he went far beyond 
his contemporaries7 use of associationism in the extent to which 
he showed minds to be impressed by environment and re-formed 
through the agency of the heart. In most cases this reformation 
is prepared for by an associational complex that the character has 
experienced but never acknowledged. The heart remains a mystic 
entity; it is linked by association to elements of the phenomenal 
world and exercises its power through this link. This was Dick- 
- 
ens7 new accommodation between association psychology's view 
of human development as continuous and the common experi- 
ence of sudden changes and reversals, his adjustment between 
that psychology's insistence on the power of the external world 
over the life of the mind and the belief that inner forces, collec- 
tively characterized as "the heart," can counteract the external 
world's power. 
David Copperf;eeld (1849-50) reflects this general pattern. Asso- 
ciationism is referred to early in the novel and is present in some 
of the striking events of David's adolescence, even in the state- 
ments that convey what J. Hillis Miller calls a "providential" or- 
dering of experience, an ordering that seems to bring together 
past and future "in a time out of time sustained by God', ("Three 
Problems" 36). In the opening chapter David mentions his "first 
childish associations" with his father's gravestone and takes care 
to point out that he cannot claim any direct knowledge of the 
arrival of Aunt Betsey, that is, knowledge "founded on the evi- 
dence" of his "own senses" (3). The chapter's concluding sen- 
tence is heavy with a providential ordering: "I lay in my basket, 
and my mother lay in her bed; but Betsey Trotwood Copperfield 
[his aunt's name for the girl David was supposed to have been] 
was for ever in the land of dreams and shadows, the tremendous 
region whence I had so lately travelled; and the light upon the 
window of our room shone out upon the earthly bourne of all 
such travellers, and the mound above the ashes and the dust that 
once was he, without whom I had never been" (11). This pas- 
sage's prophetic tone, knotty syntax, and references to light and 
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"earthly bourne" suggest a realm of experience quite apart from 
the phenomenal. 
This noumenal realm fills a place occupied in Bronte7s fictional 
world by the goddess Truth. The realm may even be more "real," 
since in the Dickens world it is more accessible and is an occa- 
sion for self-deception. From the perspective of David's later life, 
however, this sentence makes significant associations: it links 
aunt, mother, newborn, dead father, gravestone, and light to- 
gether in a syntactic structure that is the embodiment of the as- 
sociational complex formed by these elements in David's mind. 
From this point on, each element suggests to him the whole, and 
like any idea in the mind this idea of the whole can stimulate a 
sensation-in this case the feeling that he is perceiving a "tre- 
mendous region," a noumenal realm of a "time out of time." 
While David consciously prefers the providential ordering, Dick- 
ens gives him language that relates the ordering to a complex of 
impressions whose formation was purely a matter of chance. 
The second chapter of the novel draws on the Lockean con- 
cept of impressions inscribed on a blank slate and then combined 
into ideas and beliefs. David states that his goal is to search his 
mind for its earliest memories: he will look "into the blank" of 
his infant mind (11). This search yields his "earliest impres- 
sions," which, as any Lockean knows, qualify only marginally as 
ideas: they were "the first opinions-if they may be so called" 
that he remembers having "derived" from what he saw (13-14). 
These "first opinions" include specific details about the ap- 
pearance of their house, the churchyard, and the church, as well 
as an awareness of his mother's pride in her beauty. His sense of 
himself in relation to these elements of his world begins to be 
eroded when Mr. Murdstone appears, courting Mrs. Copperfield. 
David becomes aware that his mother is changing under the in- 
fluence of the suitor; she begins to withdraw her kindness except 
in surreptitious moments. 
After the marriage, David is assailed by powerful impressions 
that threaten his early shape-his sense of himself in relation to 
his family. The change comes when he bites Murdstone's hand; 
afterward he feels a guilt that lies heavily on his "breast." This 
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metaphorical weight begins to impose its shape of criminality on 
his character, and its force is augmented by a five-day imprison- 
ment in his room, where David is isolated and never even hears 
himself speak. "All this," David reflects, "appears to have gone 
round and round for years instead of days, it is so vividly and 
strongly stamped on my remembrance" (52). And no wonder it 
is so stamped; solitude was considered a grave danger in the 
psychology of Dickens' time. David's case is especially serious 
because his child mind is extremely malleable, susceptible to the 
stamping. He is also confused by contradictory impressions from 
his mother and from Peggotty (the family servant who is like a 
second mother to him). His mother believes that his "heart" con- 
tains "bad passions," whereas Peggotty continues to believe in 
his innate goodness (52-53). As strange as it feels to the young 
David to think of himself as a criminal, the balance of impres- 
sions seems to him to lie on that side. Dickens' figurative lan- 
guage effectively conveys David's sense of having a shape forced 
on him from the outside, a shape that begins to determine his 
character. 
According to associationist principles, David can hardly avoid 
conceiving of himself as a criminal. The association between 
feelings of guilt and the self-concept of criminality is intrinsically 
powerful, and its effect on David is reinforced by a beating, by 
five days of isolation from all potentially corrective associations, 
and by hearing his mother accept the Murdstones7 judgment of 
his character. The more powerful the initial association, the more 
likely it is to shape the character. When subsequent events seem 
to confirm the shape, it becomes even more binding. The lan- 
- 
guage Dickens uses, like Bronte7s language, demonstrates the 
continuing usefulness of the mind-as-entity metaphor. The im- 
age of a tangible, impressible mind helps him not just to repre- 
sent but explain such problematic mental phenomena as the de- 
velopment into belief of a young person's sense of himself as a 
criminal. David goes through the early stages of this develop- 
ment when he is sent away from home, ostensibly for education 
but in fact as punishment. Separated from all the familiar associa- 
tions of his early life, he is totally open to external impressions. 
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And Murdstone has taken care that they will be harsh, having 
informed the school of David's bestial behavior. Thus when the 
boy arrives at Salem House, he is immediately forced to wear a 
sign: "Take care of him. He bites" (67). The result of this exter- 
nal influence is that he begins to dread himself "as a kind of wild 
boy who did bite.,' 
Although the evidence of David's senses pushes him to believe 
that he really is a criminal, his heart remains strong enough to 
oppose that external evidence, as demonstrated by his later deci- 
sion to flee the firm where Murdstone has employed him and 
seek a home with his fairy-godmother aunt in Dover. This is the 
time in his life when David's heart becomes a more dominant 
part of his character and begins to play an active role. As Dick- 
ens' language makes clear, however, the heart must exert its influ- 
ence through the mechanism of association-it works through 
rather than transcends the mental entity. David's heart generates 
the initial idea from early associations, imbues it with conviction 
derived from the power of those associations, and places it in the 
brain. All of these operations are in keeping with the metaphor 
mind-as-entity, although attributing them to the heart constitutes 
an important addition to the ways that the manifestations of mind 
were described before Dickens. David points out that the idea of 
running away entered his "brain" where it "hardened into a pur- 
pose . . . my mind was thoroughly made up that it must be car- 
ried into execution" ( I  5 I). He does not write "I had made up my 
mind" but separates his self and his mind, just as Bronte has Jane 
Eyre do. The next paragraph reveals more exactly how the idea 
arose: "Again, and again, and a hundred times again, since the 
night when the thought had first occurred to me and banished 
sleep, I had gone over that old story of my poor mother's about 
my birth . . . there was one little trait in [Aunt Betsey's] behavior 
which I liked to dwell on, and which gave me some faint shadow 
of encouragement. I could not forget how my mother had 
thought that she felt her touch her pretty hair with no ungentle 
hand. . . . I made a little picture, out of it. . . . It is very possible 
that it had been in my mind a long time, and had gradually en- 
gendered my determination" ( I  5 I). The idea thus arises from a 
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complex of associations. The components of the story (especially 
the ideas of mother and aunt), associated with sensations of 
motherly gentleness, have been linked in a mental picture that 
has taken on a tangible reality for the boy. After a hundred late- 
night repetitions this reality is as strong as that of the external 
world which is trying to shape him into a criminal. 
Dickens7 language insists that David's decision does not rise 
- - 
mystically out of an unconscious realm but is engendered, al- 
though not consciously and intentionally. David's professed in- 
ability to understand his idea ("I don't know how it came into my 
head," 148; "I don't know how this desperate idea came into my 
brain," I T I )  reflects his desire to believe that his life has been 
organized by an external providence, while the language he se- 
lects indicates that his major decisions have resulted from com- 
plexes of associations. 
The "tremendous region" complex surfaces again when David 
is safely in bed at Aunt Betsey7s. It is called up because he finds 
himself in an environment emotions that replicates the one he 
knew the Murdstones appeared and because some of the same 
elements of the first "tremendous region" scene are present: a 
path of light (here the moon on the sea, earlier a lighted win- 
dow), a window through which another realm of existence seems 
visible, and a similarity of idea (traveling and being houseless is 
like "the earthly bourne of all such travellers"): 
I remember how I still sat looking at the moonlight on the water, as if I 
could hope to read my fortune in it, as in a bright book; or to see my 
mother with her child, coming from Heaven, along that shining path, to 
look upon me as she had looked when I last saw her sweet face. I 
remember how the solemn feeling with which at length I turned my 
eyes away, yielded to the sensation of gratitude and rest which the sight 
of the white-curtained bed-and how much more the lying softly down 
upon it, nestling in the snow-white sheets!-inspired. I remember how 
I thought of all the solitary places under the night sky where I had slept, 
and how I prayed that I never might be houseless any more, and never 
might forget the houseless. I remember how I seemed to float, then, 
down the melancholy glory of that track upon the sea, away into the 
world of dreams. [ I  70] 
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The paragraph is like an incantation with its repeated "I remem- 
ber how." The verb "remember" is the main verb in four of the 
paragraph's five sentences; this, along with the length and cu- 
mulative nature of the sentences, sets off the moment from the 
flow of David's day-to-day existence. Instead of action or move- 
ment, the sentences convey "time out of time," the same quality 
conveyed by the first "tremendous region" passage. The sen- 
tence structure in both passages suggests a momentary abroga- 
tion of ordinary physical reality and its laws, including laws of 
association. The scene evokes in David a complex of associations 
that calls up in him the earlier sense of a "tremendous region" 
and momentarily lifts him out of the realm governed by the laws 
of association. When the complex is evoked, David feels at one 
with his heart (his drive toward a morally respectable life) and 
briefly seems to transcend the external physical world. 
A second prominent complex of associations centers on Agnes 
Wickfield and shares some key elements with the "tremendous 
region" complex. When they first meet, David is struck by 
Agnes' "tranquillity." As she leads him to his room, pausing at 
the top of the stairs, he suddenly thinks of a stained-glass win- 
dow he has once seen, and he remembers that he "associated 
something of its tranquil brightness with Agnes Wickfield ever 
afterwards" (191). The phrase "ever afterwards" suggests that 
Agnes exists for David in a timeless realm, an impression con- 
veyed even more strongly in the following description of a mo- 
ment in the narrative present: "I see her, with her modest, or- 
derly, placid manner, and I hear her beautiful calm voice, as I 
write these words. The influence for all good, which she came to 
exercise over me at a later time, begins already to descend upon 
my breast. . . . I feel that there are goodness, peace, and truth, 
wherever Agnes is; and that the soft light of the colored window 
in the church, seen long ago, falls on her always, and on me when 
I am near her, and on everything around" (198). 
Unlike most of the associations David has formed in his life, 
this one has the power of softening him and thus causing the past 
to blur in his memory. Like the "tremendous region" complex, 
the Agnes complex lifts him out of the phenomenal realm, with 
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its linear time and its tendency to harden character in ways det- 
rimental to the individual's growth. Agnes' very face seems to 
bridge the phenomenal realm and the "tremendous region": it is 
"bright and happy" on the one hand, and on the other tranquil, 
displaying "a quiet, good, calm spirit" (191). 
The life of David's mind is structured by an interaction be- 
tween the principle of association (which shapes particular ideas, 
self-conceptions, and complexes of images) and the power of 
Agnes (which can begin to erase the whole of his mind's slate 
and endow certain complexes with a "tremendous" hue). Dick- 
ens focuses primarily on the surface of David's mind, but his 
psychology also incorporates associations that can be recognized 
retrospectively as working beneath the character's conscious 
awareness to influence moral growth. 
These associations operate "unconsciously" in the sense 
Lewes gives that term: incorporating physical and physiological 
processes of which the individual is not aware. Dickens' figura- 
tive language shows that the associational process is physical and 
has a physical influence on the shape of David's mind (impress- 
ing, smoothing out, re-forming) as well as on the ideas within 
the mind. The mind-as-entity metaphor applied to the uncon- 
scious in this way helps Dickens explain not only David's deci- 
sion to flee to Dover but also his sudden insight that he loves 
Agnes. He says of this second discovery, "I cannot so penetrate 
the mystery of my own heart, as to know when I began to think 
I might have set its earliest and brightest hopes on Agnes" (817). 
This sentence indicates both that the seed was planted long ago 
and that some details of its growth will forever remain beyond 
his ken. Immediately after Dora's death, reflecting on his suffer- 
ing, he suspects that he may attribute to Agnes the plan for his 
trip abroad, but "her influence was so quiet" that he knows no 
more than this. He also suspects that in his "old association of 
her with the stained glass window in the church, a prophetic 
foreshadowing of what she would be to me, in the calamity that 
was to happen in the fullness of time, had found a way into my 
mind" (659). His understanding of Agnes' role extends no far- 
ther. 
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However, he does understand the process that brings about his 
revelation during his wanderings in Europe, a process involving 
first a destruction of the old shape of his mind (a return to the 
blank-slate or smooth-clay condition) and then the impression of 
a new shape congruent with his heart's urges. David first de- 
scribes the accretion of bits of a new idea (his bereavement) that 
gives him a new and bleak picture of his present state: the new 
idea comes "little by little, and grain by grain. . . . At first it was 
a heavy sense of loss and sorrow. . . . By imperceptible degrees, 
it became a hopeless consciousness of all that I had lost-love, 
friendship, interest; of all that had been shattered-my first trust, 
my first affection, the whole airy castle of my life; of all that 
remained-a ruined blank and waste, lying wide around me, un- 
broken, to the dark horizon" (696). The new idea is like a physi- 
cal burden he carries from place to place, and he has a sense of 
traveling with an "ever-darkening cloud on [his] mind" (697). He 
is unable to respond to "the old abiding places of history and 
Fancy" as he passes through them, and he lacks any "sustaining 
This description stresses the tangible quality of David's 
thoughts and emotions, especially his sense of himself as a blank 
and his corresponding inability to respond to anything around 
him. His physicalistic imagery clearly portrays the weight and 
magnitude of his despair and the emptiness at the core of his 
being-the lack of a sustaining soul. Yet because he is blank 
again he can be re-formed. This process begins one peaceful eve- 
ning when a chord in his "breast" seems to stir in unison with 
the surrounding "beauty and tranquillity" and sets in motion a 
train of impressions that will evoke the "tremendous region" 
complex (697-98). At this moment David chooses to open the 
letter from Agnes. It is a trusting, exhorting, sisterly letter. Da- 
vid's response: "I put the letter in my breast." This does not 
simply mean that he puts it in his breast pocket; it means that 
David feels he has inserted the idea of his love for Agnes into his 
consciousness-the physicalistic language serves Dickens well 
to illustrate how one can add to one's stock of ideas. After David 
has placed within himself this "sustaining soul," the shadows 
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clear from his mind. From this time on he has a will and a goal: 
simply, to "tryv-try to follow her suggestions, to turn suffering 
into good, to reach out to others, to draw on nature. His success 
in this endeavor is marked by an ability to further control what 
ideas and interests he takes into himself. His decision to "try" 
represents his heart's accession to the ruling position in his men- 
tal life, from which it selects the experiences that shape his new 
character. 
Throughout his career Dickens was committed to a psychol- 
ogy based on the mind-as-entity metaphor, as can be seen in the 
figurative language of his second novel, OIiver Twist (1838) and 
his last completed novel, Our Mutual Fhend ( I  865). In contrast to 
D a d  CopperfZZd, Oher Twist does not rely explicitly on associa- 
tionism, but the psychological dangers faced by the young hero 
are dangers precisely because of the impressibility of his mind. 
Fagin, the leader of the gang that has captured and is trying to 
corrupt Oliver, says to his cohorts "once fill his mind with the 
idea that he has been a thief; and he's ours" (126). The "dear old 
man" counts on the thieves' environment and the usual lack of 
resistance in young minds to make his project successful: "In 
short, the wily old Jew had the boy in his toils; and, having pre- 
pared his mind, by solitude and gloom, to prefer any society to 
the companionship of his own sad thoughts in such a dreary 
place, was now slowly instilling into his soul the poison which 
he hoped would blacken it, and change its hue for ever" (120). 
Oliver Twist does not carry out the experiment, suggested by 
these passages, of leaving Oliver with Fagin long enough to test 
whether Fagin's attempt to fill the boy's mind could work. The 
sentences imply that it might; there is no question that Oliver's 
mind has been prepared or that the poison is being introduced. 
The only question is whether the hue of the boy's soul could be 
forever darkened. On  the other hand, Fagin's influence is op- 
posed by a "good sturdy spirit" in the boy's "breast," "im- 
~lanted" there by "nature or inheritance" ( 5 ) .  Inheritance is the 
more likely choice; late in the novel his father's will is revealed, 
with its provision that the yet-unborn child could receive his es- 
tate only by keeping his name pure as a way of validating the 
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father's "confidence in the mother, and his conviction . . . that the 
child would share her gentle heart, and noble nature" ( 3  5 I) .  
Dickens7 choice of words suggests that these qualities Oliver's 
mother passes down to him are every bit as tangible as the gold 
locket and ring which were to have proved his identity: it was 
not just her gentleness but her gentle heart, not her nobility but 
her noble nature. This heart is able to respond directly to benev- 
olent stimuli from the external world. A loving, sisterly woman 
sheds a tear on Oliver's forehead as he sleeps, and he smiles as if 
there is awakened in him "some pleasant dream of a love and 
affection he had never known," a phenomenon similar to the 
LC sudden dim remembrances of scenes that never were, in this life; 
which . . . no voluntary exertion of the mind can ever recall" but 
which are brought suddenly to mind by a melody, sound, or odor 
( 1 9 1 ) .  Similarly, when the wounded, weak boy is moved to a 
place of rustic beauty whose "scenes of peace and quietude sink 
into the minds of pain-worn dwellers in close and noisy places, 
and carry their own freshness, deep into their jaded hearts," he 
seems to "enter on a new existence." The narrator avers that "the 
memories which peaceful country scenes call up, are not of this 
world" but are from "some remote and distant time" (210). 
Echoes of Wordsworthian pre-existence aside, these passages 
suggesting a noumenal realm also imply through their figurative 
language that the realm acts on the mind or heart through the 
apparatus of perception-the passive-impression theory of the 
eighteenth century still operates for Dickens. 
From a psychological point of view, an important difference 
between Oliver and David is that the former's intellect is not 
sufficiently developed for him to be aware of and reflect on the 
kind of associational complex that David evokes during his first 
night in Dover. This does-not mean that Oliver cannotbe aware 
of a "terrific region." Quite the contrary-he never really departs 
from such a realm and is able to sense it directly, without needing 
an associational complex. His heart seems never to have lost 
touch with that "remote and distant time." The purity of Oliver's 
mind is also evident in that he is never dividedlike copperfield, 
feeling that something is wrong but choosing to do it gnyway. 
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This point has often been made, for example by Miller, who ob- 
serves that at the end of the novel Oliver is "willing to exist as 
the image of his father, willing to take as the definition of his 
essential selfhood those traits which are the repetition of his fa- 
ther's nature. . . . He lives happily ever after, but only by living in 
a perpetual childhood of submission to protection and direction 
from without" (Charles Diekens 83). 
But Miller grants Oliver too much self-direction in describing 
him as willing his essential selfhood. Oliver does lose conscious- 
ness at crucial times rather than allow his mind to be filled by the 
brutalizing impressions of the orphanage and Fagin7s den of 
thieves, as if some central executive power recognizes the dan- 
gers and switches off his awareness of the external world. These 
fainting fits are not consciously willed, however; Oliver cannot 
be said to take on his father's traits precisely because the com- 
bined natures of father and mother have always possessed him. 
The only sense in which he takes on their traits is the associa- 
tionist one, having had a shape impressed on his blank slate even 
before birth. Unable to open his mind to new impressions, he 
cannot form new associations and therefore cannot grow. Nor 
does his heart ever become so covered over with soiling impres- 
sions that he needs to undergo Copperfield's transformation. His 
character has been so rigidly determined that his intellect and 
will cannot develop beyond the rudimentary level necessary for 
his physical survival. Oliver, it seems, could have been changed 
only by Fagin's experiment or a similar exterior power. He may 
be the only one of Dickens' main characters of whom Lewes' 
criticism is undeniably true-he moves like a "simple mecha- 
nism always in one way." 
Eugene Wrayburn of Our Mutual Fnend is far removed from 
Oliver not only in the chronology of Dickens' career but in his 
susceptibility to blackening and poisoning by the external world, 
and whereas Oliver never fluctuates, Eugene's only steady char- 
acteristic is his inability to hold to one direction. Eugene seems 
to have received very little from his parents in the way of a heart 
or nature. He and his brothers did receive educations, but of an 
arbitrary sort having nothing to do with what might have suited 
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their talents or inclinations: their "respected father" has deter- 
mined in advance for each of the sons "what the devoted little 
victim's calling and course of life should be" (193). The results 
of such arranging come as no surprise: Eugene is selfish and 
easily bored, the second brother is only a shaky "pillar of the 
church," and the third "was pitch-forked into the Navy, but has 
not circumnavigated" as planned (193). Having to follow a rigid 
plan, Eugene has lost touch with his heart; nor has he been able 
to gain the self-understanding that might be expected of someone 
his age. His friend Mortimer asks if he is concealing something, 
and Eugene answers, "I know less about myself than about most 
people in the world, and I don't know" (338). He refers to him- 
self as a "troublesome conundrum" (349). Again, much later, 
Mortimer tries to determine whether Eugene cares for Lizzie 
Hexam; Eugene responds, "I thirst for information. What do I 
mean? If my taking so much trouble does not mean that I care 
for her, what does it mean?" He says these things "with a per- 
plexed and inquisitive face, as if he actually" has no idea what to 
make of himself (599-600). He views his own actions as he might 
view the actions of any other human being; those actions indicate 
that he must care for Lizzie; yet he feels no such loving attach- 
ment. He can stand outside himself and form an "impression" of 
the substance of his activities, but he claims to be unable and 
certainly is unwilling to penetrate into his own heart and explore 
his motives. His knowledge about himself is literally superficial: 
he attends only to surfaces, to his words and actions, resolutely 
refusing to attempt to penetrate within. He had once joked about 
expecting to derive a "moral influence" from his well-equipped 
kitchen (337), a joke that highlights the tragedy of a person who 
sees himself as subject to any chance impressions from his sur- 
roundings. Eugene can explain his behavior only by denying re- 
sponsibility for it: his "nature" drives him toward Lizzie. He also 
insists that her nature causes her to love him: "She must go 
through with her nature, as I must go through with mine" (764- 
65)- 
Like the re-formation of Copperfield, the re-making of Eu- 
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gene depends on the metaphor underlying associationism, mind 
as a tangible and impressible entity. Eugene, however, loses his 
old character in an instant, with none of the gradual softening 
undergone by Copperfield. His character seems to be so hard- 
ened that nothing short of a physical smashing of his skull can 
reform it. This event takes place by a river, which functions as a 
psychic mirror to reflect Eugene's state of mind and the sudden 
shattering. The scene is set with Eugene strolling along while his 
mind reaches the familiar dilemma that has always blocked its 
progress: what to do about Lizzie. He is incapable of forcing his 
thoughts in a different, more moral direction; they have traveled 
in the same pathways for too long. At the instant when he for- 
mulates the dilemma, he is attacked by Bradley Headstone and 
his ossified character is shattered: 
The rippling of the river seemed to cause a corresponding stir in his 
uneasy reflections. He would have laid them asleep if he could, but they 
were in movement, like the stream, and all tending one way with a 
strong current. As the ripple under the moon broke unexpectedly now 
and then, and palely flashed in a new shape and with a new sound, so 
parts of his thoughts started, unbidden, from the rest, and revealed their 
wickedness. "Out of the question to marry her," said Eugene, "and out 
of the question to leave her. The crisis!" 
He had sauntered far enough. Before turning to retrace his steps, he 
stopped upon the margin, to look down at the reflected night. In an 
instant, with a dreadful crash, the reflected night turned crooked, flames 
shot jaggedly across the air, and the moon and stars came bursting from 
the sky. [766-671 
In simply following what he deems his nature, Eugene has re- 
mained on the surface of his mind and has been unable to act on 
his occasional awareness that his intentions are wicked. His heart 
tells him he should either marry Lizzie or leave her, while his ill- 
formed character makes both impossible. It is indeed a crisis, 
because he feels he must act yet cannot. When the reflected night 
shatters with the blow, it is as if, simultaneously, his repressed 
heart has burst forth and he has been sucked into its depths. The 
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water represents his mind; the moon and stars bursting toward 
him signal the shattering of his consciousness. From remaining 
strictly on the surface of his mind, he is plunged into the core of 
his being. 
The violence of the destruction of Eugene's conscious charac- 
ter is paralleled by an especially long sojourn in a "tremendous 
region," during which he wanders in what he calls "endless 
place" (807). Except for brief periods of consciousness, his 
"crushed outer form" shows none of his "spirit" (806). Yet the 
re-formation has already taken place, because in his moments of 
consciousness he acknowledges his guilt and responsibility to 
Lizzie, telling Mortimer to place Lizzie and his "reparation" be- 
fore everything else, even to the extent of letting his assailant go 
unaccused (808). Bradley's murderous act has allowed Eugene's 
heart to break out of its crypt. 
Dickens also relies on the mind-as-entity metaphor in pre- 
senting characters who do not undergo the trials of David, Eu- 
gene, or Oliver. The best example is Esther Summerson (Bleak 
House, 1853), who from early in her life has the ability to control 
her emotions by literally impressing herself with reminders of 
her decision to devote her life to "duty." Esther's godmother pre- 
scribed "submission, self-denial, diligent work"; for Esther this 
means to be "industrious, contented, and kind-hearted, and to do 
some good to some one, and win some love to myself if I could" 
(19-20). She can keep to this path because she intuirively under- 
stands the force of external impressions even when those impres- 
sions are created by the individual. When Esther must lock in her 
emotions, her intellect and will order her housekeeping keys to 
be jingled, but the Esther who wills the action and the Esther 
who is reminded of her duty are not identical, as the structure of 
Dickens' sentence shows: "I gave the housekeeping keys the 
least shake in the world, as a reminder to myself" (90). 
Her understanding of this law of the mind is most evident in 
the way she protects herself from too much of a shock after a 
fever ravages her former beauty. The reader at least infers that 
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she was beautiful; Esther always denies herself any positive char- 
acteristics except a certain "noticing way" (17). The reader must 
also infer that the fever has left her truly scarred; certainly she is 
changed. But her elaborate preparations for her first confronta- 
tion with a mirror are designed as self-protection and based on 
her awareness of her mind's facility for taking impressions. First 
she must remove herself from familiar surroundings, which is to 
say from familiar associations; this means a trip to a friend's 
house. The night of her arrival, after giving her maid a tour of 
the house and being repeatedly overwhelmed by the thoughtful- 
ness of her absent host, she sends the maid to bed. Alone, she 
then reminds herself that her happiness depends on keeping her 
promise to herself (to give up her infatuation with a certain 
young man), reflects on her blessings, and lets down her hair. 
This passage follows: 
I drew [the curtain of the mirror] back and stood for a moment looking 
through such a veil of my own hair, that I could see nothing else. Then 
I put my hair aside, and looked at the reflection in the mirror; encour- 
aged by seeing how placidly it looked at me. I was very much 
changed-0 very, very much. At first, my face was so strange to me, 
that I think I should have put my hands before it and started back, but 
for the encouragement I have mentioned. Very soon it became more 
familiar, and then I knew the extent of the alteration in it better than I 
had done at first. It was not like what I had expected; but I had expected 
nothing definite, and I dare say anything definite would have surprised 
me. [444-451 
Esther has guaranteed for her senses the most favorable possible 
reception of the new face, knowing how easily sense impressions 
can quicken uncontroIlable passions and destroy all capacity for 
the submission, self-denial, and diligent work that are important 
to her. The details of this action emphasize just how impressible 
her mind is. She first looks out through a curtain of what remains 
of her former beauty, and when she parts this curtain, she sees a 
new face already composed by the calming influence of her spo- 
ken reminder and her hair. Had she not so encouraged herself, 
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she might have rejected the face and thus destroyed her carefully- 
built structure of duties and limitations. For the same reason she 
has kept herself from expecting to see anything definite, knowing 
that the associational law of contrast (here, contrast of expecta- 
tions with actual impressions) would force her to perceive her 
change as a loss. 
- 
One reason Esther understands the power of the external 
world is that she has seen what happened to her cousin Richard 
when he became too involved with-the Chancery case of Jarn- 
dyce and Jarndyce. As explained by Mr. Jarndyce, the suit 
"warped him out of himself. . . it is in the subtle poison of such 
abuses to breed such diseases. His blood is infected, and objects 
lose their natural aspects in his sight. It is not his fault" (434-35). 
Not only did Richard come to distrust Mr. Jarndyce, but he even 
allowed that distrust to extend to Esther. He was truly poisoned 
by setting his interest too narrowly on one subject, the court of 
Chancery, and thus flooding himself with associations relating to 
that social and moral disease. 
Only when actually afflicted with her own disease is Esther 
unable to control her mind: "Dare I hint at that worse time when, 
strung together somewhere in great black space, there was a 
flaming necklace, or ring, or starry circle of some kind, of which 
(was one of the beads! And when my only prayer was to be taken 
off from the rest, and when it was such inexplicable agony and 
misery to be a part of the dreadful thing?" (432). The perception 
of existing in a void, the desire to cease to exist, the sense of 
- 
unity as something dreadful, however, are all "sick experiences," 
Esther insists. She recalls them not to "make others unhappy" or 
because the memory causes her present discomfort but because 
"if we knew more of such strange afflictions we might be the 
better able to alleviate their intensity." Whether the affliction is 
an actual fever or Chancery, the natural interdependence among 
human beings becomes abhorrent. This is clearly a "sick experi- 
ence." Such interdependence is one positive aspect of the impres- 
sible nature of human minds; the sanative influence of nature on 
such minds is another. Both depend on the mind-as-entity meta- 
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Achievements and Limitations of the Novelitsts 
Both Bronte and Dickens were working toward accommodat- 
ing mind-as-entity with the mental phenomena deemed impor- 
tant by their contemporaries. Both drew on explicit tenets of the 
psychology of their age, tenets based on the mind-as-entity met- 
aphor: Bronte on the physiognomical hypothesis (surfaces shap- 
ing interiors) and Dickens on the underlying premise of associa- 
tionism (external trains being replicated within and affecting the 
shape of the mind, thus influencing the individual's habits of 
thought). Both described mental phenomena in figurative lan- 
guage that demonstrates the continuing attractiveness of the met- 
aphor as an explanation of mental phenomena. Bronte wished to 
represent the power of the depths, the hidden springs, the 
"quick," but she could do this only by granting that area of the 
mind the status of an entity separate from the lives of her char- 
acters, separate from the "I." Dickens linked moral transforma- 
tions to the power of the human heart, which he conceived of as 
separate from the associationally formed character of an individ- 
ual; such figures as Copperfield and Wrayburn sometimes seem 
to have no selves of their own but rather to exist as stages on 
which the forces of associationism and the heart struggle for 
dominance. 
It is worth asking what a language of the mind might have 
looked like, developed by either of these novelists-a language 
that would have met Reid's criterion of being solely based on the 
mind rather than on physical analogies and would also have ac- 
commodated the new interest in other-than-rational experience. 
Two metaphors that might have helped generate a new concep- 
tion of the mind are mind-as-light and mind-as-water. These 
were present in the psychological traditions out of which Bronte 
and Dickens were writing and were also present in germinal form 
in their novels. The metaphor of the light of reason as a specific 
kind of mental illumination dates at least from the time of Locke. 
For Locke, this light was both something that the mind could 
direct and something that might flash forth on its own; in the 
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latter case it would be felt as an intuition. Light remained a stan- 
dard metaphor as late as the middle of the nineteenth century. It 
was an important device for Emerson, for example, who de- 
scribed the human soul as a light rather than an organ, a function, 
or a faculty: "From within or from behind, a light shines through 
us upon things, and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the 
light is all" (161). The metaphorical connection between 
thoughts and water was of long standing. Thomas Brown noted 
a "very obvious, but a very beautiful similitude" between the 
relationship of brain to nerves and "the parent Ocean, receiving 
from innumerable distances the waters of its filial streams" (Lec- 
tures 185). Robert Langbaum remarks on the link made by 
Wordsworth between the flux of thought in his "veins" and "the 
external river that was his first sensation" (42). The more general 
metaphor likening the flow of thoughts to the circulation of some 
kind of current began to look more literal, less metaphorical, 
with the increasing research into the nervous system and charts 
of stimulus-and-action loops such as Carpenter's. As Bain noted, 
speaking of neural currents, "no currents, no mindl' 
Dickens made explicit comparisons among water, light, and 
mind in his description of the shattering of Eugene's mind. 
Throughout Our Mutual Friend water is strangely compelling 
both to the characters in the novel and to Dickens' imagination; 
water's symbolic connections with death, rebirth, and baptism are 
never far from Dickens7 image-hoard. Evening light and moon- 
light are crucial components of David's associational complexes. 
Bronte7s main references to light are those implicit in her descrip- 
tions of eyes flashing and sending rays, although she too worked 
with the image of moonlight as a signal of other-than-rational 
understanding. (See Heilman, "Charlotte Bronte.'') Bronte relied 
heavily on the metaphor of the internal spring and the current of 
life flowing from it in depicting her main characters' growth. 
Either metaphor could have adequately represented some of 
the unconscious phenomena that were becoming important in 
the nineteenth century, but neither was complete. Bronte drew 
on the fluid metaphor as the best way to represent what she re- 
garded as the "unseen seat of Life," just as Upham had recourse 
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to inner "fountains" in describing the progress of a soul's knowl- 
edge of itself and its relationship to God. Dickens7 characters 
experience a particular kind of light as part of their transforma- 
tions, and Copperfield's association of Agnes Wickfield with a 
stained-glass window is an interesting variation. But neither of 
the metaphorical vehicles was in itself sufficiently complex or 
textured to represent the whole body of effectively. 
Both departed from the concept of mind-as-entity, but neither 
could represent more than a single faculty or single kind of men- 
tal experience. 
wha t  was needed was a metaphorical vehicle that could ren- 
der the mind as a complex and living being, in particular, a being 
with a full range of sentient experience. Neither water nor light 
displays any variation of structure or organizing pattern, so nei- 
ther could render one of the most important received facts about 
the mind, that it has a structure designed by God for a specific 
purpose, and neither could render one of the most important sub- 
jective experiences, the felt texture within the stream of ideas and 
sensations. The metaphors remained limited to representing spe- 
cific experiences-water associated with the sense of a continu- 
ing mental life, and light with the sense of intuitive understand- 
ing or discovery-for which they were well suited. The 
development of metaphors that go beyond this limitation is the 
story of the next chapter. 
VI 
TOWARD THE LIFE 
OF THE MIND: 
JAMES AND ELIOT 
DISCOVER SENTIENCE 
Bronte and Dickens differed from earlier novelists in paying 
more attention to the springs of mysterious mental phenomena 
which are now usually associated with "unconscious" mental 
processes. To represent the development of these phenomena, 
they used the earlier psychology-mental faculties, associations, 
physiognomical "readingsn-and that psychology's underlying 
metaphor of mind-as-entity. But these materials were used in 
new ways to demonstrate the inescapable subjectivity of some 
experiences, in Bronte's case, and the inevitable pressure of ex- 
ternal events on character, in Dickens' case. Both novelists gave 
fictional voice to the new emphases of some psychologists who 
saw a complex of sentient relationships weaving every individual 
into the web of nature, society, and history. 
Each writer displayed at least one characteristic limitation of 
the mind-as-entity metaphor, however: Dickens insisted on a 
qualitative separation between his characters' experiences of the 
phenomenal and noumenal realms, and Bronte similarly sepa- 
rated each character's "I" or executive power from the other op- 
erations and sensations. These limitations may not seem at first 
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to be characteristic of the mind-as-entity metaphor, but as I have 
shown, they can be correlated with the difference between every- 
day and metaphysical senses of such terms as "substance" and 
( 6  entity." The doctrine of an immaterial mental substance is not 
something most people can apply, although it is easy enough to 
speculate about. In everyday usage, in order for the mind to prey 
serve its divine component, there must exist a discontinuity 
somewhere in the stream of experience, in either what or how 
one experiences. Thus Dickens represented the experience of the 
"tremendous region," David Copperfield's land of dreams and 
shadows, as different from other experiences, and Bronte consist- 
ently represented the executive faculty as endowed with aware- 
ness and will: "Iordered my brain to find a response.'' These two 
novelists lacked what the psychologists also lacked-language 
that could bridge the gap between the new wealth of experimen- 
tal data on neural anatomy and physiology and the inescapable 
subjective data of experience. They lacked metaphors that could 
serve a theory-generative function, that could precipitate and 
then guide a revolution in the concept of mind. 
George Eliot and Henry James were better placed. While not 
engaged, as were their psychologist associates and relations, in 
advancing the field's scientific understanding and respectability, 
both imbibed on a daily basis the most advanced psychological 
theories and discoveries of their time-Eliot through Lewes and 
James through first his father and then his brother. These links 
may explain the appearance in both writers7 works of mental 
metaphors that represent, better than anything in the psycholog- 
ical literature, a life of the mind as a sentient being in every 
significant respect identical to the person with whose physical 
body it is associated. The speculation about sources is secondary; 
of primary importance is that Eliot and James used new meta- 
~ h o r s  and renewed the old metaphors to present the mental his- 
tory of sentient beings. Eliot and James portrayed the operation 
of all identifiable forces-those external to the individual, those 
related to the association of ideas, and those which remain ulti- 
mately mysterious-within the field of sentient awareness. Their 
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metaphors show that all forces have an immediate influence on 
that awareness and a longer-term, formative influence on the 
sense of self. 
Like Bronte and Dickens, James and Eliot acknowledged the 
importance of sensations felt to be welling up from some subter- 
ranean source, the importance of sympathy with the external 
world, and the importance of feeling connected with other hu- 
man beings and with the rest of the external world (a feeling that 
was usually called "sympathy"). They continued to make use of 
the language of mind-as-entity where appropriate. But to a far 
greater extent, they were concerned to represent mental experi- 
ence across a full range of sentient experiences. 
The revolutionary nature of this attempt should be clear. Well 
into the nineteenth century, psychologists and some novelists 
wrote as if most important mental experiences could be analyzed 
as the effects of sensory stimulation and nerve-force transmis- 
sion. So conceived, the mind is a physical system, a collection of 
states and changes of states in the brain cells. When Spencer, 
Bain, and Lewes insisted that life and mind were inseparable, 
they were calling for an approach like that of David Ferrier, who 
interpreted principles of human behavior from physical and bio- 
logical phenomena. As Lewes repeatedly stated, physiology must 
be the basis for all other human sciences. Eliot and James made 
the leap directly from physiology to mind, easily clearing the 
mind-body barrier with which the theorists were forced to con- 
tend. They took as a given the organic nature of mind and the 
mind's relationship to the external world, a relationship charac- 
terized by various levels of sentient experience, and they worked 
from this experience to the outside world. Their novels provide 
the applications which the theories were not quite able to realize. 
Both the literary and scientific endeavors were important, al- 
though from the point of view of metaphors of mind the novelists 
were more successful because they achieved a new figurative lan- 
guage to give vivid and compact expression to what was literally 
inexpressible. 
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Mindscapa, R 6 s y  andAffairs of the Senses in HenryJames 
In his famous essay "The Art of Fiction" ( I  884), Henry James 
responds to Walter Besant, who advised writers to "write from 
experience." This is inadequate advice, James contends: 
What kind of experience is intended, and where does it begin and end? 
Experience is never limited, and it is never complete; it is an immense 
sensibility, a kind of huge spider-web of the finest silken threads sus- 
pended in the chamber of consciousness, and catching every airborne 
particle in its tissues. It is the very atmosphere of the mind; and when 
the mind is imaginative . . . it takes to itself the faintest hints of life, it 
converts the very pulses of the air into revelations. . . . The power to 
guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to 
judge the whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life in 
general so completely that you are well on your way to knowing any 
particular corner of it-this cluster of gifts may almost be said to con- 
stitute experience. . . . If experience consists of impressions, it may be 
said that impressions are experience, just as . . . they are the very air we 
breathe. [ I  2- I 31 
This description is puzzling when loolted at closely. In what way 
can experience be equated with sensibility? In everyday language 
(( experience" usually means "what one has experienced," what 
has happened. How can this be separated out, "suspended in the 
chamber of consciousness"? How can it be both an atmosphere 
and impressions? William Veeder has noted that in his criticism 
James relies on multiple metaphors as one way of expressing "his 
perceptions in a style adequate to their intricacy" (I). Veeder's 
point is well illustrated by this passage, in which experience is 
equated with an immense sensibility and the very atmosphere of 
the mind, is likened to a spider web and a cluster of interpretive 
abilities. In the paragraph I'm quoting from, James' last but prob- 
ably not final word is that "If experience consists of impressions, 
it may be said that impressions are experience" (13).  
The concept here expressed by James is certainly intricate. 
The metaphors suggest that experience is identical to sensibility 
yet different from consciousness. The mix of metaphors suggests 
that James is being pulled in two directions to represent mental 
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phenomena. Characterizing experience as a web and associating 
it with the perceptive faculties ("an immense sensibility") sound 
like variations on the mind-as-entity metaphor, as does referring 
to consciousness as occupying a chamber. From this perspective 
Experience is that mental entity or component which records the 
particles of sensation and thought-it is the blank slate. But sev- 
eral features of the description evoke Spencer's definition of life 
as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external 
relations" (Pniz+les 1:293) and Lewes' emphasis on sentience as 
the proper term for psychology because it is more inclusive than 
consciousnas ("Mind" 5 ) .  The web must necessarily change with 
each particle it captures; as long as the consciousness lives, ex- 
perience changes-"it is never complete17 Because the web of 
sensibility is "suspended in the chamber of consciousness," some 
impressions, some particles of experience, may be trapped in the 
web without the individual being aware of them. Lewes7 "senti- 
ence" and James' "sensibility" both refer to the full range of 
mental experiences, from the impressions or particles that may 
be captured but not consciously perceived, to the perceptions and 
conceptions that are present in conscious awareness. Taken to- 
gether, James' details suggest two important claims about the 
relationship among sensibility, experience, consciousness, and 
impressions. First, the sensibility responds to each faint hint 
taken in, so that experience can never be complete, concluded, 
finished. Second, consciousness is separated from impressions 
both structurally and functionally. 
Paul Armstrong, in a detailed discussion of this passage from 
"The Art of Fiction," remarks that what seem "transcendent 
powers of revelation" attributed to the person who can "judge 
the whole piece by the pattern" are no more than "an extreme 
instance of the general workings of consciousness as both James 
and phenomenology understand them" (39). Reading James as a 
phenomenologist is attractive, but Armstrong severely weakens 
his position by seeing James as committed to "penetrating to the 
essence of existence" (47). The phenomenologist's concern with 
such essences, especially when expressed in language that grants 
them them a transcendent reality, is at odds with James7 stated 
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concern with relations. For the same reason, the analyses of Fred 
See and Stuart Johnson are not entirely on the mark. Johnson 
sees James implying a "prelinguistic consciousness" that is 
cc completely independent of the conditions of the world" (248), 
and See attributes to James' language a similar urge to represent 
the transcendent, to "restore the order of the signified while neu- 
tralizing its theological reference" (134). 
Reading James in light of the psychology of Spencer and 
Lewes provides a useful corrective to this transcendental orien- 
tation and preserves the Jamesian emphasis on sense impressions 
and what one makes of them. Spencer and Lewes wanted to 
understand the individual in relation to the natural and social 
environments and also to the individual's total experience over 
time. James' metaphor of the experiential web implies that the 
novelist's attention has shifted as Spencer and Lewes said the 
psychologist's attention must shift. No longer does it suffice to 
represent the individual mind as shaped and impelled by rela- 
tively coarse external forces, consisting mostly of ideas and emo- 
tional pressures. The mind must now also be represented as part 
of a human web of sensitivity involving impressions ranging 
from those clearly perceived to those not at all perceived by the 
individual yet detectable in the direction of the individual's 
thoughts and actions. Seen from this angle, James' famous dic- 
tum, "Try to be one of the people on whom nothing is lost!" 
truly differs from Besant's "Write from experience" in what it 
suggests is possible-awareness of every quantum of (im- 
pressed) experience. 
Experience is thus inescapably "an affair of the senses," to 
borrow a phrase from The Ambassadors, where "senses" has the 
most general possible meaning-not just what enters the mind 
through the five senses but what the mind senses in itself and 
creates for itself. This affair incorporates the totality of sentient 
life as Lewes defines it: the full range of activity of the sentient 
organism ("Mind" 5). But James adds a crucial element with his 
references to the "gifts" of the "imaginative" mind, the power to 
convert even the minutest sensory impressions into ideas about 
the whole phenomenon from which they originate. It is as if he 
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grants sentience to the web itself, making possible for the first 
time a complete life of the mind as a single entity. This mental 
life manifests itself in two ways in James' novels: in his technique 
of representing the mind of a character as a whole individual 
within a mindscape, and in his close analysis of what his charac- 
ters construct from the impressions they receive. Figurative lan- 
guage suggesting the mind-as-a-living-being metaphor is the 
connective tissue throughout. 
Just how revolutionary is James' placement of the mind within 
the mindscape can be appreciated by looking again at several 
passages fromJane Eyre in which mental states or phenomena are 
described in terms of landscapes. First, this: "A ridge of lighted 
heath, alive, glancing, devouring, would have been a meet em- 
blem of my mind when I accused and menaced Mrs. Reed: the 
same ridge, black and blasted after the flames are dead, would 
have represented as meetly my subsequent condition, when half 
an hour's silence and reflection had shown me the madness of my 
conduct, and the dreariness of my hated and hating position" 
(69-70). This ridge is explicitly not Jane but her mind, an emblem 
rather than her inner life itself. As an emblem, it has no claim to 
continuity in the novel; other mental states call up different im- 
ages. 
Bronte does not develop the image to parallel Jane's mental 
development, nor does she repeat it as a way of measuring Jane's 
subsequent changes. Thus, of a later event, Jane writes that her 
mind "made its first earnest effort to comprehend what had been 
infused into it concerning heaven and hell: and for the first time 
it recoiled, baffled; and for the first time glancing behind, on each 
side, and before it, it saw all around an unfathomable gulf: it felt 
the one point where it stood-the present; all the rest was form- 
less cloud and vacant depth" ( I  10-1 I). Or, later still, she de- 
scribes herself as bringing back such of her thoughts "as had 
been straying through imagination's boundless and trackless 
waste, into the safe fold of common sense" (190). 
The images of ridge and peak serve the author's immediate 
need-to represent Jane's mental states-but are not connected 
in a way that shows the ongoing life of the mind. Mind in both 
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cases is an entity subordinate to and distinct from Jane herself. 
Likewise, her thoughts are relatively independent elements 
which are pulled one way or another depending on the relative 
strength of imagination and common sense. 
Karen Chase attributes to Bronte a "new interest in psycho- 
- - 
logical depth, an interior space that will serve as a highly charged 
dramatic arena" (52). In support of this astute observation she 
notes that Jane Eyre's changes of location are psychologically 
<< resonant" acts and that "the self has emotions, faculties, and 
dispositions only because it also has a geography" (65, 91). But 
Chase does not show Bronte actually working with this interior 
space as much as she shows that she manipulates location and 
change of location in interesting ways. This limitation highlights 
a key difference between Bronte and James: Bronte reveals her 
characters' "inner lives" but does not "analyse their conscious- 
ness as James does" (Holder-Barell 81). The best example is The 
Portrait of a Lady (1888), whose heroine James places in a mind- 
scape at a crucial moment in her life and returns to it several 
times to demonstrate the psychic distance she travels during her 
. . 
story; the images are what Alexander Holder-Barell calls itera- 
tive-they contribute to the novel's structure ( I  17). They con- 
tribute to the motif of seeing that dominates the entire novel (Van 
Ghent 2 I 5). 
The mindscape first appears when Isabel Archer is being 
courted by Gilbert Osmond but before she has decided exactly 
what that courtship will mean to her. He has just openly ex- 
pressed his love for the first time; it has troubled her because she 
feels herself being forced to choose, and the pressure seems to 
her like "the slipping of a fine bolt-backward, forward, she 
couldn't have said which" (263). He leaves, and she sits alone, 
reflecting: "What had happened was something that for a week 
past her imagination had been going forward to meet; but here, 
when it came, she stopped-that sublime principle somehow 
broke down. The working of this young lady's spirit was strange, 
and I can only give it to you as I see it, not hoping to make it 
seem altogether natural. Her imagination, as I say, now hung 
back: there was a last vague space it couldn't cross-a dusky, 
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uncertain tract which looked ambiguous and even slightly treach- 
erous, like a moorland seen in the winter twilight. But she was 
to cross it yet" (265). 
And cross it she does, realizing its full extent when she learns 
not only that Osmond pursued her mainly for her money but 
that a woman she thought one of her true friends had been his 
mistress and had put him up to the plot. Again she is reflecting, 
this time while journeying to London to sit at her cousin's death- 
bed and with her new knowledge about Osmond fresh in her 
mind: "She performed this journey with sightless eyes. . . . Her 
thoughts followed their course through other countries- 
strange-looking, dimly-lighted, ~athless lands, in which there 
was no change of seasons, but only, as it seemed, a perpetual 
dreariness of winter" (464-65). 
Together these passages represent a whole world within Isa- 
bel's mind, a desolate but nonetheless more vital place than the 
propositional sea Sterne attributed to Dr. Slop or the impressing 
and copying device described by Hume. This world differs 
enough from the external world that other laws may prevail: 
there seems no passage of time. The two descriptions also dem- 
onstrate a continuity in Isabel's inner life. They clearly stand out- 
side of but run parallel to the ongoing events of her external 
world. The second passage shows her mind crossing that uncer- 
tain tract earlier constructed by her imagination. "Imagination" 
in the first passage denotes not a separate faculty but the mind in 
its most attentive state, as the comment in "The Art of Fiction" 
makes clear. In the second passage, likewise, James explicitly 
designates Isabel's eyes as sightless to indicate that her corporeal 
self is an insentient shell-she ts her thoughts as they perform 
that other journey. 
James dips into this internal world again at the novel's end, 
using the mindscape imagery to dramatize a new stage in Isabel's 
inner life. Her first suitor, the unfortunately named Caspar 
Goodwood, insists that she leave Osmond and return with him 
to America. Hearing this proposal, Isabel feels as if she is floating 
< C '  In fathomless waters"; to rescue herself from this rapturous 
near-drowning, "she seemed to beat with her feet, in order to 
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catch herself, to feel something to rest on" (489). But her trial is 
not yet over; Caspar seizes and kisses her, and it is "like white 
lightning, a flash that spread, and spread again, and stayed" 
(489). The narrator comments: "This however, of course, was 
but a subjective fact, as the metaphysicians say; the confusion, 
the noise of waters, all the rest of it, were in her own swimming 
head" (489). The point of this bit of Jamesian irony is that to 
devalue Isabel's experience because metaphysicians would call it 
subjective would be a mistake. Although explicitly presented as 
similes, the inner flood and lightning are as tangible and real as 
the external world. It is such passages that lead Richard Hocks to 
connect Henry James with William James' radical empiricism, an 
empiricism which "must neither admit into its constructions any 
element that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them 
any element that is directly experienced. For such aphilosoph~ the 
relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced rela- 
tions, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as >ear as 
anything ehe in the system" (65-6). By excluding subjective rela- 
tions, however directly experienced, the metaphysicians to which 
James refers leave out these essential details of Isabel's inner life. 
One of the many ironies of Portrait is that Isabel's struggle 
does culminate in choosing to allow her mind to be rather like 
that of a character in a novel from the eighteenth century, a char- 
acter whose mind is a relatively passive, impressible entity. The 
novel suggests pretty clearly that in turning her back on the inner 
fountains Caspar has caused to flow, hence shunning new knowl- 
edge of herself, she makes an immoral choice because she denies 
life. Most of the main characters regard other individuals' minds 
as things. The narrator notes that Gilbert Osmond wants to treat 
Isabel Archer's mind as a "polished, elegani- surface" for reflect- 
ing his thoughts, her "intelligence" as "a silver plate . . . that he 
might heap up with ripe fruits" (296). Isabel herself regards Os- 
mond7s daughter Pansy as "like a sheet of blank paper" and 
hopes "that so fair and smooth a page would be covered with an 
edifying text" (238). Later she comes to understand that "Pansy 
was really a blank page, a pure white surface, successfully kept 
so; she had neither art, nor guile, nor temper, nor talent. . . . She 
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would have no will . . . her force would be all in knowing when 
and where to cling" (268). At this point in the story Isabel does 
not think the less of Osmond for what he has done to his daugh- 
ter; it does not strike her as wrong to treat an individual as a 
blank sheet to be covered with a text, however edifying to the 
people who will be reading it. She only understands when she 
falls victim to the same treatment: "Her mind was to be [Os- 
mond7s]-attached to his own like a small garden-lot to a deer- 
park.. . . so far from desiring her mind to be a blank he had 
flattered himself that it would be richly receptive" (362). 
The Lockean language in these passages shows that James 
acknowledges the possibility of treating minds as blank slates. 
Pansy definitely has been kept blank and nearly without will, and 
Isabel in spite of herself has become a silver plate in Osmond7s 
collection. But to treat minds only in this way denies their inner 
fountains and the importance of human interaction. It denies 
some of the components of sentience that were being raised to 
new importance in the nineteenth century. A discussion between 
Madame Merle and Isabel makes this point. Madame Merle in- 
sists: "every human being has his shell and.  . . you must take the 
shell into account. By the shell I mean the whole envelope of 
circumstances. There's no such thing as an isolated man or 
woman . . . . What shall we call our 'self'? . . . It overflows into 
everything that belongs to us-and then it flows back again" 
(175). Isabel takes exactly the opposite view: she believes that 
nothing she owns or wears expresses herself and that "every- 
thing's on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary 
one" (175-76). Neither view is correct. The older woman sees 
only the "shell" of the individual; she sees the individual identity 
as nothing more than the expression-impression relationship be- 
tween character and possessions. Isabel's response stresses the 
inviolability of the individual identity. She is here as naive as 
Madame Merle is worldly. Neither understands the most accurate 
view of the life of the mind, given much earlier in a description 
of Isabel as someone who "carried within herself a great fund of 
life, and her deepest enjoyment was to feel the continuity be- 
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tween the movements of her own soul and the agitations of the 
world" (41). 
Isabel's end is tragically fitting because she is not able to raise 
to a conscious principle her intuitive understanding of the conti- 
nuity between an individual's inner self and the outer world. Os- 
mond, she learns too late, is a person who "lived exclusively for 
the world" despite giving the impression of being entirely indif- 
ferent to it (33 I); "this base, ignoble world, it appeared, was after 
all what one was to live for. . . indifference was really the last of 
his qualities; she had never seen any one who thought so much 
of others" (360). She wanted to transcend that world, to preserve 
her individuality in the face of what she regarded as arbitrary 
limits, yet her mind does become a garden-plot attached to Os- 
mond's deer-park, cultivated solely for his pleasure. Like Pansy, 
she becomes a victim not only of Osmond but of the immorality 
always possible in the mind-as-entity view. 
Following the "sightless eyes7, passage, James drops the mind- 
scape construction but continues to dwell on how Isabelfeeh her 
new knowledge: 
She had plenty to think about; but it was neither reflexion nor conscious 
purpose that filled her mind. Disconnected visions passed through it, 
and sudden dull gleams of memory, of expectation. The past and the 
future came and went at their will, but she saw them only in fitful 
images, which rose and fell by a logic of their own. It was extraordinary 
the things she remembered. Now that she was in the secret, now that 
she knew something that so much concerned her and the eclipse of 
which had made life resemble an attempt to play whist with an imper- 
fect pack of cards, the truth of things, their mutual relations, their 
meaning, and for the most part their horror, rose before her with a kind 
of architectural vastness. She remembered a thousand trifles; they 
started to life with the spontaneity of a shiver. She had thought them 
trifles at the time; now she saw that they had been weighted with lead. 
Yet even now they were trifles after all, for of what use was it to her to 
understand them? [465] 
Her known past life and projected future life seem to follow their 
own logic in rising into her awareness, in a language emphasiz- 
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ing that Isabel's perception of these new relations is very much 
an affair of the senses-the ideas have shape, weight, even a 
logic of their own. And the ideas do not just contribute to but 
also define her state. As the narrator goes on to say, "Nothing 
seemed of use to her to-day. All purpose, all intention, was sus- 
pended." She is only able to sense the impressions she has earlier 
missed and perceive the connections they have established 
among themselves. The paralysis of Isabel's will is all the more 
significant in view of her earlier vitality. This mental event is one 
way James marks her decline into passivity and subjection. Isabel 
may now have a full deck of cards, but as the relations among her 
impressions arrange themselves without her guidance, it seems 
that the game is still beyond her ability. 
This affair of Isabel's senses is subjective and varying but 
nonetheless significant. The once-trifling ideas become weighty 
and then again trifling as her mood fluctuates from moment to 
moment. These are not the eighteenth century's independent and 
indivisible billiard balls of thought. Nor are they the "sick expe- 
riences" of Dickens' characters or the scorned "figments" of 
Bronte's. As James insists, the fact that metaphysicians would 
label Isabel's thoughts subjective makes them no less real a part 
of her world. Indeed, for the period of this reflection, what passes 
outside the window of the train simply does not exist for Isabel 
or for the reader either. Her subjective world is the only one that 
she knows and we know, and it is as rich in opportunities for 
sensual experiences as the real Rome or Florence. The internal 
realm is as active and functional as the external. In the Jamesian 
world, perception is never disembodied but is always a sensual 
experience, the most important component of the individual's 
sentient life. To render this sensual quality, James uses figurative 
language based on the mind-as-entity metaphor because this lan- 
guage can vividly and compactly represent subjective experi- 
ences within the sentiences of his characters, experiences that 
have equal or greater claim to validity. This language is a con- 
stant throughout James7 career, as present in the early TheAmer- 
ican (1877) as in TheAmbassadors (1903). 
Christopher Newman, the hero of the earlier novel, undertakes 
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a journey like Isabel's to be at the side of a young friend on his 
deathbed. Awakening aboard a train, Newman "found his eyes 
resting upon one of the snow-powdered peaks of the Jura, behind 
which the sky was just reddening with the dawn. But he saw 
neither the cold mountain nor the warm sky; his consciousness 
began to throb again, on the very instant, with a sense of his 
wrong" (222). He has a sense of his wrong, and it causes him 
sensible mental pain, a throbbing consciousness; the sense is not 
a product of analysis or reflection. Throughout his wanderings 
after he loses Claire, his fiance, he preserves his "sense of being 
a good fellow wronged" (303); he is "filled with a sorer sense of 
wrong than he had ever known" (245). The simplicity of phras- 
ing and the use of the word "sense" draw attention to Newman's 
heart pain as an affair of the senses. 
In describing how his hero feels his way through moral prob- 
lems, James preserves the consistency of this character who per- 
ceives his mind as a storage place, who desires to make an im- 
pression on the world and on the minds of other people, who 
searches for a wife to place on his pile of money "like a statue 
on a monument" and desires "to possess, in a word, the best 
article in the market" (44). This attitude may result from New- 
man's early life, of which he says, "I have never had time to feel 
things. I have had to do them, to make myself felt" (41). He 
makes this statement in the context of asserting himself to be a 
man of feeling, but this feeling is a matter of collecting impres- 
sions. He had gone to Europe for two reasons, first to get a wife 
and second to give "his mind a chance to 'improve,' if it would. 
He cheerfully believed that it had improved," especially during 
the six months he traveled while waiting for Claire to decide 
about his offer (74). But this improvement seems to consist 
mostly of having collected impressions. He writes to a friend that 
she could peruse his guide books and identify the places where 
he had "a sensation of some sort or other" by marks in the mar- 
gins (75); the experiences seem to have made marks in his mind, 
or impressions, but they have contributed neither to a greater 
self-understanding nor to a greater awareness of that world 
which has produced Claire's family, the de Bellegardes. 
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Newman is satisfied to regard his period of traveling as noth- 
ing more than an attempt to "scrape together a few conclusions" 
of a very vague sort; he feels how far away is his earlier life, how 
prominent in his recent memory are Claire's eyes, and how lack- 
ing in beauty his life has been. These are "rather formless medi- 
tations" because Newman can only collect and record sensations; 
he cannot direct and shape them. He has made the external world 
yield him a substantial fortune, but he has no such ability within 
his sentient life. 
Newman7s lack of introspective power is especially note- 
worthy. Early in the novel he describes to a friend how he decided 
against revenging himself against the fellow who had played him 
a costly business trick-he had suddenly felt a "mortal disgust" 
for the revenge he had planned. He goes on to say that "this all 
took place quite independently of my will, and I sat watching it 
as if it were a play at the theatre. I could feel it going on inside 
me. You may depend upon it that there are things going on inside 
of us that we understand mighty little about" (34). On the one 
hand this curious description seems to indicate some kind of self- 
awareness; Newman7s simile implies an inner eye that observes 
these "things going on inside of us." Yet the experience has not 
brought him any greater self-understanding; he remains as inno- 
cent of the causes behind this change of heart as he is unaware of 
any deeper principles guiding what he sees on stage. His senses 
in both cases take in what there is to be taken in, but the most he 
can do with it is to formulate a superficial truism like "there are 
things going on inside of us." It has certainly not helped him deal 
with Claire's decision to enter a convent: her conduct "struck him 
with a kind of awe, and the fact that he was powerless to under- 
stand it or feel the reality of its motives only deepened the force 
with which he had attached himself to her" (245-46). 
Because he can only impress and be impressed, Newman is 
constitutionally unable to deal with the world of the de Belle- 
gardes. One of his greatest frustrations about his relationship 
with the family is that he cannot make any impression on them, 
make them "feel" his "presence." Thus he enjoys a real triumph 
when he tells Claire's brother that he knows the family has a 
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terrible secret. The latter "almost succeeded in looking untroub- 
led; the breaking up of the ice in his handsome countenance was 
an operation that was necessarily gradual. But Newman7s mildly- 
syllabled argumentation seemed to press, and press, and pres- 
ently he averted his eyesv (252). This desire to impress himself 
also manifests itself once in his relationship with Claire; when 
she tells him their marriage is off, he first argues with her, to no 
end, and then forces a kiss on her (244). Of course neither act 
changes the outcome of the story; Claire enters the Carmelite 
convent and her family's name is never sullied by an alliance with 
a mere rich businessman. 
The language used by James to describe his hero's thoughts 
and feelings stresses Newman's dominance by sensations and his 
inability to understand or empathize. James' imagery also sug- 
gests that Newman cannot reflect about himself. The depths of 
both his own mind and other minds remain for him unfathom- 
able. He can no more understand such depths than he can the 
Carmelite nuns singing behind their wall: to his ears the music is 
only a "confused, impersonal wail" (277), the convent itself only 
a "high-shouldered blank wall" (305). Newman's resolution of 
the affair indicates that it has never been more than an affair of 
the senses. His first meeting with Claire had been for him like 
opening a book and being captured by the first lines (82). At the 
novel's end, after standing outside the convent, he visits Notre 
Dame, where he realizes that "the most unpleasant thing that had 
ever happened to him had reached its formal conclusion, as it 
A A 
were; he could close the book and put it away" (306). It is not 
likely that this formal conclusion would have been different if he 
had been more self-aware, but it is possible that he would have 
obtained a different kind of knowledge from the experience. 
- 
For Newman, Europeans as well as his own inner life remain 
blank walls. He approaches them sensuously but can see little 
structure and can make no impressions. His story is a fictional 
analog to the wholistic principle enunciated by Lewes: "We can- 
not have one [single] sentient state that is not enmeshed with 
other sentient states, so that each wave of stimulations sets going 
- - 
a multitude of connected stimulations. Were it not so there would 
I 94 Metaphors of Mind 
be no Experience; only a succession of isolated sensible affec- 
tions" ("Mind" 41). This principle manifests itself in the two 
basic laws of sensibility. The first is that "every wave-impulse is 
irradiated and propagated throughout the system.'' But this law is 
an "ideal construction," Lewes points out: "there can never be an 
irradiation throughout the central tissue, because each wave- 
impulse must be arrested and deflected as it is compounded with 
multitudinous impulses from other sources" (44). The second 
law brings the ideal construction into conformity with the real 
world: "Every impulse is restricted, and by its restrictions a 
group is formed" (45). Arguably, all of James' stories can be read 
as working out this principle in structure and character. Newman 
might have set his goals differently had he understood just how 
complex was the system he was interacting with and how impos- 
sible it was that a simple pressure could pass through without 
deflection and combination. 
Lambert Strether, the central consciousness of The Ambassa- 
dors, has been called by Susan Griffin "the prototypic Jamesian 
perceiver." According to Griffin, Strether adjusts to his environ- 
ment "by selecting those perceptions which fulfill his needs," and 
for him "the moment of perception is a moment of engagement 
with the problems of life" (398,409). Griffin correctly insists that 
Strether is an active perceiver; it is equally important to note that 
some of the perceptions on which he acts originally entered his 
memory through the activity of his sentient web, without his 
being aware of them. What separates Lambert Strether from 
Christopher Newman is twenty years of chronological age, a 
weight of additional impressions that would be impossible to 
quantify, and a sensory apparatus well enough developed to 
catch the nuances and complexities missed by the younger man. 
Strether is a sensory web that allows very little to be lost; he has 
been given the imagination to "guess the seen from the unseen" 
and "judge the whole piece by the pattern." When Strether real- 
izes that he has never felt possessed of freedom, it is a sensible 
realization, "an affair of the senses." He juxtaposes the tangible 
quality of an hour he has spent in the apartment of a young man 
who does seem to possess freedom against the felt emptiness of 
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his own youth ( 3  18). The awareness itself has a tangible quality, 
becomes itself a matter of sensation, and thus it can contribute to 
Strether's consciousness in a way that Newman's collecting of 
impressions and viewing of his mind as a theater cannot. 
Strether7s sensible perception of his mental states is difficult to 
illustrate by excerpt because his reflections go  on for pages and 
only gradually settle down into what William James characterizes 
as "resting-places," which are "the 'substantive parts' of the 
stream of thoughtv-the definite ideas or  conclusions that will 
lead to some kind of action (Principles 236). This is one reason 
why the quivering, web-like sensibility described by Lewes is a 
more accurate representation than the "stream" of William 
James. Each new thought or impression of Strether's influences 
the whole web, and James takes as his writerly duty the tracing 
of these vibrations. 
Nevertheless, certain elements can be extracted from lengthy 
reflections such as that in the Luxembourg Gardens after Strether 
has been two days in Paris (59-67). This scene supplies back- 
ground information important for understanding the reflections 
as they progress. Strether had visited Paris as a young man and 
had carried away great plans of preserving the sense of culture 
kindled in him there. But the death of his wife and child and a 
long period of relatively dependent living in Woollett thwarted 
the plans. He is now in Paris to "save" the son of his benefactress 
from an apparently sinful relationship; if he succeeds, his reward 
will be marriage with Mrs. Newsome. James presents few of 
these details directly, of course; the reader must function as a 
Jamesian perceiver. But in the Luxembourg Gardens both 
Strether and the reader gain understanding as Stretherfeeh his 
way toward a number of new conceptions about himself and his 
past. 
While reading the letters from Woollett, including those from 
Mrs. Newsome, Strether notices a "sharp" sense of escape, and 
he feels a ''dutyV to try to explain that freedom and account for 
the corresponding sense of being young again. He wants to work 
out the explanation like a sum in arithmetic, but what he comes 
to is a sensual awareness of his present state in contrast to his 
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past. Only now does he become aware of his mental state of two 
weeks ago, when he was "one of the weariest of men.'' This 
sensation, as now perceived, leads him to the idea of the cause: a 
"crowded past" that has made his life in Woollett "empty." He 
now hears what has been sounding in his mind's ear subliminally 
for years, "the hum of vain things." His sensual awareness of his 
past is all the sharper because it contrasts with the impressions 
of the previous day in Paris, which "had really been the process 
of feeling the stirred life of connections long since individually 
dropped.'' This stirred life is manifest in his sensations regarding 
the lemon-colored volumes he has seen in a book shop and re- 
members having considered buying on his previous visit. Their 
impact on him is a "conversion of the subconsciousness that, all 
the same, in the great desert of the years, he must have had of 
them." That is, his sentient web has been vibrating all these years 
from that stimulus, but vibrating too gently to be perceived until 
reinforced with the present experience of seeing a similar set of 
volumes. Once reinforced, the subconsciousness-the unper- 
ceived but captured impressions in the chamber of conscious- 
ness-become converted into the idea of his emptiness and wea- 
riness. 
These and other details cohere for Strether in a tangible 
awareness of some of the essential features of his past life that 
have led to the empty present, and he now has the sensation of 
being free from that present. Here in Paris he senses the possibil- 
ity of recovering dignity and identity, of being more than just the 
Lambert Strether whose name is on the cover of the review he 
edits for Mrs. Newsome. He is put into contact with the very stuff 
of his consciousness: the stirred life of connections from his past 
and especially the unsuspected presence in his subconsciousness 
of the books he never bought, books that also represent his un- 
fulfilled plans and unmet goals. 
Having been awakened, this stirred life develops page by page 
in Strether's conscious awareness. Its growth gives him among 
other things a measure of the significance of events. Such an 
event is the hour he spends waiting for Chad in the latter's apart- 
ment, on the evening of the day he has admitted to Mrs. New- 
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some's elder daughter, another of the "ambassadors," that he 
actually approves of Madame de Vionnet, Chad's "virtuous" at- 
tachment. He  knows that this is ('perhaps the most positive dec- 
laration he had ever made in his life," and when their interview 
terminated he knew that "it probably was all at an endn-his 
potential marriage to  Mrs. Newsome (279-80). The dramatic 
event, juxtaposed with his sense of being in possession of Chad's 
rooms while he waits, will cause this hour to  loom in later mem- 
ory as one among the "particular handful that most had 
counted." During this hour, the time since his arrival in Paris 
takes on a tangible quality: 
He had heard, of old, only what he could then hear; what he could do 
now was to think of three months ago as a point in the far past. All 
voices had grown thicker and meant more things; they crowded on him 
as he moved about-it was the way they sounded together that 
wouldn't let him be still. He felt, strangely, as sad as if he had come for 
some wrong, and yet as excited as if he had come for some freedom. 
But the freedom was what was most in the place and the hour; it was 
the freedom that most brought him round again to the youth of his own 
that he had long ago missed. He could have explained little enough to- 
day either why he had missed it or why, after years and years, he should 
care that he had; the main truth of the actual appeal of everything was 
none the less that everything represented the substance of his loss, put 
it within reach, within touch, made it, to a degree it had never been, an 
affair of the senses. That was what it became for him at this singular 
time, the youth he had long ago missed-a queer concrete presence, 
full of mystery, yet full of reality, which he could handle, taste, smell, 
and the deep breathing of which he could positively hear. It was in the 
outside air as well as within; it was in the long watch, from the balcony, 
in the summer night, of the' wide late life of Paris, the unceasing soft 
quick rumble, below, of the little lighted carriages that, in the press, 
always suggested the gamblers he had seen of old at Monte Carlo push- 
ing up to the tables. [z81-821 
Strether's awareness of his intangible loss (freedom and what he 
might have had from it) is a queer concrete presence of voices 
heard, things seen, events lived through. By contrast, David 
Copperfield's awareness of his tangible losses (two friends, his 
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wife, and so forth) is simply an abstract weight. Strether's aware- 
ness of the past he might have had is sensual, ranking equally 
with his awareness of the actual apartment where he waits. His 
consciousness of both incorporates the whole of his sentient 
awareness, hence the strangeness, the queerness, the mystery, 
hence his inability to treat the awareness simply as an element of 
rational consciousness. 
Strether7s encounter with the reality of the relationship be- 
tween Chad and Madame de Vionnet-that it is sexual and in- 
volves, at the very least, nights in country inns-is just as sen- 
sual and subjective (307-13). Here too the essential impressions 
are not at first ~rocessed by his consciousness. The several para- 
graphs leading up to his seeing them on the river trace the events 
as they develop: Strether observes the two figures approaching 
in their boat, senses their intimacy ("The air quite thickened, at 
their approach, with further intimations"), and suddenly recog- 
nizes them as his two friends. But he does not yet see what their 
being together means. James then subtly shifts to Strether's later 
reflections: that he had been the one trying to explain how he had 
arrived there, without explicitly stating that he had not "plotted 
this coincidence.'' He felt the need to explain but did not then 
know why he had that feeling, since "nothing of the sort, so far 
as surface and sound were involved, was even in question." His 
sense of something not quite right, his feeling that the two have 
something to hide, is an "impression" that is "destined only to 
deepen, to complete itself." As the narrator makes explicit, only 
when the passage of hours has allowed this completion to take 
place does Strether know "how he had been affected-he but half 
knew at the time." The chapter's final paragraph reveals the re- 
sult of this experience; Strether feels with his entire organism the 
reverse of what Paris has been to him until now: he feels "lonely 
and coldl' His response to "the quantity of make-believe" in the 
performance of his friends is a psycho-physical sensation-a re- 
vulsion in his "spiritual stomachv-and hefeeh "the pity of [their 
intimacy] being so much like lying." In this event, as in others 
that are crucial to Strether's developing understanding of himself 
and of the life people lead in Paris, James relies on the language 
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of sentience and on the concept of unperceived impressions to 
represent the workings of the mind. 
This analysis of the recognition scene should demonstrate the 
problem with some modern critical statements, for example that 
Strether "has long been in the uncomfortable position of sensing 
more than he can allow himself to know," that the knowledge 
comes from "the depths of the psyche itself:' and that in such 
moments "James's men and women confront what in some part 
of themselves they have long since known" (Yeazell 25, 33). This 
is definitely a twentieth-century reading; as Yeazell says, in 
James7 novels "the deepest reaches of the psyche-at least as the 
twentieth-century understands them-rarely come into view" 
(17). When we read Strether's and Isabel's discoveries in light of 
the late-nineteenth-century emphasis on sentience and under- 
stand that this psychology allowed the possibility of uncognized 
sensations, we no longer need to labor at constructing characters' 
psyches and finding that such construction leads to the paradox 
of knowledge being limited to "some part of themselvesl' Lewes, 
Spencer, and possibly even Henry James himself would say that 
sensations by themselves do not constitute knowledge; sensa- 
tions become knowledge only when they are combined into pat- 
terns by imagination and judgment. 
Because of his attention to the subjective components of ex- 
perience and the value he gives those components, James ulti- 
mately transcends the limitations of the mind-as-entity metaphor. 
He makes this point explicit in Strether7s famous conversation 
with Little Bilham in which he tells the younger man "Live all 
you can; it's a mistake not to" (132)- This injunction comes as 
part of a "quiet stream of demonstration" that Strether has not 
planned, that in fact "overwhelmed him with its long slow rush" 
( I  3 1). That is, it seems to flow out of his total sentient awareness, 
not just out of a logical consciousness. It leads Strether to make 
a very Lockean observation: the "affair of life" is like a tin mould 
'6. into which, a helpless jelly, one's consciousness is poured-so 
that one 'takes7 the form." But it then carries him to a more fun- 
damental truth, that what the metaphysicians would call not just 
subjective but illusory can be a formative influence: "Still, one 
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has the illusion of freedom; therefore don't be, like me, without 
the memory of that illusion" (132). 
Strether's experiences in Paris exemplify the power of this in- 
fluence, the constructing aspect of his perceptions, as he realizes 
during his private visit to Madame de Vionnet's rooms. Standing 
in the antechamber, he looks back through the vista of the rooms, 
(6 full, once more, of dim historic shades, of the faint far-away 
cannon-roar of the great Empire.,' This historical perspective is 
"doubtless half the projection of his mind, but his mind was a 
thing that, among old waxed parquets, pale shades of pink and 
green, pseudo-classic candelabra, he had always needfully to 
reckon with" (236). He has to reckon with it because it will cre- 
ate the connections-now between the room and its resonances 
of Empire, and at another time between himself and his own 
empty past. And the echoes of history are only halfthe projection 
of Strether's mind. Without forcing one word to carry too much 
interpretive weight, we may at least speculate that such echoes 
still rebound in the room, there to be caught by a sensitive 
enough web. 
George Eliot's E b s  of  Sentience 
Although James named the metaphor, there are two reasons 
why the figure of consciousness as a sentient web is best attrib- 
uted to Eliot. Most obviously, she elaborated it earlier. Second, 
she attended more to presenting a character's total sentient 
awareness. The Jamesian emphasis is always on consciousness; 
every affair of the senses in James either is or becomes an affair 
of consciousness. Eliot also stressed consciousness-it is after all 
the field of moral action-but she represented more fully the 
slow accumulation of half-cognized and uncognized impressions 
on the organism. And since Lewes also explicitly named the web 
metaphor, it is worth recalling the close intellectual relationship 
between him and Eliot. The two of them studied Comte and 
other continental philosophers together; he certainly helped 
shape her ideas about the possible relationships between fiction 
and psychology; and she edited the third series of his Problems of 
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L$ and Mind. (See Collins, Kaminsky, Mason, Shuttleworth.) 
But as W J. Harvey warns, for a thinker with Eliot's intellectual 
breadth and depth and independence of mind, we cannot make 
easy causal links between any given philosopher or psychologist 
and her choice of images ( I  5 5). The question of influence is im- 
portant, but the images must be understood first. 
As comparing James with Bronte illuminates the revolution- 
ary quality of the Jamesian mindscape, so comparing Eliot and 
Dickens illuminates the generative function of her metaphor of 
the sentient web. Through his plots and his language Dickens 
emphasizes the effect of surroundings on the individual and the 
interconnections among seemingly disparate parts of the world. 
An often cited example of this emphasis in a Dickens plot is 
Esther Summerson's fever, which she contracted from her maid 
Charley, who got it from Jo the Crossing-Sweeper, who brought 
it with him from the pestilential corner of London named Tom- 
all-Alone's. This is one answer to a question posed by the omni- 
scient narrator of Bleak House: "What connexion can there be, 
between the place in Lincolnshire, the house in town, the Mer- 
cury in powder, and the whereabouts of Jo the outlaw with the 
broom . . . what connexion can there have been between many 
people in the innumerable histories of this world, who, from op- 
posite sides of great gulfs, have, nevertheless, been very curi- 
ously brought together!" (197). Strange as it must seem to such 
figures as "the fashionable intelligence" of this novel, there are 
many such connections-familial, legal, and most of all moral. 
Esther's fever visibly manifests her legal tie to Tom-all-Alone's 
(she is a ward in the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, and Tom's is 
a property in the same case), her familial tie (her father died 
nearby and was buried there), and less explicitly but just as im- 
portantly, her moral tie as a human being. The connections are 
all-pervasive and as tangible as those in any ecosystem. 
Dickens made the same point explicitly in Dombey and Son 
(1846-48) in accounting for "moral pestilence": "Those who 
study the ~ h ~ s i c a l  sciences, and bring them to bear upon the 
health of Man, tell us that if the noxious particles that rise from 
vitiated air [of slums] were ~ a l ~ a b l e  to the sight, we should see 
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them lowering in a dense black cloud above such haunts, and 
rolling slowly on to corrupt the better portions of a town. But if 
the moral pestilence that rises with them, and, in the eternal laws 
of outraged Nature, is inseparable from them, could be made 
discernible too, how terrible the revelation!" (619-20). The cloud 
results from "a long train of nameless sins against the natural 
affections and repulsions of mankind"; it spreads out from the 
slums and jails to create such perversions of the natural order as 
"infancy that knows no innocence, youth without modesty or 
shame." Dickens did not see the root causes of vice and fever as 
innate in the world; although his images may occasionally ob- 
scure the point, he holds people fully responsible for the cultiva- 
tion of all souls with whom they associate. If a soul has grown 
too warped to be gradually corrected by fertilizing, pruning, and 
staking, then a cutting must be taken and rerooted, so to speak, 
in order to force the necessary change of heart. This is what 
happens to Eugene. 
In the context of metaphors of mind, the key point is that for 
Dickens the change of heart, like the initial formation of the char- 
acter, operates through the whole individual and has as much to 
do with physical as with moral influences. Certainly this is a 
reasonable perspective, but Dickens gives no indication of how 
the world's connections act on the minds of characters. Lewes' 
criticism of Dickens' characters as "moving like pieces of simple 
mechanism, always in one way (instead of moving with the infi- 
nite fluctuations of organisms)" pointed to this limitation. The 
pressures of the Dickens world are generally coarse; they permit 
only certain types of movements. Such pressures as act on the 
organism seem to act physically. They shape characters7 minds 
and do not involve the mental organism except as the passive 
subject of the forces. 
In contrast, George Eliot shows environmental pressures act- 
ing through the senses on the consciousness and more generally 
on the sentience of the individual. One critic even identifies "the 
basis" of Eliot's creativity as her "painfully direct sense of other 
selves and of the organic nature of society," a sense she seeks 
to represent through her characters' sensations (Beer 101). The 
Toward the L$Z of the Mind 203 
following passage from Middlemarch (1871-72) is often cited as 
the paradigmatic instance of Eliot's concern in her novels with 
the webs of relations that shape and limit the individual: "For the 
first time Lydgate was feeling the hampering threadlike pressure 
of small social conditions, and their frustrating complexity" 
(124). The passage also hints at Eliot's conception of psychology, 
that her characters' minds could move "with the infinite fluctua- 
tions of organisms" in response to the complex threadlike pres- 
sures. The minds participate in a web of sensations in two ways: 
sensations are transmitted along the web (often without the di- 
rect awareness of the individual, which only comes later, when 
the pressures have created enough force), and the web itself 
seems to be a sentient organism, as when a social group comes 
to share a conclusion without having discussed it. 
Early in her career Eliot presents-these threadlike pressures as 
more real than any other forces, by means of the key image of 
Hartleyan associationism (updated by Spencer and Bain): vibra- 
tions passing along either tangible or intangible threads. The 
various declensions of vibration are important in her description 
of Maggie Tulliver's mental events in The Mill on the Floss (1860). 
In this novel Eliot also presents herself as a scientist, describing 
psychological and social conditions and then searching the envi- 
ronment and the personal histories for contributing factors. In 
Middlemarch the vibrations image is generalized into that of the 
web, and the web is presented more explicitly as something 
which shapes characters' choices. In her last novel, Daniel De- 
ronda (1876)~ Eliot's primary psychological interest is in drama- 
tizing the events her characters experience and then showing how 
these events create dispositions and reactions at all levels of sen- 
tience. 
In The Mill on the Floss the sensitive web informs the structur- 
ing of whole scenes in a context of psychological analysis and 
also manifests itself in an image complex that incorporates vibra- 
tions, flows, fibers, streams, and rivers. Many scenes in this novel 
either begin or end, or both, with relatively general explanations 
of the psychological principles and forces underlying the drama- 
tized behavior. Such a scene is Maggie Tulliver's secret meeting 
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in the Red Deeps with Philip Wakem, the son of the man her 
father believes caused his bankruptcy. Like a natural scientist, 
Eliot isolates their meeting in a single chapter and magnifies it to 
fill the entire field of view. The long introductory paragraph iden- 
tifies Maggie's principal psychological tension, her conflict 
between, first, the "severe monotonous warning . . . that 
she was losing the simplicity and clearness of her life by admit- 
ting a ground of concealment" and, second, her desire not to lose 
Philip's friendship and companionship as well as the external 
world he represents (286). This is a prominent theme in Eliot's 
work, the struggle of an individual (usually a woman) to recon- 
cile the claims of externally-imposed duty, which seem to limit 
self-development, with the desire to grow freely. 
The chapter proceeds almost analytically. A section of dialog 
is followed by a description of what the characters feel as they 
speak, and these moment-to-moment events are placed against 
the fixed qualities of the situation: Maggie's discontent, which 
Philip's words set "vibrating," and the "monotonous" voice that 
warns her against the temptation to preserve their relationship 
by continuing to meet in secret. It is a complicated situation, and 
Eliot's method renders it effectively. When Philip accuses Maggie 
of trying to "stupefy" herself by refusing to see him any more, 
Eliot shows not one but two responses in the girl: "Maggie's lips 
trembled; she felt there was some truth in what Philip said, and 
yet there was a deeper consciousness that, for any immediate 
application it had to her conduct, it was no better than falsity. 
Her double impression corresponded to the double impulse of 
the speaker. Philip seriously believed what he said, but he said it 
with vehemence because it made an argument against the reso- 
lution that opposed his wishes" (288). Philip's corresponding 
double impulse does not directly give rise to Maggie7s conflicting 
responses. Rather, Eliot's language shows, they share the same 
set of motivations. A single statement can spring out of contend- 
ing impulses and can evoke in a sympathetic and sensitive con- 
sciousness similar responses. 
Near its end, the chapter focuses on Philip's internal struggle 
to determine whether he had been acting out of selfish motives 
Toward the L#i of the Mind 205 
or had Maggie's best interests foremost. The chapter closes as it 
began, with generalizations. The narrator begs the reader's indul- 
gence for Philip, who does not understand the situation and 
causes Maggie pain: his seemingly selfish behavior results from 
his imperfect character, which in turn has been shaped by his 
physical deformity, the lack of a mother's love in his life, and a 
father affectionate and indulgent but also flawed: "Kept aloof 
from all practical life as Philip had been, and by nature half fem- 
inine in sensitiveness, he had some of the woman's intolerant 
repulsion towards worldliness and the deliberate pursuit of sen- 
sual enjoyment; and this one strong natural tie in his life-his 
relation as a son-was like an aching limb to him. Perhaps there 
is inevitably something morbid in a human being who is in any 
way unfavourably excepted from ordinary conditions until the 
good force has had time to triumph; and it has rarely had time 
for that at two-and-twenty" (291). These are ordinary psycho- 
logical observations; indeed, they sound quite dated to modern 
ears. What is significant about them is their patterning: they 
bracket the dramatic presentation and cause the entire chapter to 
read something like a case study. 
While Eliot may have arrived at this technique in any number 
of ways, it does conform both to her sentient web metaphor and 
to the accepted scientific method of her psychologist contempo- 
raries. The whole human being and the whole context of action 
must be studied together, and an individual's actions and moti- 
vations must be related to general principles. The reasons are 
clear. An impulse stimulated anywhere in the web will be trans- 
mitted through the whole, will continue to vibrate for some in- 
definite time, and will condition the reception of subsequent im- 
pulses. But because she is writing fiction and not psychology, 
Eliot is free to supply what the psychology lacks by creating 
these case studies. Thus she demonstrates the reality of the sen- 
tient web more effectively than her psychologist contemporaries, 
with their continuing dependance on mind-as-entity language 
and images. 
Eliot's distance from a psychology based on the mind-as-en- 
tity metaphor can be measured by the language she tends to 
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avoid as well as by her dominant metaphors and her structuring 
of scenes. She employs very few images connoting mind as a 
passive substance that takes impressions or as a passive vessel to 
be filled. The one e lace such images occur in some density in this 
novel is in the description of Mr. Tulliver7s recovery from his 
stroke, where the images underscore the damage to his mind's 
active power. "The impression [was] on his mind that it was but 
yesterday when he received the letter from Mr. Gore" (222). 
"The thought of Wakem roused new vibrations" in him (225). 
"They were just the words to lay the most painful hold on" Mr. 
Tulliver's mind (225). "In a mind charged with an eager purpose 
and an unsatisfied vindictiveness, there is no room for new feel- 
ings" (257). In these examples, Mr. Tulliver's mind is not that 
much different from those of Caleb Williams, Tristram Shandy, 
Pamela, and other characters created during the previous century, 
nor is it a mind that would challenge the psychology of Hume, 
Stewart, Bain, or Mill to explain. The mind takes in and is filled 
up by impressions; it can be literally gripped by stimuli from the 
external world; thoughts create impressions. 
One other type of image present in the eighteenth century, the 
mind or brain as a separable, tangible, and subordinate entity, 
occurs occasionally in Eliot, but she uses it in isolation and ap- 
plies it to a relatively simple mind or mental event. Shrewd but 
simplistic Bob Jakin remarks, "I think my head's all alive inside 
like an old cheese, for I'm so full 0' plans, one knocks another 
over" (276). When Maggie and her brother are children, their 
minds can be "quite filled for the moment with the words 'beg- 
gar' and 'workhouse"' (178). These brief echoes of the mind-as- 
entity metaphor scarcely count in view of how Eliot elsewhere 
describes the development of young minds. Of "keen moments" 
she observes that each has left a "trace" in the individual, "but 
such traces have blent themselves irrecoverably with the firmer 
texture of our youth and manhood" (57). Again, an item from 
the past is to be cherished as "the long companion of my exis- 
tence, that wove itself into my joys when joys were vivid" (134). 
What these early experiences contribute to our texture, how- 
ever, is not the whole story. There is also the long-term pressure 
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of a textured psychological environment. Eliot explains how this 
pressure operates in describing the limited religious and intellec- 
tual life of the people in St. Ogg7s, especially the Dodsons and 
the Tullivers, and the impact of that life on Tom and Maggie: 
I share with you this sense of oppressive narrowness; but it is necessary 
that we should feel it, if we care to understand how it acted on the lives 
of Tom and Maggie-how it has acted on young natures in many gen- 
erations, that in the onward tendency of human things have risen above 
the mental level of the generation before them, to which they have been 
nevertheless tied by the strongest fibres of their hearts. . . . In natural 
- 
science, I have understood, there is nothing petty to the mind that has a 
large vision of relations, and to which every single object suggests a 
vast sum of conditions. It is surely the same with the observation of 
human life. [z38] 
This passage may be compared to Reid's description of the prob- 
lem of knowing our minds from their first awakening: 
If the original perceptions and motions of the mind were to make their 
appearance single and unmixed, as we first received them from the hand 
of nature, one accustomed to reflection would have less difficulty in 
tracing them; but before we are capable of reflection, they are so mixed, 
compounded and decompounded by habits, associations, and abstrac- 
tions, that it is hard to know what they were originally. [/nquiry 71 
The two passages differ strikingly in the approach and in the 
metaphors they imply. Reid insists on introspection while Eliot 
scrutinizes the external context; Reid's metaphor of mind-as-en- 
tity leads him to concentrate on the contents of the mind in spite 
of their mixed state, while Eliot's metaphor of the web of senti- 
ence leads her to speak of "the fibres of their hearts" and to view 
mental life as a living tapestry into which sensations weave 
themselves. 
As a student of human life, Eliot sets as her goal the tracing of 
the relations, the calculating of the vast sum of conditions. In 
conveying her results, she is well served by the image complex 
of webs, fibers, and vibrations, just as the concept of the sentient 
web serves her well in exploring the mental territory of Tom and 
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Maggie, territory so well known and yet so unknown. Tom's is 
the less interesting study, because for him "mere perception pre- 
dominates over thought and emotion" (145); he suffers from a 
u congenital deficiency," having been "born with a deficient 
power of apprehending signs and abstractions" (148). Tom and 
his father are of a piece: "it's puzzling work, talking is" observes 
the elder Tulliver (10). Tom's mind seems not to vibrate at all; 
his father's apparently vibrates only to one note, the thought of 
his mortal enemy, Wakem. 
Maggie, on the other hand, is continually sensing vibrations 
from the external world, and this makes her seem more alive than 
her father and brother. Eliot closely examines the interaction in 
Maggie between a physical state or change of state and a mental 
state, as these two examples show: "But they had reached the 
end of the conservatory and were obliged to pause and turn. The 
change of movement brought a new consciousness to Maggie" 
(387-88). Maggie "moved her arm from the table, urged to 
change her position by that positive physical oppression at the 
heart that sometimes accompanies a sudden mental pang" (363). 
In such passages, Chase sees Eliot providing "the mechanical 
equivalent of consciousness" ( I ~ I ) ,  but in fact they show a much 
more subtle interaction between strictly physical and mental 
events. Maggie is susceptible to Stephen Guest because he can 
set her vibrating with his voice, his look, or even his mere pres- 
ence in the same room. It is when describing the meetings of 
Stephen and Maggie that Eliot portrays most vividly the 
moment-by-moment impact of specific events on sentient aware- 
ness and the continuing modification of that awareness by events. 
These meetings are rich in moral and emotional complexities. 
Stephen is engaged to Maggie's cousin, whom Maggie loves, and 
Maggie feels that if she is to marry anyone it must be Philip 
Wakem, who was so much a part of her earlier life. Maggie in- 
sists to Stephen that "the real tie lies in the feelings and expecta- 
tions we have raised in other minds" (394). It does sometimes 
seem to her "right" to follow her strongest feelings, "but then, 
such feelings continually come across the ties that all our former 
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life has made for us-the ties that have made others dependent 
on us-and would cut them in two" (395). Eliot's references to 
Maggie's sensation of "beating at head and heart" and her "slight 
start such as might have come from the slightest possible electric 
shock" (392) may seem strictly within the limits of the mind-as- 
entity concept. But these metaphorical vehicles are transformed 
by their context, the metaphor of "ties" (elsewhere "fibres") 
lying in one direction and feelings trying to cross against the 
grain of this felt mental structure. They contribute to the overall 
presentation of sentient life rather than representing a primarily 
passive, impressible mental entity. 
Eliot uses the image of vibration to describe Maggie when she 
feels most alive, and she uses this figure in a significantly new 
way. For Maggie, to vibrate is to live; her "mind glanced back 
once or twice to the time when she had courted privation. . . . 
[but] The music was vibrating in her still . . . and she could not 
stay in the recollection of that bare, lonely past" (338). One of 
the sentences most revealing of the connection of life and vibra- 
tions is the following, when Maggie has been dancing and is still 
excited: "Life at this moment seemed a keen vibrating conscious- 
ness poised above pleasure or pain" (387). Equating life with a 
keen vibrating consciousness evokes some of the key principles 
of Eliot's psychologist contemporaries, especially Bain's Law of 
Relativity. In Mind andBody Bain writes that the state of uncon- 
sciousness may be accounted for by supposing either that "the 
nervous mass as a whole is quiescent" or that "currents are still 
kept up, but at an even, settled, unaltering pace" (48-49). He 
suggests that the second is more likely in view of such analogous 
observations as the slight degree of muscular tension that is pre- 
- - 
sent even during sleep and in view of our experience of "the 
really fitful nature of the mind; the stream of consciousness is a 
series of ebullitions rather than a calm or steady flow" (40). Thus 
(6 when all the currents of the brain are equally balanced, and 
continue at the same pitch-when no one is commencing, in- 
creasing or abating-consciousness or feeling is null, mind is 
quiescent" (50). But Eliot does not just borrow from Bain; she 
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uses this image of a poised and vibrating consciousness to bring 
his formulation into greater coherence with subjective experi- 
ence. 
Bain and others insisted that the essential characteristic of con- 
sciousness was movement plus change of state. This subjective 
reality, as explained by the psychologists, corresponds with the 
physiological reality of constant neurological activity: in Bain7s 
words, "no currents, no mind." The problem is that introspection 
sometimes reveals exactly what Maggie feels-a lively yet mo- 
tionless state. Eliot's "vibrating consciousness" accommodates 
the psychologists7 insistence on movement while allowing the 
mental state to remain unchanged. The metaphor provides a 
vivid, compact, and expressive representation that combines psy- 
chological and physiological perspectives. The psychologists 
tend to calculate the amount of mental life at a given moment by 
the quantity of nervous flux, thus implying large changes in short 
periods of time. A vibrating consciousness exists from the subjec- 
tive perspective in a single state full of life, although at the level 
of the nerve fibers there may well be vibrations. (That is, neural 
physiology of Eliot's time could admit them.) 
One more important point must be made about these vibra- 
tions in light of Eliot's moral endeavor. As Maggie has told Ste- 
phen, the various channels of a mind do not all run in the same 
direction; hence feelings running in one way may cut another 
feeling in two. The vibrations do constitute a flow of feeling, 
which is potentially destructive. Chase points out that Eliot 
makes no easy equation between a given mental metaphor and a 
moral value; currents can both flow and flood, and structures can 
both channel and constrain (176-80). Each current in a charac- 
ter's psychic life must be evaluated by its effect on the character's 
internal and social lives. To Maggie, life "seemed a keen vibrating 
consciousness," and perhaps it was at that moment, but Eliot's 
point is that life is always much more than what one moment 
represents. In fact s t a m  of mind must be transient, but the main 
currents will always be present. Eliot makes this clear in her de- 
scription of Maggie at the charity bazaar. Before this event Mag- 
gie was pleased by her appearance and indulged her vain feel- 
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ings, but then Stephen and Philip argue, with her as the covert 
cause, and her triumph is spoiled. Eliot remarks: "If that state of 
mind [vanity, sense bf sup;emacy] could have lasted, her choice 
would have been to have Stephen Guest at her feet. . . . But there 
were things in her stronger than vanity-passion, and affection, 
and long deep memories of early discipline and effort . . . and the 
stream of vanity was soon swept along and mingled impercepti- 
bly with that wider current which was at its highest force today" 
(383). In this description Eliot gives fictional voice to Bain7s sug- 
gestion that currents are always flowing, even in the quiescent 
mind. Maggie remains a moral being because her particular cur- 
rents are moral and are stronger than the ebullitions; their moral 
value is further enhanced when they figuratively conjoin with the 
flood at the novel's end. For Bain neither type of current, steady 
or excited, is intrinsically more worthwhile, but for Eliot the two 
metaphors of streams and vibrations carry an inescapable valua- 
tion. 
In Middlemarch Eliot attends even more to the lives of various 
minds as these lives are linked by an extremely fine web of rela- 
tions and shaped by gentle (but nearly irresistible) pressures over 
long periods of time. The vibrations of Mil  have almost disap- 
peared from the psychological picture. The web metaphor is 
most explicitly articulated in parallel with Lydgate's research. He 
is portrayed as desiring to build on the work of Bichat, who "first 
carried out the conception that living bodies . . . must be re- 
garded as certain primary webs or tissues, out of which the vari- 
ous organs" are constructed; it is fallacious to attempt to study 
living bodies as confederations of independent organs (101). 
Lydgate's method is not entirely sound: in seeking the "primitive 
tissue" he is like Casaubon seeking "the key to all mythologies." 
The two are "emblematic of the materialist and idealist positions 
pushed to their extreme," and each position is flawed by seeking 
"to become unitary" (Carroll 74). Both go against the precept of 
Spencer and others that it is impossible to get at what mind or 
life "really is" by identifying the stuff out of which it is made. 
Lydgate desires to "demonstrate the more intimate relations of 
living structure, and help to define men's thoughts more accu- 
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rately after the true ordern-a worthy goal, but as Eliot points 
out, his way of putting the question, his quest for the primitive 
tissue, is not "the way required by the awaiting answer" (102). 
There is no question that Lydgate is capable of exercising the 
same "idealizing imagination of the invisible" valued so highly 
by Eliot and Lewes (Putzell-Korab 17). He desires to approach 
physiological questions 
with the imagination that reveals subtle actions inaccessible by any sort 
of lens, but tracked in that outer darkness through long pathways of 
necessary sequence by the inward light which is the last refinement of 
Energy, capable of bathing even the ethereal atoms in its ideally illumi- 
nated space. He for his part had tossed away all cheap inventions where 
ignorance finds itself able and at ease: he was enamoured of that ar- 
duous invention which is the very eye of research, provisionally fram- 
ing its object and correcting it to more and more exactness of relation; 
he wanted to pierce the obscurity of those minute processes which pre- 
pare human misery and joy, those invisible thoroughfares which are the 
first lurking-places of anguish, mania, and crime, that delicate poise and 
transition which determine the growth of happy or unhappy conscious- 
ness. [ I I ~ ]  
But a criticism is implicit in the last few lines of this passage: the 
lurking-places, the poise and transition, do not totally define the 
individual. No matter how precisely the subtle actions are under- 
stood in themselves, they still must be seen in the whole environ- 
mental context. Lydgate would have better served his science by 
studying the tissues in relation to the external environment rather 
than searching for the "common basis from which they all 
started." Eliot follows her own implicit advice. She does not 
search for the starting points, although she mentions them when 
she finds them; she pays more attention to the threadlike pres- 
sures of society and each individual's personal history. She dem- 
onstrates what Vicar Farebrother tells Dorothea: "Character is 
not something solid and unalterable. It is something living and 
changing, and may become diseased as our bodies do" (507). 
As in Mill on the Floss, Eliot uses the mind-as-entity metaphor 
to describe the minds of her lesser figures. Mr. Brooke, for in- 
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stance, is not intended to be complex. He functions in the story 
as a rather comic spokesperson for the safe opinions of landed 
gentry. When campaigning, he must have his mind managed like 
a warehouse: "The only way in which Mr. Brooke could be 
coerced into thinking of the right arguments at the right time was 
to be well plied with them till they took up all the room in his 
brain. But here there was the difficulty of finding room, so many 
things having been taken in beforehand. Mr. Brooke himself ob- 
served that his ideas stood rather in his way when he was speak- 
ing" (348). Casaubon is described in a similar way: his soul "was 
too languid to thrill out of self-consciousness into passionate de- 
- 
light . . . [his] was that proud narrow sensitiveness which has not 
mass enough to spare for transformation into sympathy, and 
quivers thread-like in small currents of self-preoccupation" 
(193). Brooke could easily have occurred in a Dickens novel; the 
description of his brain is similar to the description of Bradley 
Headstone of Our Mutual Fnend, who "had made of his mind a 
place of mechanical stowage" (266). Casaubon's mind is more 
like the minds implicit in Mill's mental chemistry and mental 
physics, but it is still very much an entity that can be separated 
from the individual and described in metaphorical language 
closely akin to that of the eighteenth century. The organic meta- 
phor is evoked by "quivers thread-like" and the physical one by 
11 has not mass enough". 
But the major characters' minds are shown in sensitive re- 
sponse to external pressures or rebellion against them, and all 
achieve a greater conscious awareness of some part of life as a 
result of this activity of the entire sentient organism. 
In Dorothea's case, new understanding comes when her dom- 
- 
inant mental current combines with the pressure of certain new 
experiences as they sink into and become part of her memory. 
The narrator notes, "In Dorothea's mind there was a current into 
which all thought and feeling were apt sooner or later to flow- 
the reaching forward of the whole consciousness towards the 
fullest truth, the least partial good" (141). This is Dorothea's 
tendency even as a young woman. It accounts for her initial at- 
traction to Mr. Casaubon: "All Dorothea's passion was transfused 
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through a mind struggling towards an ideal life; the radiance of 
her transfigured girlhood fell on the first object that came within 
its level," the dried-out scholar Casaubon (28). But this flow or 
transfusion is not all-powerful, because her mind can take in new 
experiences that come to exert a significant pressure. One such 
kxperience is her Roman honeymoon with her husband. "The 
weight of unintelligible Rome" makes a deep impression on Do- 
rothea, not least because she sees in Rome an analogy to her own 
situation, a confused mixture of what is "living and warm- 
- 
blooded" with what is superstitious and degenerate, the sum 
being a "vast wreck of ambitious ideals." These perceptions "first 
jarred [Dorothea] as with an electric shock, and then urged them- 
selves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused ideas 
which check the flow of emotion. Forms both pale and glowing 
took possession of her young sense, and fixed themselves in her 
memory even when she was not thinking of them, preparing 
strange associations which remained through her after-years. . . . 
in certain states of dull forlornness Dorothea all her life contin- 
ued to see the vastness of Saint Peter's . . . and the red drapery 
which was being hung for Christmas spreading everywhere like 
a disease of the retina" ( I  3 5 ) .  
Mind-as-entity elements are present in the images of ideas 
blocking a flow of emotion and of forms fixing themselves in her 
memory. But each of these images is also related to immediate 
and long-term mental processesthat cannot be accounted for by 
an associational interpretation like those common in earlier psy- 
chological works. While the associations remain in Dorothea's 
mind, they are evoked not by a specific impression but by "cer- 
tain states." Moreover, the original associations have affected Do- 
rothea at other than a conscious level; they cause in her a psy- 
cho-physical ache but otherwise almost surreptitiously make 
their way into the memory. Insofar as this can be considered an 
associational process, it is of the highly modified sort described 
by Lewes which involves states of the whole organism. To de- 
scribe these processes Lewes relies on terms such as "the ground 
tone of feeling" and "silent processes of growth in the soul which 
make up what is called the Character" ("Mind as a Function of 
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the Organism" 136). Eliot's figurative language, with its forms 
and lingering visions of the mind's eye, is just as compact but 
more vivid and expressive. 
Eliot goes on to explore more carefully the reasons for Doro- 
thea's present forlorn state and its ramifications. The truism is 
that "the light had changed, and you cannot find the pearly dawn 
at noonday": exchanging the state of courtship for the state of 
marriage necessarily changes the appearance of the partner 
( I  3 5 ) .  Dorothea only imperfectly perceives the reality beneath 
the truism: "that new real future which was replacing the imagi- 
nary drew its material from the endless minutiae by which her 
view of Mr. Casaubon and her wifely relation, now that she was 
married to him, was gradually changing with the secret motion 
of a watch-hand from what it had been in her maiden dream" 
( I  3 5 ) .  The endless minutiae can scarcely be perceived but can be 
inferred from the reaction they induce; Dorothea is finding her- 
self "a mere victim of feeling, as if she could know nothing ex- 
cept through that medium: all her strength was scattered in fits 
of agitation, of struggle, of despondency" (138). Eliot's method 
here is inseparable from her metaphor of webs of sentience: she 
assumes a cause for every event, but the cause in most average, 
normal lives is not a single dramatic event but "thread-like" pres- 
sures in minute quantities operating over a long time. 
When dramatic events come, they still do so in a context of 
memories and social pressures. One such event is Dorothea's 
realizing that "it was really herself whom Will loved and was 
renouncing" (438). The immediate realization is triggered by his 
final words before he leaves the room, and it is represented met- 
aphorically and also syntactically as a disconnected instant: "It 
was all one flash to Dorothea-his last words-his distant bow 
to her as he reached the door-the sense that he was no longer 
there" (438). However, her subjective experience of a flash is led 
up to by Will's words and her concurrent thoughts. Will feels 
unable to tell this widow outright that he loves her, and as he 
talks to her of being forbidden what he cares for most in the 
world, she must determine whom he is referring to-her or Ro- 
samond: "The thought that she herself might be what Will most 
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cared for did throb through her an instant, but then came doubt" 
- 
(437). The doubt quickly transforms itself into "images . . . refer- 
ring to" Rosamond. This is the context in which she achieves her 
moment of insight. Nor does Eliot conclude the scene with this 
moment; she goes on to trace Dorothea's subsequent feelings. 
There is first the "sense of loving and being loved," which to 
Dorothea "was as if some hard icy pressure had melted, and her 
. . 
consciousness had room to expand: her past was come back to 
her with larger interpretation7' (438). yet gradually her aware- 
ness of "the world" returns and weighs on her "heavily," because 
the world-her family-would not approve of any connection 
with Will. Eliot's message and method are clear: there are no 
isolated flashes in the world of Middlemarch. 
With the minds of Lydgate and Bulstrode, Eliot has excellent 
material for presenting the web-like nature of psychological 
events. In the case of Lydgate the most important events happen 
after he arrives in Middlemarch: he meets Rosamond Vincy and 
finds in Dorothea the woman who probably would have been his 
ideal companion. His marriage to Rosamond is a mistake that 
works in him "like a recognised chronic disease mingling its un- 
easy importunities with every prospect, and enfeebling every 
thought" (408). It affects the life of his mind exactly as a physical 
disease affects the body, interfering with ordinary perceptual and 
intellectual processes. As he watches Rosamond prepare his tea 
and thinks about trying to discuss with her their financial 
troubles, his mind wanders to thoughts of Dorothea: "These re- 
vived impressions succeeded each other quickly and dreamily in 
Lydgate7s mind while the tea was being brewed. He had shut his 
eyes in the last instant of reverie. . . . [Dorothea7s] voice of deep- 
souled womanhood had remained within him as the enkindling 
conceptions of dead and sceptered genius had remained within 
him . . . the tones were a music from which he was falling 
away-he had really fallen into a momentary doze, when Rosa- 
mond said in her silvery neutral way, 'Here is your tea, Tertius"' 
(409). This brief moment of awareness is one of Eliot's best psy- 
chological touches, showing her conception of the past weaving 
itself into present awareness. 
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Eliot continues in this vein as she describes how Lydgate feels 
presenting their unpleasant financial situation to his wife: "Some 
of the angry desire to rouse her into more sensibility on his ac- 
count which had prompted him to speak prematurely, still min- 
gled with his pain in the prospect of her pain" (409-10). Her 
beauty "touched Lydgate now, and mingled the early moments 
of his love for her with all the other memories which were stirred 
in this crisis of deep trouble" (410). Again, the mingling is the 
immediate manifestation of the web of sentience; the verb sug- 
gests not only the conscious thoughts but also the half- 
remembered emotions and unverbalized desires at work in Lyd- 
gate. One of Eliot's points about this young doctor is that he is 
not as wise or experienced as he would like to think and defi- 
nitely does not understand Rosamond well enough to know how 
she will respond: "Perhaps it was not possible forlydgate, under 
the double stress of outward material difficulty and of his own 
proud resistance to humiliating consequences, to imagine fully 
what this sudden trial was to a young creature who had known 
nothing but indulgence, and whose dreams had all been of new 
indulgence, more exactly to her taste" (41 I). 
FO; Bulstrode, the threadlike pressures extend far into the past 
and consist of not-quite-repressed guilt. Bulstrode has lived long 
enough in Middlemarch to seem in the town's eyes a person 
whose life began with his arrival there. But the earlier yeais have 
had their continuing effect, just like Lydgate7s chronic disease of 
the mind. This point is made when Bulstrode's history is re- 
vealed, as he reflects back over his life and his early struggle to 
reconcile his pious inclinations with the opportunity to get rich 
through increasingly unsavory means: "Mentally surrounded 
with that past again, Bulstrode had the same pleas-indeed, the 
years had been perpetually spinning them into intricate thick- 
ness, like masses of spider web, padding the moral sensibility" 
(426). He experiences once again the "bare fact," the great lie of 
his earlier life that enabled him to realize his money lust. He sees 
that "bare fact" as it would look to outsiders, as it looked to him 
at the time, and as it still looks, "broken into little sequences, 
each justified as it came by reasonings which seemed to prove it 
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righteous.,' Bulstrode7s overall self-justification, as Eliot's lan- 
guage demonstrates, has been a matter of innumerable steps, so 
many that "his soul had become saturated with the belief that he 
did everything for God's sake" (426). He has kept his conscience 
in check with "mental exercises" and has made his immoral acts 
lie "benumbed in the consciousness" for nearly thirty years 
(428). Yet these acts have never been wiped away. When Raffles, 
his former accomplice, appears, the past awakens and floods his 
mind "as if with the terrible irruption of a new sense overbur- 
thening the feeble being" (427). 
Eliot goes beyond the writers of the eighteenth century and 
their dependance on mind-as-entity as a theory-constitutive met- 
aphor in three ways. She gives explicit attention to the psycho- 
logical states resulting from the pressures of the past; she pur- 
posefully takes account of the full subjective history of a 
character in understanding the character's present psychological 
state; she uses descriptions that stress texture and connectedness. 
Middlemarch is not a Dickens novel in which the mind is a piece 
of soft clay whose shape can be totally changed or a Bronte novel 
in which the mind exists separately from the self. When Bul- 
strode reflects, he is "mentally surrounded" by the past. Bul- 
strode is one more example of a theme that Eliot announced as 
early as her first novel, Adam Bede: "Our deeds determine us, as 
much as we determine our deeds" (359). Thus when Bulstrode7s 
carefully constructed outer life falls apart, he remains the same 
individual and cannot change in such fundamental aspects as the 
pattern of his thoughts. The old justifications still come to him 
as if they have been drilled in by mental exercises, and his ten- 
dency to secrecy remains as strong as before. He longs to confess 
to his wife the full extent of his misdeeds, so that she will not 
again be as shocked as when she learned that he was implicated 
in the death of Raffles. The narrator notes that he may do this 
yet, "but concealment had been the habit of his life, and the im- 
pulse to confession had no power against the dread of a deeper 
humiliation," that his wife would "recoil" in disgust at the new 
confession (568). 
Eliot has left behind the atomistic mental analyses generated 
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by the mind-as-entity metaphor, in which long-range effects were 
represented, if at all, as the growth of seeds planted in the mind. 
For Eliot, any early event must have an impact on the whole 
mind, although the impact might not be available to conscious- 
ness until much later. She has also gone beyond the tendency of 
earlier writers to regard development of a mind as either an iso- 
lated growth or a shaping by external forces. At the very end of 
Middlemarch it is remarked of Dorothea that the "determining 
acts of her life were not ideally beautiful. They were the mixed 
result of young and noble impulse struggling amidst the condi- 
tions of an imperfect social state . . . For there is no creature 
whose inward being is so strong that it is not greatly determined 
by what lies outside it" (577). 
Eliot's metaphor of the sentient web leads her to attend con- 
sistently to threadlike pressures. This attention is a crucial ele- 
ment of her optimism, for a character can generate as well as 
receive such pressures. Throughout her life Dorothea's "finely- 
touched spirit still had its fine issues . . . the effect of her being 
on those around her was incalculably diffusive." George Levine 
rightly insists that such statements mark Eliot as both determin- 
istic and optimistic: a character "can, in some limited degree, 
move counter to the push of external circumstance, and, by al- 
lowing himself to become aware of his own motives, can even at 
times overcome them by changing them" (3 57). 
In DanielDeronda Eliot places the sentient-web metaphor in a 
somewhat new context: the growth of consciousness. More than 
in Mil on the Floss and Middlemarch she attends to what individu- 
als know and do consciously and how these actions and choices in 
turn reflect back on and change the individuals. By no means 
does she ignore the other-than-conscious levels of sentient ex- 
perience, but her interest is now much more directed to how 
characters make informed ethical choices rather than how they 
are driven by un-cognized experiences to ethical or unethical 
acts. She uses the metaphors to texture the life of the conscious- 
ness in society (ideas and awareness extend outward to other 
minds) and through time. For such an endeavor, generalizations 
are not very useful. To try to explain a psycho-physical phenom- 
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enon with terms such as "sensitiveness" and "excitable nature" 
will be fruitless without "an extensive knowledge of differences" 
among various cases (Deronda 57). No longer is it regarded as 
valid to assume a straightforward continuity or point-for-point 
correspondence between some impression and some idea or ac- 
tion. The possible outcomes are too numerous because the pres- 
sures on any organism come from every other organism in rela- 
tion. Thus predicting behavior is nearly impossible, even when 
some "general certainties" are available: "Of what use, however, 
is a general certainty that an insect will not walk with his head 
hindmost, when what you need to know is the play of inward 
stimulus that sends him hither and thither in a network of pos- 
sible paths?" (261). Without a complete history of the individual 
mind, especially its unique features, the general principles are 
nearly worthless. "There is a great deal of unmapped country 
within us which would have to be taken into account in an expla- 
nation of our gusts and storms," she observes (257). There is no 
doubt, however, that if the inner country could be mapped, the 
map would be helpful, and if one could know the history of a 
mind or of a consciousness, one would know how it might be 
likely to behave. 
The psychological interest is much more overt in DanielDe- 
ronda than in the earlier novels. No subtitle like Middlemarch's "A 
Study of Provincial Life" would be possible here, unless "life" 
were replaced by "life of the mind." One very obvious signal of 
this interest is the explicitly psychological nature of some of the 
chapter epigraphs, such as this, to chapter 25: "How trace the 
why and wherefore in a mind reduced to the barrenness of a 
fastidious egoism, in which all direct desires are dulled, and have 
dwindled from motives into a vacillating expectation of motives: 
a mind made up of moods, where a fitful impulse springs here 
and there conspicuously rank among the general weediness? 'Tis 
a condition apt to befall a life too much at large, unmoulded by 
the pressure of obligation. . . . '14s you like' is a badf;nger-post'7 
(258). This chapter concentrates on Henleigh Grandcourt, who 
lives strictly to please himselc part of his pleasure includes mak- 
ing others suffer. His is not the vibrating life of Maggie Tulliver 
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but a deadened and deadening vacillation. As the epigraph states 
in general and as many of the chapters dramatize, where there 
are no connecting fibers to other lives and where there is no 
sense of obligations resulting from expectations aroused in oth- 
ers, the mental life must be barren and the mind itself shapeless. 
Elsewhere it is noted of Grandcourt that his sudden impulses 
(( have a false air of daemonic strength because they seem inex- 
plicable, though perhaps their secret lies merely in the want of 
regulated channels for the soul to move in-good and sufficient 
- - 
ducts of habit without which our nature easily turns to mere ooze 
and mud, and at any pressure yields nothing but a spurt or a 
puddle" (141). 
Grandcourt provides a standard against which to measure the 
mental and moral development of Gwendolen Harleth, as she 
grows very slowly throughout the novel from a young woman 
whose guiding principle is "as you like" into one who acknowl- 
edges "the pressure of obligation" and is able to develop "ducts 
of habit" to better control her mind. Early in the novel the nar- 
rator asks, "Could there be a slenderer, more insignificant thread 
- 
in human history than this consciousness of a girl, busy with her 
small inferences of the way in which she could make her life 
pleasant?-in a time, too, when ideas were with fresh vigour 
making armies of themselves" (109). As a thread in the total 
fabric of human existence this particular consciousness is insig- 
nificant, but as Eliot has demonstrated in Middlemarch and has 
stated in The Mill on the F'oss, "there is nothing petty to the mind 
that has a large vision of relations." Hers is such a mind. 
In portraying the development of Gwendolen's mind, Eliot 
uses the full range of metaphors available, those drawing on 
mind-as-entity as well as those which she has created. The fol- 
lowing examples illustrate this range: 
Every word that Klesmer had said seemed to have been branded into 
her memory, as most words are which bring with them a new set of 
impressions and make an epoch for us. [243] 
In the dark seed-growths of consciousness a new wish was forming 
itself. [27 I ]  
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As always happens with a deep interest, the comparatively rare occa- 
sions on which she could exchange any words with Deronda had a 
diffusive effect in her consciousness, magnifying their communication 
with each other, and therefore enlarging the place she imagined it to 
have in his mind. [545] 
The first example effectively conveys the experience of a single 
moment or event being marked as significant because of its in- 
tensity, but the phrase "set of impressions" shows Eliot's insis- 
tence on multiple pressures and threads. The second example 
demonstrates the occasional sensation of ideas having a life of 
their own from their first inception. This idea of ~wendolen's has 
a close family resemblance to the ideas flying around in the brain 
of Caleb Williams, but it differs in being explicitly related to 
Gwendolen7s consciousness: it will sooner or later manifest itself 
fully in her conscious awareness. Had Eliot written something as 
- 
simple as "Gwendolen began to be aware of a vague wish . . ." 
she would have failed to convey the subtle sense that we do oc- 
casionally become fully aware of ideas whose existence we have 
sensed or intuited for some time previously, that is, ideas that 
have been part of our uncognised sentient experience. The third 
example conveys a similarly common experience: rarity and in- 
terest combine to give an idea a disproportionate place in our 
consciousness. The actual mental operation is similar to that of 
the second example in taking place below the level of conscious 
awareness, but it differs in that it seems to be governed by a 
mechanical rather than an organic law, the law of "diffusion." 
- 
This word is an important part of the explanatory apparatus of 
Eliot's contemporaries, especially Bain. Diffusion as an image 
conveys on the one hand the relationship between the subjective 
substance or weight of an idea on the one hand and on the other 
- 
the density of the associated neural connections in the brain as 
well as the density of the associations themselves. 
These examples also comprise an interesting historical pro- 
gression. The first evokes a Lockean metaphor; the second has 
more of an affinity with Reid's portrayal of mental growth; the 
third resembles the descriptions of neural activity and brain ac- 
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tivity given by the psychologists contemporary with Eliot. This 
historical progression also corresponds to Gwendolen's develop- 
ing maturity. In the first her mind is a mere passive recipient of 
impressions. In the second, her uncognized experience is nurtur- 
ing a new idea, although there is a definite connection with con- 
sciousness. In the third, the phenomenon is strictly within Gwen- 
dolen's consciousness. The figurative passages thus provide a 
measure of her progress toward a state of active, involved life. 
These metaphors, together with Gwendolen's selfishness and 
thoughtlessness, provide a fairly complete map of part of her 
mental territory. But there remains that unmapped country 
- - 
where her puzzling actions originate. This country Eliot does n i t  
try to explore; she simply presents the actions and notes the puz- 
zles. The first such action is Gwendolen's fainting spell from a 
mental shock. Gwendolen "wondered at herself in these occa- 
sional experiences, which seemed like a brief remembered mad- 
ness, an unexplained exception from her normal life" (56). These 
moments of terror Eliot characterizes as her "liability to fits of 
spiritual dread.,' More explicitly, "Solitude in any wide scene im- 
pressed her with an undefined feeling of immeasurable existence 
gloof from her, in the midst of whirh she was helplessly inca- 
pable of asserting herself" (57). The references to religious awe 
constitute no explanation, however, only a description; Jacob 
Korg is incorrect in saying that this and other "motivations" in 
Eliot's world are "clear and determinant" (87). 
Calculating the sum represented by Gwendolen Harleth and 
thus explaining her behavior is made even less possible by her 
reactions to men. To her first suitor, she bursts out with a fierce 
"Pray don't make love to me! I hate it" (73). She has known that 
he loves her but has not foreseen such a reaction in herself; it is 
"all a sudden, new experience." Even stranger is what she tells 
her mother after the distraught young man leaves: "I can't love 
people. I hate them" (74). She experiences the same confusion, a 
bit less violently, when she recognizes that she does not know 
what will be her answer to Grandcourt's proposal: "This subjec- 
tion to a possible self, a self not to be absolutely predicted about, 
- .  
caused her some astonishment and terror" ( 1 2 1 ) .  
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The most dramatic of Gwendolen's outbreaks, however, is pre- 
pared for, with metaphorical language that helps explain the pro- 
cess. On  her wedding day she feels a triumph and, beneath that, 
a "yeasty mingling of dimly understood facts with vague but 
deep impressions, and with images half real, half fantastic.'' 
These facts and impressions originate from her earlier meeting 
at the Whispering Stones with Lydia Glasher, Grandcourt's for- 
mer mistress and the mother of four children by him. Hearing 
Lydia's story, Gwendolen feels "a sort of terror . . . as if some 
ghostly vision had come to her in a dream and said, 'I am a 
woman's life"' (137). Gwendolen at once determines she cannot 
have anything more to do with Grandcourt, but when her family 
loses their small fortune and she sees poverty for all and life as a 
governess for herself, she changes her mind. "Everything is to be 
as I like," she tells her mother (282). But inevitably any yeasty 
mixture will continue to work somewhere in the mind. Thus 
when the newlyweds travel to Grandcourt's other estate and 
Gwendolen receives not only the family diamonds but also a ver- 
bally poisoned letter from Lydia, she begins to realize the extent 
of what she has done in marrying him, the total impossibility of 
her now living the life she had desired. When Grandcourt enters 
the room after she has read the letter, the yeasty mixture finally 
comes to a head: "The sight of him brought a new nervous 
- - 
shock, and Gwendolen screamed again and again with hysterical 
violence" (3 3 I). 
Gwendolen is probably the first respectable woman in En- 
glish-language fiction to be described as reacting in this way to 
her husband, but because of the metaphorical preparation for the 
- - 
scene, her reaction can be understood. The hysteria is a surprise 
to Grandcourt, who sees only her surface, but it is no surprise to 
the reader, who has been made privy to her inner state, to the 
turmoil in her consciousness. Gwendolen had been able to re- 
press the effect of the interview with Lydia Glasher-indeed, she 
had to do this before she could accept Grandcourt's proposal- 
but these written words "hung on her consciousness with the 
weight of a prophetic doom. . . . [They] stirred continually the 
vision of the scene at the Whispering Stones. That scene was 
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now like an accusing apparition" (395). The immediate result of 
this experience is that Gwendolen becomes "conscious of an un- 
easy, transforming process-all the old nature shaken to its 
depths, its hopes spoiled, its pleasures perturbed, but still show- 
ing wholeness and strength in the will to reassert itself" (394). 
She has lost the trait that was once most notable in her, "the 
belief in her own power of dominating"; the narrator links this 
loss to the already displayed "large discourse of imaginative 
fears" which Grandcourt has taken advantage of. Together, the 
images Eliot creates show not the primitive tissue of Gwendo- 
len7s mind but enough close analysis of her experiences to make 
her comprehensible. What caused those irrational reactions in 
her is less important than the changes that begin in her as a result 
of her marriage and her dependence on Daniel Deronda. Thus 
near the end of the novel she is "for the first time being dislodged 
from her supremacy in her own world, and getting a sense that 
her horizon was but a dipping onward of an existence with which 
her own was revolving" (748). 
In building up the history and texture of Gwendolen's con- 
sciousness, the repetition, development, and overall consistency 
of Eliot's images are as important as the actual language. She 
presents the development of Deronda's consciousness in the 
same way, by identifying some guiding feelings and traits and 
showing how these interact with new experiences to produce 
new awareness, sometimes beginning at the pre-conscious level 
but always developing into consciousness. One of the major as- 
pects of Deronda's character is his concern to know his parent- 
age, which Eliot spends all of chapter 16 developing. While Dan- 
iel may have considered the question before in a passing way, it 
became central in his consciousness when he learned learned 
from his tutor why Roman Catholic prelates are always spoken 
of as having so many "nephews." He immediately made the con- 
nection with his own state as the supposed nephew of his guard- 
ian, Sir Hugo, and the result was, "A new idea had entered his 
mind, and was beginning to change the. aspect of his habitual 
feelings.'' It was only at this moment that "there had darted into 
his mind with the magic of quick comparison, the possibility that 
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here was the secret of his own birth," that Sir Hugo was really 
his father. 
The immediate result of this idea was "a new sense in relation 
to all the elements of his life." A longer-term result was a sensi- 
tivity to the possibility that others knew things about him that he 
did not, a sensitivity that "set up in him a pre-mature reserve 
which helped to intensify his inward experience." After that day 
there existed in him "a newly-roused set of feelings" that were 
"ready to cluster themselves" around any incident that his 
(6 imagination could connect with his suspicions" ( I  53). This is 
like the image used to describe Gwendolen's consciousness-a 
(< set of impressions" and a "diffusive effect in her consciousness." 
Deronda's new feelings exist as a set and can cluster themselves 
around incidents. Already early in the novel Deronda is highly 
developed in this way. As a student he did not pursue a standard 
course at the university because he could not consent to the "de- 
mand for excessive retention and dexterity without any insight 
into the principles which form the vital connections of knowl- 
edge" (164). Rather, he feels that he has to maintain his connec- 
tions with the whole large web. The same is true about his hesi- 
tancy in choosing a career: because he senses "wide-sweeping 
connections with all life and history," he feels he should not 
"draw strongly at any thread in the hopelessly-entangled scheme 
of things" (172). As the novel develops, the wisdom of these 
choices becomes clear. He finds his true connections first in a 
spiritual kinship with the Jewish people and then in an actual 
kinship when he learns that he was born a Jew. 
Daniel's life is an embodiment of Bain's statement that "the 
sum of all consciousnesses is the sum of all existences" (Mental 
Science, appendix 93) .  The life of an individual mind is its con- 
sciousness, and its consciousness is to be understood in the con- 
text of the overall web of human existence. Daniel Deronda is 
Eliot's fullest portrayal of the development of the contents of 
consciousness and its operations, the most complete working out 
of her generative metaphor of the sentient web. 
VII 
AFTERWORD: 
WILLIAM JAMES' LANGUAGE 
OF THE MIND 
Describing the principle of association in chapter 14 of his Prin- 
clples ofPsychology ( I  890), William James attributes to Locke and 
Descartes the correlation between the "psychological law of as- 
sociation" and the "physical fact that nerve-currents propagate 
themselves easiest through those tracts of conduction which have 
been already most in use" (531). James continues with a quota- 
tion from the Essay, into which he inserts a revealing comment: 
"'Custom,'" says Locke, "'settles habits of thinking in the under- 
standing, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in 
the body; all which seem to be but trains of motion in the animal 
spirits [by this Locke meant identically what we understand by 
neuralprocesses], which, once set a-going, continue in the same 
shape they have been used to, which, by often treading, are worn 
into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it 
were natural"' (53 I). This tip of the hat from one great student 
of psychology to another across almost exactly two centuries 
provides a fitting point of departure for a concluding meditation 
on metaphors of mind. In these few pages I will not attempt 
anything like a substantial analysis of William James' work. 
Rather, I will sketch out the hypothesis that mind-as-a-living- 
being functions for James as a generative metaphor and is mani- 
fested in the surface metaphor stream-of-consciousness. I will 
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begin by showing that James' phrase "neural processes," inter- 
polated into the quotation from Locke, does not "mean" the 
same thing as "trains of motion in the animal spirits": the two 
phrases are surrounded by entirely different contexts of relations 
and are put to different uses within the theories of mind of the 
two writers. 
In the section James quotes from, Locke goes on to say that 
while the "natural cause" of ideas is probably "animal spirits," 
he will not try to determine if that is the cause in fact-he wants 
rather to use the hypothesis as a help toward conceiving of "In- 
tellectual Habits, and of the tying together ofIdeas" (Locke 396). 
For this purpose the more important component of the phrase is 
cc trains of motion," which renders in an accessible way how the 
ideas are drawn together. "Trains of motion" is fundamental to 
Locke7s descriptive and explanatory enterprise. It draws on the 
mind-as-entity metaphor by implying a mind made of material 
substance and occupying definite space, and it suits the concept 
of ideas as corpuscular, able to be tied together. The mind-as- 
entity metaphor provides the context of relations for the phrase, 
and the phrase itself functions in Locke's theory as the metaphor- 
ical embodiment of what would otherwise remain a vague ab- 
straction. 
As I have shown, mind-as-entity serves a theory-constitutive 
function in the language of the psychologists of the eighteenth 
century. The meaning of "trains of motion in the animal spirits" 
is the use to which Locke puts the phrase and the context of 
relations in which it exists-its rhetorical and explanatory func- 
tions in his psychology. By these criteria, which James himself 
would have to approve as eminently pragmatic, the meaning of 
the phrase is coextensive with the core of Locke's theory of the 
formation of ideas. "Trains of motion" is the surface manifesta- 
tion of the mind-as-entity metaphor that constitutes Locke's 
theory. In James7Pnn+les, two phrases are likely candidates for 
carrying this kind of meaning, this set of functions and relations: 
"neural processes" and "stream of consciousness.7' The two fit 
together in a complementary way: fundamental to neural pro- 
cesses is the flux of nerve current, what Bain called "ebullitions," 
and this physical stream has as its subjectively experienced, psy- 
chological counterpart the flow of thoughts and sensations. 
This complementarity, however, will only gradually become 
apparent to a reader. The impression conveyed by the early pages 
of Princ&les is that James is not departing very far from earlier 
nineteenth-century psychological tenets and approaches. His 
opening sentence, "Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, 
both of its phenomena and of their conditions" ( I  5 ) ,  does sound 
several new notes. These include the unapologetic use of the 
term "psychology" rather than "mental science," and the asser- 
tion that the conditions of mental life can be studied scientifically. 
But for some pages thereafter he uses language reminiscent of 
the mind-as-entity orientation. The following three passages are 
typical: 
Phenomena have absolutely no power to influence our ideas until they 
have first impressed our senses and our brain. [17] 
Our first conclusion, then, is that a certain amount of brain-physiology 
must be presupposed or included in Psychology. [18] 
On the whole, few recent formulations have done more real service of 
a rough sort in psychology that the Spencerian one that the essence of 
mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, "the adjustment of inner 
to outer relations." [19] 
These passages show the mind as impressible by the external 
world. The impressing operation can be approached through 
brain-physiology, which registers the adjustment of inner to outer 
relations. When James introduces the concept of the active nature 
of mind, he makes an evolutionist point: "The pursuance ofjiture 
en& and the choice of means for their attainment are thus the mark and 
criterion of the presence of mentality in a phenomenon" (2 I). This 
statement is phrased in such an abstract way that a reader could 
be excused for regarding it as emanating from the same materi- 
alistic perspective responsible for the mind-as-entity metaphor. 
After his introductory chapter describing the scope of psy- 
chology, James turns to the functions of the brain; this organiza- 
tion recalls the texts of Bain, Morell, and others. Applying the 
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latest advances in "brain physiology," he uses diagrams and anal- 
ogies to explain the "Meynert scheme": "the whole general no- 
tion that the hemispheres are a supernumerary surface for the 
projection and association of sensations and movements natively 
coupled in the centres below" (38 n.4). This "scheme," which 
regards the process of projection and association as "like the 
great commutating switch-board at a central telephone station" 
(38), James considers substantially correct, although, as he will 
show, it "makes the lower centres too machine-like and the hemi- 
spheres not quite machine-like enough" (39). His summary of 
the evidence pertinent to the Meynert scheme takes "currents" as 
the single most important term, and consciousness seems to 
come along as an afterthought both in the scheme and in James' 
description: a "'motor' centre" can be regarded as "only the 
mouth of the funnel, as it were, through which the stream of 
innervation, starting from elsewhere, pours; consciousness ac- 
companying the stream" (73). Similarly, "the brain is essentially 
a place of currents, which run in organized paths" (78). 
Habits, the topic of James7 fourth chapter, are also to be under- 
stood in a materialistic way. Given the isolation of the hemi- 
spheres from the external world, they can be impressed only by 
the blood and by the nervous currents, and "the whole plasticity 
of the brain sums itself up in two words when we call it an organ 
in which currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with 
extreme facility paths which do not easily disappearn ( I  12). "A 
path once traversed by a nerve-current," he continues, becomes 
"a natural drainage-channel" (1 I 3). The drainage-channel ter- 
minology recurs near the end of Pin+la when he considers why 
a nerve current takes the path it does the first time: "Each dis- 
charge from a sensory cell in the forward direction ["towards the 
motor cells"] tends to drain the cells lying behind the discharging 
one of whatever tension they may possess. The drainage from 
the rearward cells is what for the first time makes the fibres per- 
vious. The result is a new-formed 'path'" ( I  I 86). These mechan- 
ical metaphors of currents and channels frame Prin+la and also 
provide a unifying thread. 
Nevertheless, despite the prominence of "neural processes," 
there are several good reasons for not regarding the phrase as 
holding the same meaning relationship to Prinqbies as "trains of 
motion in the animal spirits" holds with respect to Locke7s Essay. 
The first is a fact that historians of psychology have long recog- 
nized: although James began his teaching career with a post in 
physiology, had a laboratory, and kept himself up to date on new 
developments in the area, he was by inclination more committed 
to introspection than to experimentation, more committed to 
analyzing the contents of the mind than the structure of the brain. 
Edmund Boring, for instance, sees James as an ancestor of both 
behaviorism and Gestalt psychology, but an ancestor because of 
his emphasis on cognition rather than his notable experimental 
insights (514-16). The second reason is more important, espe- 
cially for a consideration of James7 language of the mind: the 
fundamental step of his method was a "plunge into the 'stream 
of consciousness"' made at the very beginning of the inquiry 
(Peters 687). The phrase "stream of consciousness" of course 
does not surface in Pnitqbles until chapter 9, "The Stream of 
Thought." But it pre-dates the book by at least six years, James 
having used it in his 1884 article "On Some Omissions of Intro- 
spective Psychology." In this article the phrase is much more 
prominent than in chapter 9. It comes early (on page z), is in the 
first sentence of a short paragraph, and leads into James' distinc- 
tion between the two components of mental life, the "resting- 
places" and the "places of flight.,' The phrase may be regarded as 
the leading point of James' vigorous criticism of the association- 
ist "demand for atoms of feeling," which he labels "an illegiti- 
mate metaphor" ("Omissions" I I). 
The straightforward structuring function of "stream of con- 
sc iou~ness~~  in the 1884 article becomes diffused in Princkles, but 
it is still visible. In chapter 9 itself, the diffusing effect results 
partly from a two-fold increase in length, partly from some un- 
helpful diagrams, partly from a toning down of the criticisms, 
and partly from more space given to brain processes. But the 
important concept of '>psychic overtone, sufiion, orf;ngen still OC- 
cupies an important place, and the references to the brain serve 
the analysis of the stream of consciousness, as here: "Our earlier 
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chapters have taught us to believe that, whilst we think, our brain 
changes, and that, like the aurora borealis, its whole internal 
equilibrium shifts with every pulse of change. . . . Every brain- 
state is partly determined by the nature of this entire past succes- 
sion. Alter the latter in any part, and the brain-state must be 
~. 
somewhat different. Each present brain-state is a record in which 
the eye of Omniscience might read all the foregone history of its 
owner" (Princj?les 228). Thus, James does not always place the 
physical before the psychological subject; sometimes the struc- 
ture of his sentences and of his larger units of discourse shows 
the influence or impression moving in the &her direction. By this 
reading, it is not correct to say that "James, the evolutionary 
naturalist, had to maintain that mental states grow out of physical 
states, in spite of whatever difficulties this view entails" 
(Earle 243). 
The significance of "stream of consciousness" can also be 
seen in the beginnings of several chapters and in sentences that 
refer both to the stream and to nerve currents. Variations on the 
phrase bolster coherence at the beginnings of chapters by re- 
minding the reader of what has been established previously be- 
fore introducing something new. In chapter 10, on conception, 
the first paragraph concludes thus: "'The same matters can be 
- - 
thought ofin successive portions ofthe mental stream, and some o f  these 
portions can know that they mean the same matters which the other 
portions meant.' One might put it otherwise by saying that 'the mind 
can always intend, and know when it inten&, to think of the Same"' 
(434). Rhetorically considered, the end of a first paragraph is one 
of the most important positions in a chapter or an essay; readers 
expect the note sounded there to continue throughout, and in- 
deed James fulfills this expectation in the pages that follow. 
The second paragraph of chapter 14, on association, begins, 
"The manner in which trains of imagery and consideration fol- 
low each other . . . the restless flight of one idea before the next 
. . . all this magical, imponderable streaming has from time im- 
memorial excited the admiration of all whose attention happened 
to be caught by its omnipresent mystery" (519). By using or 
echoing "stream of consciousness" to weave new chapters into 
the text, James gains more than surface coherence. Each new 
beginning recurs to and evokes the governing conceptions of 
Principles, thus helping to carry a reader through the 1,280 pages. 
Each functions as a resting-place for the reader to become pre- 
pared for the conceptual flight to follow. The references to con- 
sciousness streaming implicitly remind us that the governing 
conceptions have to do with thephenomena and conditions of Men- 
tal Life. 
Similarly, by linking references to stream of consciousness 
with references to neural processes, James gives to the former a 
more substantive role. I have already quoted his statement, "In 
- - 
the first place, the brain is essentially a place of currents, which 
run in organized paths" (78). One might reply to this that the 
brain is many more things than "essentially a place of currents17 
But the restricted, functional definition makes sense if James is 
being guided by a conception of the mind as first and foremost a 
stream of consciousness. If this is so, any description of the brain 
will have to suit that conception. The hypothesis that James is 
being guided in this way is supported by his discussion of the 
case of consciousness helping the "instable brain to compass its 
proper ends," that is, the case of consciousness intending a par- 
ticular end: "The nerve-currents, coursing through the cells and 
fibres, must be supposed strengthened by the fact of their awak- 
ing one consciousness and dampened by awaking another" 
(144). 
James was by no means the first psychologist to use the met- 
aphor of a stream to illustrate some aspect of mental life. Bain 
refers to "the great complex currents of each one's individual 
existence"; each individual's current "embraces all our actions, all 
our sensations, emotions, volitions, in the order of their occur- 
rence" (Senses, 3d ed., 450). Thomas Brown varied the metaphor- 
ical vehicle somewhat, reminding his audience in his nineteenth 
lecture, "The mind, in that central brain in which it is supposed 
to reside, communicating with all these extreme branches, has 
been compared, by a very obvious, but a very beautiful simili- 
tude, to the parent Ocean, receiving from innumerable distance 
the waters of its filial streams" (Lectures 185)- As early as 1792, 
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in the first volume of his Elements, Dugald Stewart wrote, "By 
means of the Association of Ideas, a constant current of thoughts, 
- 
if I may use the expression, is made to pass through the mind 
while we are awake" (2:266). But the continuation of this pas- 
sage shows that Stewart's conception of this stream was entirely 
different from James': "So completely, however, is the mind in 
this particular subjected to physical laws, that it has been justly 
observed, we cannot by an effort of our will call up any one 
thought, and that the train of our ideas depends on causes which 
operate in a manner inexplicable by us" (23266). 
These current and fluid metaphors share one key feature- 
they are all isolated occurrences, either isolated in the sense of 
being singular utterances (as in the Brown and Stewart ex- 
- - 
amples) or isolated from the writer's psychological theory (Bain7s 
currents remain essentially physiological). The examples from 
James, however, conform to the program made explicit in the 
opening sentence of Pnn+les and to the metaphor underlying 
that sentence: mind-as-a-living-being. James7 description of how 
consciousness controls the brain is especially suggestive in this 
regard; it implies a mind with the power and the will to make an 
impact on the physical world rather than an entity that simply 
has its seat in the skull. This metaphor, I suggest, though never 
enunciated as such by James, serves a generative function in his 
psychology. It suits his reaction against earlier atomistic psychol- 
ogy and his stress on the nature of cerebral life as a current 
(rather than on the equally plausible figure of a field, for ex- 
ample). It motivates his conception of the stream of conscious- 
ness as the most important element of mental life. Mind-as-a- 
living-being is the metaphor toward which Lewes may have been 
groping with his stress on sentience, the metaphor which could 
have vivified the mechanical stimulus and response models of 
Carpenter and Morell. In light of this metaphor, James' psychol- 
ogy may be read as fulfilling Reid's call for a science of the mind 
in the language of the mind. James demonstrates how the funda- 
- - 
mental term of subjective mental life-stream of comciousnars- 
can be translated into a term useful in understanding neural pro- 
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cesses-currents-and thus how the insights from physiology 
can be brought into psychology without dominating. 
One final piece of evidence in favor of reading Prinqbles as 
generated by the mind-as-a-living-being metaphor is its relation 
to the novels I have discussed. All of them represent in figurative 
language the psychological manifestation of physiological phe- 
nomena and the physiological manifestation of psychological 
phenomena. The attention paid to this part of life becomes more 
pronounced in the later writers; they begin to show the mind less 
as a relatively passive, relatively malleable substance and more 
as a living, thinking, willing being. The following examples, dis- 
cussed in earlier chapters, can speak for themselves as a con- 
densed history of the shift in fiction to a new metaphor of mind: 
I. These things oppressed my mind. [Defoe] 
2. It would be impossible to say . . . which of all [Emma's] unpleasant 
sensations was uppermost. [Austen] 
3. [M]y soul began to expand, to exult. [Bronte] 
4. [For Strether, a day in Paris] had really been the process of feeling 
the stirred life of connections long since individually dropped. 
[Henry James] 
This new metaphorical conception led to representations that 
more vividly and expressively reflected the increasing emphasis 
on subjective experiences of all kinds, especially the experience 
of sometimes seeming to have a whole world within our heads 
that operates by laws very different from those of the external 
physical world. 
While the metaphor helped generate such verbal devices as 
the stream of consciousness, the mindscape, and the sentient 
web, it did not lead to a new governing psychological theory. As 
Allan Buss suggests, the history of psychology may make the 
most sense when seen as an oscillation between two paradigms: 
( I )  Person Consnucts Reality and (2) Reality Constructs Person (59). 
The metaphorical shift I have described constitutes a shift from 
the second to the first, in which reakty means external, physical 
reality either impressing itself on the passive mental substance or 
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being reconstituted within the individual by an active mind and 
its associated sentient processes. The mind-as-a-living-being 
metaphor, as I have shown, could at best share the field with 
mind-as-entity; paradigm (2) has remained somewhat plausible 
and at times quite useful. The result: a psychology for which no 
single metaphor can serve a theory-constitutive function. Or  it 
may be that a study of the twentieth century's languages of the 
mind will reveal such a metaphor, perhaps even one that fulfills 
the autonomy thesis while maintaining contact with our every- 
day folk-psychological language. 
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compared to Austen, 85; compared 
to Mill, 113; compared to Spencer, 
122; figurative language of, 9-1 1; 
language of, compared to William 
James, 233; Lectures on the Philoso- 
phy ofthe Human Mind, 10; mind- 
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tual operations, 75-76; necessary 
for normal development, 75; and 
nerve paths, 1 16- 17; as percep- 
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Dickens, 178-79; criticized by 
Coleridge, 1-2, 10-1 1; of Dickens, 
175-77; in Emma, 81; of empiri- 
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life of the mind: in Bronte, 146; in 
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231; image of mind as a corpuscu- 
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teenth century, 48; of interest in 
nineteenth century, 47; irrational 
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mental faculties, 7, 42, 77. See aho 
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mental physiology, 43; defined by 
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guage of, 12 
mental states, 10, 11, 24-25; in 
George Eliot, 208, 210; inJane 
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states, 118; in William James, 232 
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24-25, 35; contextual approach to, 
25,26,28-36; dead, 22-24,34-35; 
defined by Soskice, 17; detection 
of, 21; and inexpressibility, 24-25; 
semantic deviance approach, 22, 
26-28; semantic need for, 23; and 
simile, 21; vividness of, 24-25, 35 
metaphor-intention, 25 
metaphors of mind, as a problem, 2, 
12, 15, 21, 25, 35 
Miall, David, 26 
Mill, John Stuart, 106, 132; compared 
to George Eliot, 206, 213; com- 
pared to Morell, 117; compared to 
Spencer, 124; on the laws of mind, 
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tal states; soul 
-mental and spiritual aspects of: as 
active, 12; active and passive, 7, 
48; as an active being, 87; as an ac- 
tive entity, 73; active power of, 78- 
79; awakened by external world, 
75; as a complex being, 136; con- 
nected to God, 135-36; faculties of, 
7; growth of, in Bronte, 144; im- 
material and unique, 31, 34; as in- 
divisible, 66; inseparable from life, 
125-26, 134; percipient principle 
of, 54-56; powers of, 87; as a sen- 
tient web, 235; as a sentient web, 
in George Eliot, 200, 203-26; as a 
sentient web, in Henry James, 183; 
as a thinking substance, 136; unex- 
tended and indivisible, 6; as unity, 
48; unity of, in nineteenth century, 
110 
-physical characteristics of: ability 
to expand or rise, 58; and brain, 
100; as container, 33; as corpuscu- 
lar system, 61; defined by Hume, 
53; divided against itself, 66; ex- 
tended and tangible, 32; as ex- 
tended substance, 83, 105; flow 
divisible and extended, 9; flow of 
feelings in, 58; impressibility of, 
47; impressibility of, in Dickens, 
161, 167, 174; and impressions, 
1 17-18; imprinting of ideas on, 13; 
as localized, 87; and molecular 
changes, 126-27; movement of 
thoughts within, 57; as passive, 13, 
61; as a passive, impressible entity, 
in Henry James, 187-88; as passive 
and impressible, 46,47; passive na- 
ture of, 78; as a passive substance, 
in George Eliot, 206; physical lo- 
cation of, 117; as a physical sys- 
tem, 71,76, 180; as a physiological 
entity, 74-1 11; as presence-room, 
35, 63; qualities of, 13; sensorium 
in, 54-55; as separable from the 
self, in Bronte, 145-46; as sub- 
stance, 6, 117-20; substance and 
extension of, 58; and surfaces, 141; 
as tangible, 7 
mind, development of, 48; active 
power in, 75; in Austen, 82; in me- 
land, 77 
mind-as-a-living-being, 37, 236; as a 
generative metaphor, 87, 134; in 
Henry James, 184; in William 
James, 227, 234-35 
mind-as-entity, 2, 7, 37; defined by 
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connotations of, 55,78; limitations 
and problems of, 13-14,47,55, 
135; and the sublime, 55-57 
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86; in Bronte, 142-46, 148, 150-51, 
156-57; in Bronte and Dickens, 
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ence in Thtrarn Shandy, 70; in 
Dickens, 162, 165, 167, 171, 174; 
in George Eliot, 205-6, 207,2 12- 
13,214, 218-17, 221-22; in Henry 
James, 182, 187-70, 177; preserved 
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teenth-century novels, 60; use by 
Poe, 47; in Wordsworth, 78 
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faculties, 73; and development of 
the mind, 48; in eighteenth-century 
psychology, 46; influence on Bain, 
77, 100-103, 105, 108; influence on 
textbooks, 72; in Lewes, 126-28, 
131; in Locke, 228; in Mill, 113, 
1 15; in Morel], 1 16-19; in nine- 
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chology, 80-8 1; in nineteenth-cen- 
tury psychology, 17; and 
perception, 51; in philosophical 
psychology, 11 1-32; in physiology, 
43; in psychology, 70-71; in Spen- 
cer, 120-24; Stewart's use of, 15; in 
William James, 229 
-theory-constitutive function of, 37, 
48, 105, 110, 228; in Bain, 108; in 
Bronte and Dickens, 136; in Car- 
penter, 97; in Dickens, 139-40; in 
Locke, 49; in Pamela, 60-63; in 
nineteenth-century psychology, 94, 
132-34; and passive-impression 
theory, 51; in Sterne, 67, 74; in 
Upham, 76,87 
mind-body problem: avoided by Eliot 
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118; Bain on, 99-105; Mill on, 113 
mind-in-landscape, 37 
mindscape, 134,235; in Henry James, 
184; in Upham, 87 
models, related to metaphors, 40-43 
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guage of, 116-18; language of, 
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Morell, 116 
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of, 121 
neural physiology, 179; of Bain, 100- 
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neural processes, William James on, 
227-30 
neurophysiologists, 22 
neurophysiology, 87 
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and theory-constitutive metaphor, 
38-39 
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Bronte and Dickens, 136; of 
Lewes, 126, 128, 131-32; of Spen- 
cer, 121 
novel metaphors, 23,28-29 
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agency of the senses in, 61; de- 
scribed, 51; in Dickens, 168; and 
mental structure, 52; used by 
Sterne, 67 
Pepper, Stephen, 37 
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Bronte, 149-50; caused by impres- 
sions, 34; hypotheses of, 14,35-3% 
as sensual experience, in Henry 
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phenomena of the mind: and analogi- 
cal language, 15; Bain's discussion 
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philosophical psychology, and mind- 
as-entity, 11 1-32 
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the mind, 35,48, 63 
psychiatry, 90-92 
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36,38 
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175; defined by Lewes, 125-27; de- 
fined by William James, 229; of 
Dickens, 136-37, 139-40, 158-75; 
eighteenth-century, 45; figurative 
language of, 48; Freudian, 18; as 
the fundamental science, 89; of 
George Eliot, 203; as a moral en- 
deavor, 12; nineteenth-century, 89, 
97; pre-Freudian, 18-20; scientific, 
dominated by mind-as-entity, 88; 
Spencer's approach to, 122; subject 
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Upham, 58; Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers ofMan, 5-7; An Inquiry into 
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Locke and Hartley, 35; on the 
mind's powers, 87 
Reinhart, Tanya, 27, 28 
repression, in Bronte, 146 
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98-99; of Eliot and James, 136, 
180; and generative metaphor, 38- 
40; of Lewes, 125-26, 128; of 
Spencer, 122-23 
Richards, I. A., 17, 19 
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root metaphor, 37 
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86; in Bronte, 152-56; in Henry 
James, 195-200; occupying mental 
space, 82. See also sentience 
Senseman, Wilfred, 151 
sensibility, in Henry James, 181-83 
sensibility, laws of, defined by Lewes, 
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sensorium, 78, 109; defined by Rees, 
54; denied by Bain, 106; Lewes on, 
126-27, 130-31; located in the cere- 
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51, 54; as passive, 55 
sentience: in Bronte, 141, 142, 144, 
148; in Henry James, 182-83; as 
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30 
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speech-act, as metaphor, 26 
Spencer, Herbert, 89, 132, 134, 180, 
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Shandy, 70 
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sublime, 55-57, 59 
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theory-constitutive metaphor, 19,43; 
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of, 7 
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